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RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN THE U.S.A.

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INTRODUCTION

This work represents an attempt to find an answer to the question: how do the specific features of religion affect the ideological and political aspects of the social conflicts in the U.S.A.

Social conflicts, even of one and the same kind, as, for example, between the landowner and the industrial bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie and the working class, have different ideological and political forms in different bourgeois countries. Social conflicts in France and the U.S.A., countries of approximately the same level of economic and cultural development, have always differed remarkably. One of these countries has, in modern times, adopted a new constitution almost 15 times, the other only one; one has gone through 4 bourgeois revolutions, while the other had just one; a mass communist party is active in the first, while in the second the communist party had no such mass character and the organized labor movement has a definite complexion of narrow trade-unionism; in one, there is an intricate and multifarious party system, while in the other, there are 2 main parties hard to differentiate.

We could enumerate further. These are the differences of interrelated systems characteristics, although sometimes only very painstaking research is able to establish the systems interrelationship of what, at first, seem completely heterogeneous elements of bourgeois societies.

Meanwhile, in continuing our comparison of the characteristics of various bourgeois societies, we shall inevitably come to the vital factor of religion. France is not only the country of 4 bourgeois revolutions, an intricate party system and a mass communist party; it is also a Catholic country, where, as Engels wrote, "the Calvinist minority was suppressed in 1685 and either Catholicised or driven out of the country"(8; 374)[1] as the result of the bloody

[1] The figures in brackets in italics represent the number of the work in the list of references given at the end of the book, then comes the page number (Ed.'s note).

civil wars.(Since the 17th century and up to the present day, Protestants constitute an insignificant minority of the population in France.)

The U.S.A. is not only a country with one permanent constitution, 2 main bourgeois parties, etc.; it is a Protestant country with a vast religious pluralism from the very beginning, in which, in the words of Marx, "the endless fragmentation of religion ... gives it even *externally* the form of a purely individual affair" *(4;* 155), a country to which bourgeois anti-clericalism has been virtually unknown, and, nowadays, a country with huge figures of religious statistics. Are the features of the religious life of various countries in the past and the present linked to the peculiarities of their political systems, parties, working-class organizations, etc.? Although the very existence of such a link is obvious, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate it, to disclose its nature.

This problem falls into 3 divisions:

1) the role of religion in the genesis of a given bourgeois society, i.e., whether religion was conducive to the formation of that society, or else this society sprang up in the struggle with religion; and what peculiarities of religion its role in society is linked with;

2) the role of religion in the workings of a given society: whether it is a force which unites and integrates society, or it tears society apart; its relationship with the prevailing bourgeois ideology and the ideology of other social classes and groups, and how it affects the ideological and political aspects of social struggles;

3) the role of secularization in a given bourgeois society. (We shall deal with the concept of secularization in somewhat greater detail at a later stage.)

Our work is constructed along these lines; a special section is dedicated to examining the links of the specific features of religion in the U.S.A. with those of the working-class movement there.

This work does not lay claim to providing the definitive answer to all these questions. Only some of the relationships of the U.S.A.'s religious and other social, political and cultural characteristics are obvious. The majority of them are obscure and invisible, and can be brought to light only after a great deal of special research.

It is obvious that this set of problems cannot generally be solved once and for all—further research will bring to light new and ever more complex interrelationships. But then, this set of problems is such that it cannot be solved on American material alone. Indeed, although religion

is important, it is just one of the factors influencing the country's life. Its role and that of the other factors can only be singled out in a series of comparative studies. For example, which characteristics of the ideological and political aspect of the U.S.A.'s social conflicts come from the Calvinist tradition and which from the emergence of American society from colonialization can be more or less definitely identified only after a series of successive comparisons of the U.S.A. with other societies with a Calvinist tradition (the Swiss Calvinist cantons, Scotland, Holland, the Boer states) and other societies born of colonialization (South America, Australia, the South African Republic, New Zealand, Canada). Only the first steps have been taken in the States in applied comparative studies of the U.S.A. and other countries These preliminary steps have, however, already yielded very interesting results. (See the works of Louis Hartz—*105*, and Seymour Lipset— *133.)* We intend to take just a small step in this direction, to highlight only the more visible relationships lying on the surface. Many of our conclusions will inevitably be preliminary and hypothetical.

Part I

RELIGION AND THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN BOURGEOIS SOCIETY

I. The Concept of Secularization. The Various Ways of Secularization

It is impossible to speak of contemporary religion, especially of its development, leaving aside the process of secularization. All, from the professional theologian to the professional atheist, are agreed that the modern era is the era of secularization. Meanwhile, what secularization is, what its causes are, even what its visible signs are, all this is far from being obvious and, moreover, harder to identify in some cases precisely because of the apparency of secularization (see the article by L. Shiner for the various meanings of this term—*185)*. It is, in our opinion, essential to recognize the deep-going, fundamental mainstay of secularization, along with its various external manifestations. Firstly, wherein lies the essence of secularization?

Man's inability to satisfy his inherent needs, to control either nature (both external nature as far as it is without cognition, and his own biological nature—it is impossible for man to ward off old age, death, to completely master his instincts), or the primordial social processes, finds an outlet in myths and magic. These give the illusion of satisfying the needs which left unfilled would lead to despair and impotence with the very idea of the impossibility of fulfillment. Myths and magic give man a kind of confidence in himself, in controlability of the world, in the ultimate satisfaction of all needs. They are, therefore, of enormous psychological significance. Any form of mythology represents wishful thinking and, therefore, is expressed, however vaguely, in the assertions tested ultimatelv bv life itself. It, however, clashes with the ever expanding body of knowledge, which contradicts the given mythology. Since knowledge cannot be discarded, the old myth should be. But rejection of the old myth does not necessarilv mean rejection of myth in general.

Only when new knowledge not merely destroys the old myth, but does indeed fulfill those demands which the old myth gave the illusion of satisfying, will the myth

simply disappear. Thus, agricultural technology killed off agricultural mythology and magic, which had a very wide following in its day; thus, today's fishing fleets do not perform magical rites when weighing anchor; and metallurgy gets along fine without its gods and saints—the patrons of the smiths.

But what if knowledge, having destroyed the old myth, does not in fact satisfy man's needs? The opposition of myth and knowledge is, in this case, understood as a particularly racking psychological conflict. If, in the mythological systems, the gods on Mount Olympus, or the God in Heaven, were guarantors of the supreme justice, if they were able to grant man victory over the vicissitudes of fate and death, then, in the system where knowledge prevails, Olympus is merely a mountain, and Heaven, the infinite cosmos, granting neither supreme justice, nor victory over death. The conflict between knowledge and the myth becomes bitterly painful. Nevertheless, this conflict must be resolved.

Just as the myth in general, or the principle of the myth, is expressed in infinitely diverse mythological forms, correspondingly, the process of destroying and transforming the myth is expressed in an infinite variety of ways. Nevertheless, in our opinion, we can name two basic alternatives for the outcome of the conflict between the old myth and new knowledge, where new knowledge does not satisfy the needs expressed in the myth.

The first is to transform and revalue the old mythological symbols. The mythological symbol, expressing some human need or other, is always rather vague, for the main thing about it is precisely its ability to satisfy a need, not an allusion. Accordingly, the mythological symbol may, as it were, be extended within certain limits under the influence of knowledge. Myths escape verification: gods escape on Olympus and then Heaven, and subsequently Heaven turns out to be immaterial, and the gods themselves, at first with hands and feet, then becoming invisible, are incorporeal accordingly. This process cannot go on forever: trie mythological symbol deprived of its primary concrete substance dies away. The span of this extension may, however, be very great. The symbols of Zeus and the other gods were evolved and transformed from the time of Homer to the philosophy of the neoplatonists. The symbols of Christian mythology, which were conceived in the depths of antiquity, give us cause for reflection and reconsideration today.

The second alternative is discarding the old mythological svmbols, and (insofar as nature and the social processes

are beyond our control) to construct a new mythology, which, naturally, is not regarded as mythology. Thus, in ancient times, the neoplatonists, in preserving the exterior symbols, saw the pagan myth not as containing a literal meaning, but as allegories pregnant with profound meaning. The Christians considered these myths as mere fables, but regarded their own, that of the resurrection of Christ, as fact. Contemporary Protestant theologians subtilize the Christian myth as far as possible, while the Maoist treats Christianity as a mere fable, and the greatness of Mao Zedong as a self-evident fact.

The result is the same in both cases—a system is created which does not contradict the level of knowledge attained in the given society or social group, thus giving the illusion of satisfying man's unsatisfied needs.

These processes, whereby knowledge fully supplants the myth, where knowledge, as opposed to the myth, does really satisfy man's needs which the myth gave the illusion of satisfying, and whereby the old myths are reconsidered and new ones are created, when knowledge, having destroyed the old myth, turns out to be incapable of satisfying the needs the myth expressed, have been going on throughout the entire history of mankind and continue today. When Christianity supplanted the primitive heathen mythology and the neoplatonists reinterpreted it a definite stage in this process was marked. In the same way, the supplanting of Christianity by various forms of non-Christian bourgeois ideology and the present-day transformation of Christianity represent a later stage in this process.

Contemporary secularization is linked to the development of modern science, whose foundations are mathematics and experimentation, and is characterized by the unusually high tempo of these processes due to the accelerated accumulation of knowledge.

Thus, the deep-going, fundamental process of secularization has, on the surface, various forms: completely supplanting the myth from certain spheres of life, transforming myths, and exchanging some of the myth for other less obvious and more rational ones. The researcher should, therefore, take great care and strive not to confuse the deep-going process of secularization with its external manifestations. Thus, a fall in the statistics for religious beliefs and activities does not necessarily mean secularization—it might mean that the given religious mythology is supplanted by some other mythology. Similarly, the stability of religious mythological symbols and religious statistics, or even rise in the latter, does not necessarily mean that there is no secularization. Secularization

can take place in a latent form, through a revaluation of religious symbols and without effecting their external form for the time being. In a word, secularization is always present when there is a growth in knowledge, a development in science, a progressive development of society. However, only concrete research can determine what expresses secularization. It is especially important to differentiate between the essence and the external manifestations of secularization in the case of the U.S.A.—a country whose entire history has taken place in an era of the rapid development of science and technology, and, at the same time, a country where religious symbols and the statistics of religion have hardly changed at all.

But how can one explain why secularization takes this or that form, or goes along this or that path?

One of the most important factors determining which path secularization follows is obviously the specific features of a religion interacting and conflicting with new knowledge, its flexibility and capability of inward change in accordance with the new knowledge and needs. It is secularization from within that delays its demise. The more rigid a religion, the greater the danger the growth of knowledge holds for it and the more actively it hinders the growth and spread of knowledge or any change in general. It thereby slows up development and imparts it an explosive character. Correspondingly, on the other hand, the greater a religion's elasticity, the less danger new knowledge presents for it and the less it hinders the growth and development of knowledge as a whole. The process of secularization in this case is smoother and more evolutionary.

2. Protestantism and Secularization

Of all the existing religions, the Protestant variation of Christianity is obviously the most adapted to secularization from within, the most flexible, the stablest in relation to new knowledge, and, correspondingly, the least hindering its development. As this is the prevailing religious ideology in the U.S.A. we must dwell on its specific features in more detail in order to understand the role of religion in this country.

F. Engels wrote that *"every* religious movement was *formally a reaction,* an alleged return to the old, simple customs" (9; 74). Reformation was just that alleged return to the old.

The fact of the matter is that although the ideology of the Reformation, as we are attempting to show, was a

principally new form of religious ideology, its cardinal pivot was that it was not in the least conceived as something new, but as the original purity of Christianity, as established in the Scriptures. In our opinion, the principle of the absolute primacy of the Scriptures can well serve to differentiate between Reformation ideologies proper and those quasi-Reformation forms which the Reformation gave rise to. These are the sectarian movements which, like the main trends of the Reformation, proclaimed their return to early Christianity, but which, at the same time, supplemented the Scriptures with new revelations, and semi-religious forms, such as Hussitism or the early High Church Anglicanism, which did not fully cast off the tradition.

Luther and the other Reformers strove not to speak on their own but to stick to the Bible in their teachings. This idea of returning to the primary source is obviously as immanent to any religious dogmatic ideology as is the departure itself from the primary source, and the Christian Reformation is similar to such movements in other religions as Wahhabi movement or Karaism. Consequently, the idea of reformation in itself as a return to the primary source, and, of course, the primary source itself, which is common both to Protestantism and other branches of Christianity, were neither new nor unique in the ideology of the Reformation. What was new and unique was the combination of both—it was reformation applied to Christianity, and Christianity viewed as a means of reformation. Consequently, if we are to understand what in the ideological currents born of the Reformation makes them so flexible, so adaptable to secularization from within, we must examine several specific characteristics of early Christian ideology recorded in the Scriptures, the characteristics owing to which the Reformationist review of the Scriptures had the results that were far off the attempts to structure the entire life on the Koran or the Pentateuch.

The paradoxical idea of the relationship between God and man is found only in the Christian mythology. The founder of Christianity is conceived, on the one hand, as a being higher than the founders of other religions—neither a prophet like Mohammed, nor a wise man like Confucius, but simply God. Likewise, his function is conceived as particularly grand, cosmic; he not only delivered the true teaching, and pointed out the correct path in life, but directly triumphed over death and the devil. On the other hand, he was a man, close to the dregs of society, who achieved no obvious success in life, and, what is

more, was crucified. As a matter of fact, these characteristics are interrelated. Absolute misfortune on earth will not shake man's faith only if it is regarded as a heavenly cosmic victory. So God is brought nearer to man (in other religions God does not become man), yet, at the same time, he is utterly estranged from man. Because God is mortal and is crucified on the cross, he in a way shows utter disregard for the normal state of things on earth. This, to a certain extent, makes him seem more beyond this world than those gods who never walked the earth and by this non-intrusion sanction the existing order on earth. In accordance with this, the early Christian teachings, as reflected in the New Testament, set divine and mortal values in extreme opposition to each other. "My kingdom is not of this world", and everything which "this world" values is nothing in the eyes of God. Neither notability, nor wealth, nor learning, nor the formal righteousness of the Pharisees can grant man salvation.

On the one hand, such a doctrine was more attractive, especially to the oppressed strata of society. Yet on the other, it contained an anti-dogmatic potential, and, of course, in its original form it not only could not become the prevalent doctrine in society, but was incapable of creating any lasting religious system. Therefore, Christianity, while turning from a persecuted sect into a Church organization, was undergoing transformations that in the end literally reversed its original values. While, according to early Christianity, truth reveals itself to the naive understanding of a child, rather than to the learning of the scribes, subsequently, a very complex and abstract theological system was created. While early Christianity rejected the formal righteousness of the Pharisees, in the later period a tiny mistake in carrying out religious rites became a deadly sin. While Jesus is seen as a man opposing the authority of organized religion, subsequently, an organized Church was set up which had a strict ideological discipline and which mercilessly dealt with heretics. The "kingdom" of early Christianity was "not of this world", yet subsequently, popes made claims for temporal authority over the world. And just as Christianity was originally more non-formalistic and anti-dogmatic than other religions, it became more dogmatic, more formalistic as an accomplished system. The burning of heretics at the stake was a phenomenon peculiar to Christianity. Dogmatism and formalism would seem to compensate for the original antidogmatism and non-formalism.

However, it is not only the matter of the original traits. The point is that the anti-dogmatism and non-formalism

of early Christianity are recorded in the Scriptures. The Scriptures can be reinterpreted, hidden away, but they cannot be destroyed, nor can any errors be found in them. The Scriptures, therefore, always posed a potential threat to the Church (that is why it tried to keep them from the layman). Yet once the non-formalistic elements of the Scriptures are not rejected but merely reinterpreted, this means they are latently present in theology itself. The idea of a fundamentally inscrutable God lies behind scholastic wisdom. The idea that the effectiveness of all this formalism depends on an absolutely non-formal condition, the love of God, lies behind the dry formalism of magical actions which guarantee salvation. These deep-buried strata of ideology press upon the upper strata precisely because these upper strata are so rigid and so strikingly differ from the deep ones.

It is this contradiction of developed Christianity, the combination of extreme formalism and non-formalism, which was the source of its flexibility and strength and helped it triumph and assert its supremacy. However, like any contradiction, it was fraught with explosive situations.

The history of the evolution of Christianity is that of the departure from original non-formalism both attractive and dangerous at the same time, the history of the building of an enormous theological, exegetic, organizational, and ritual fence around the Scriptures. The logical outcome of this process was that it was forbidden to translate the Bible into spoken languages, the Vulgate was canonized and laymen were even forbidden to read the Bible themselves. However, this process was simultaneously that of the accumulation of explosive, reformationist potential. Indeed, the more powerful and complex the dogma, the more culture and knowledge the theologians have to possess, but this means they will see the evergrowing contradiction between dogma and the Scriptures all the sooner. The stricter the organization, the more its members are subjugated to it, but this means the sooner the devotion to the organization can be switched over to the ideal of the organization, and the sooner there can be rebellion against the organization in the name of the ideal. The more humiliated the layman and the further he is from the Scriptures, the sooner he will rise up against this humiliation. The richer the organization, tne more strikingly its original poverty stands out against the background of its present wealth. The greater the claims of the Church on temporal power, the sooner temporal

power will rise up against the Church.

The Western and the Eastern Churches found themselves in very different historical situations after the fall of the West Roman Empire. The decentralized Church in the East (with a number of equal patriarchs) found itself in opposition to centralized temporal power. The centralized Church in the West, on the other hand, found itself in opposition to a number of weak states, which were at loggerheads with each other. It was these differing conditions which led to the gradual accumulation of ideological and organizational differences, and eventually to complete rupture.

The existence of the single religious center allowed the Western Church to become further separated from the layman (unmarried Catholic priests), and to become centralized. This also allowed the Western Church to develop its dogma further and render it more complex, for the single center of the Church acted as a body capable of taking decisions on questions of dogma. Consequently, it could more or less safely formulate new issues and stand up to the inevitably ensuing discord. (In the Orthodox Church, on the contrary, it became practically impossible to hold ecumenical councils once the Orthodox patriarchs found themselves in different states. The unity of the Church could only be preserved by not diverging one iota from the position the Church was in at the time of the last ecumenical council.) This enabled the Western Church to achieve independence from temporal power, unthinkable for Orthodoxy, and even a considerable measure of dependence of temporal authority on the Church. In a word, the Western Catholic Church was going further along the path leading from the original ideology, the path of further formalization and hierarchy. This, in turn, meant it had set off along the path leading to the Reformation.

Explosive potential had accumulated inside the Western Catholic world by the 16th century. New social forces (the urban strata, the pre-bourgeoisie), discontented by the layman's subordinate position in the Church, grew in a society where the continual struggle between temporal power and the Church prevented the social structure from ossifying. Scholasticism had reached a deadlock, the fact that it ran contrary to the Scriptures becoming more and more obvious. Knowledge was accumulating within the monastic orders and Church hierarchy, making reference to the original source unavoidable. As always happens in such cases, an apparently insignificant event, a public statement by a young monk and theologian in a god-forsaken province, sparked off the explosion of the Reformation. In the words

of Marx, "the revolution ... began in the brain of the *monk* " (5, 182).

Racked by all the contradictions of Church dogma, Luther broke away towards the paradoxy of the early Christian myth buried deep under dogma. He was, as Calvin later was, in a way bewitched by this paradoxy and by the opportunity he found in the early Christian myth to get rid of the dogma and the spiritual domination of the Church. The paradoxical character of the early Christian myth gives him the strength to set himself up against the entire Church.

Just as God of immeasurable greatness was able to hold all human values in contempt and die on the cross precisely on the strength of this greatness, which means that all human values and concepts are of no significance to Him, that they are not essential, so now He could speak not through the Pope, or the Sorbonne, but through Luther. The Pope was no higher than Luther before His greatness. "If God spoke by an ass against a prophet, why should He not speak by a pious man against the Pope?" *(137;* 284-85). "Now God is the sort of person who likes to do what is foolish and useless in the eyes of the world," writes Luther *(137;* 336). This break towards the paradoxy of the early Christian myth not only provided the foundation for the Reformist carried out by Luther and Calvin. It also had significantly wider consequences: the revitalized non-formalistic potential latent in this myth, objectively and in many respects against the will of the Reformers themselves, prevented the creation of a new rigid system of dogma and organization and led to the appearance of a basically new form of religious ideology and organization open to secularization, which all conforms to the new bourgeois society.

Let us now examine how the non-formalistic potential of the Christian mythology is revitalized in the ideology of the Reformation. For this purpose we shall conventionally divide the doctrines of the Reformers into 2 basic problematic groups: where the knowledge of how to attain salvation is taken from, and what does one have to do to attain salvation.

This division is indeed conventional, because the Reformers consider that knowledge and salvation itself as basically inseparable. They could not allow the thought that there might exist a man who correctly understands where and in what salvation lies, yet is not saved.

The problem of the sources of knowledge. First of all, let us examine the Reformist point of departure, what it is they set their doctrine up against, i.e., what the

Catholic interpretation of the doctrinal sources is.

Catholicism has two equally valid doctrinal sources—the Scriptures and tradition. The absolute truth, passed on to the Church by its founder, was transmitted partly in writing, partly in the form of oral tradition, which, naturally, could not contradict each other, for both stem from the one source, which is Truth. However, taken by themselves, in isolation from the Church, neither the Scriptures nor tradition are Truth. Both the Scriptures and tradition, as is known, may be heretical. The truth of the Scriptures and tradition is guaranteed by the fact that they are the Scriptures and the tradition of the Church, which is infallible, for through it speaks the Holy Spirit, God, i.e., again the very same source of the Scriptures and tradition. It is implied that the doctrines of the Church primordially contained all the Church dogmas subsequently adopted and contain those yet to be adopted. The external, obvious indication that a certain postulation belongs in Church creed is the explicit recognition of it by the Church, basically, by decisions officially adopted by the Church and, by their very essence, contradicting neither the Scriptures, nor tradition, nor one another.

This kind of epistemology that pivots around the idea that the Church commands the entire absolute truth mitigates early Christianity's concept of the limitations of the human mind vis-a-vis the infinite divine reason. Correspondingly, it also mitigates the early Christian non-formalism, for in the process of cognition, the intermediary between God and man is the organization. This organization, on the one hand, is completely real and historical, yet on the other, "divine", the mystical "corpus Christi". Such epistemology allowed a great many elements objectively contradicting the Scriptures to be incorporated into Church doctrine. This comprises, on the one hand, the many-fold magical and mythological garb accumulated by Christianity in its transition from the milieu of the Judaic poor, brought up in a strict monotheistic tradition, to that of the poor of the Greco-Roman towns, then to the villages of the Roman Empire, and finally to the barbarians, whose cultural past contrasted sharply to that of the early followers of Christianity. It comprises, on the other hand, what Christianity acquired in its transition to the highly cultured stratum of Roman society in the period of patristic studies and as a result of the culture amassed by the Church intelligentsia of the Middle Ages. Magical ceremonies for calling up the rain and scholastic knowledge are, naturally, essentially different elements of Church learning. They are, however, interrelated

elements, two sides of the same coin, for the more irrational, mythological and magical elements, the more complex and artful the constructions have to be which make them acceptable to the cultured elite.

Such incorporation into a doctrine of elements which are not contained in the Scriptures, on the face of it enhances the importance of human knowledge, for the results of this, if acknowledged by the Church, are, as it were, placed on the same level with a "revelation" contained in the Scriptures. The limits of the "revelation" are eroded, and Aristotle, a theologian or some saint or other who has had a vision, since they are recognized by the Church, have virtually no less authority than the Bible. But since the Church is infallible and everything it recognizes as truth is of absolute significance, then every achievement of the human intellect recognized by the Church, will fetter the intellect. The intellect is fettered not only by the Bible, but by the entire doctrine elaborated by the Church, and, most importantly, by its absolute dependence on the judgement of the Church. The believer is not very afraid of the Scriptures; he is impressed by the boldness of the scholastics proving "logically and mathematically" the dogma of the Trinity, and the boldness of the mystic ascetics who are in direct contact with the Divinity. The believer, however, knows that no matter how obvious the results of his knowledge be to him, he must immediately renounce them should the Church examine them and find an error.

The Reformers countered this doctrine with the principle of the Scriptures being the only source of faith. Just as God is immeasurably greater than all earthly things, so the divine truths bearing man's salvation are immeasurably greater than the human intellect. Independent efforts on the part of the human mind are absolutely incapable of understanding them. God revealed them to people, and they were once and for all recorded in the Scriptures—their one and only source.

It is, therefore, not the Church, prompted by the Holy Spirit, that determines what the Scriptures are and what they contain (the Reformers reject the supernatural attributes of the real historical Church and proclaim the "holiness" of all believers). Just the opposite is true—the Scriptures determine what the Church is, i.e., insofar as the doctrine of the Church corresponds to the Scriptures it is the Church *(68;* 94). In his polemics with the Papists, referring to the fact that Paul called the Church the "pillar of truth," Calvin wrote: "If the Church 'is the pillar of truth', it follows that the

Church is not with them, when the truth not only lies buried, but is shockingly torn and thrown and trampled under foot." *(66;* 91).

One can only believe in the revelation of the Scriptures (in the fact that they have been revealed, that they impart truths, which man is not capable of perceiving himself) and one can believe in the revelation of the Scriptures alone. The belief in something else, even if it were the decision of a Church synod, is substitution of mortal for the divine, the sin of idolatry. The attempts of scholastics to rationally interpret, and, as it were, to justify revelation, and the case of Catholic doctrine declaring the wise men of antiquity as coming close to or anticipating revelation, are all satanic pride. Revelation cannot be rationally grounded, neither can one draw close to it. It can either be taken entirely for granted, or rejected.

Such glorification of the Scriptures meant the human intellect was humiliated to the extreme. It was based on the idea that reason was completely incapable of understanding the "redeeming truth". Paradoxically, it was this glorification that contained the potential of emancipation and triumph of reason inconceivable before. Then how did this come about with the Reformers?

In the first place, in acknowledging the Scriptures as the only source of faith, the intellect is freed from the fetters of the Church authority and its dogma. Out of the entire mass of dogmatic authorities of the Middle Ages, the Bible remains the only absolute one, with which the believer finds himself face to face. But couldn't it be that the human intellect is falling prey to an even worse form of enslavement, by the Bible, the Scriptures?

There was that tendency. But the Reformist treatment of the Bible is a specific, paradoxical phenomenon containing a powerful anti-dogmatic impulse which, in the final count, turned out to be stronger than that tendency.

First of all, let us consider who determined, according to the logic of the Reformers, that the Bible was the Holy Scriptures. The answer to this is obvious for Catholics: the Church determined this. The Reformers, however, have a rather more complicated answer. The Bible, for them, is self-determining - its hol

of the Scriptures are in practice transmuted by their antithesis. Luther himself constantly said he was insignificant and had no right whatsoever to independent thought. "...If you are convinced that Luther's teaching is in accord with the Gospel and that the pope's is not ... you should ... say: Whether Luther is a rascal or a saint I do not care, his teaching is not his, but Christ's" *(137;* 265). Yet he was so bold as to define the limits of the Canon, something which would have been inconceivable earlier, rejecting, for example, on the basis of well-reasoned human arguments, that the Apocrypha were part of the Scriptures. The intellect, which seemed to nave been driven out and declared "the devil's whore" turned out to be the supreme judge determining the limits of the Canon.

This, naturally, concerns not only the limits of the Canon. For these limits are defined on the basis of the content, the meaning of the text. Who is it that defines the meaning of the text? Once again—it is reason. The Reformers resolutely changed the principles of text analysis, rejecting the medieval Catholic idea of the multiple meaning and complexity of the text of the Scriptures perceived as a code which can only be understood within the traditional Church interpretation. Butzer, leader of the Reformation in Strasbourg, expressed this very well when he said: "Because I wish that this trifling allegorizing could be altogether ejected from the Churches, I have never used it. For the Spirit does not put forward anything uncertain or variable in his Scriptures. He teaches in a completely perfect way, and therefore everything he says is consistent with itself." *(161;* 44). The meaning of the Scriptures is obvious and comprehensible to the simple human mind. Thus, it is precisely the immeasurable glorification of the Scriptures which is the highest authority for the intellect. This makes the text of the Scriptures into an everyday ordinary text, which is just as understandable as any other book. And thereby, the way is opened for scientific work on the text, as, for example, carried out by Luther in consulting rabbis when he was translating the Bible.

There is, however, a more striking conclusion to be drawn from this. If the Bible can be understood like any ordinary book, then, like any other book, it is fallible. For example, some lines might have been spoilt, might have been distorted in the copying, or might have been inserted at a later stage. And what is more (only Luther dared draw this conclusion, Calvin did not go as far as this), as with any other text created by man, it bears the imprint

of human limitations and inadequately conveys the revelation. It has sections which are correct and important, but also those which are trivial and erroneous. In his polemics with the Catholics who justify the mystery of the last rites by quoting the epistles of James, Luther begins by saying that the epistles are obviously not those of an apostle, for it is beneath the dignity of an apostle to have written them. However, immediately after this he says that even if the apostle did write them, then he does not have the right to introduce them into practice. Consequently, he is wrong! *(137;* 118).

Thus, man himself determines the meaning of the Scriptures by his own thought. But is this definition precise and adequate? The answer is important, for if it is acknowledged that the meaning of the text can be defined unequivocally then this unequivocal definition will be dogma. Meanwhile, neither Luther nor Calvin have a clear answer.

They were subjectively convinced that the conclusions they arrived at on the basis of the Scriptures were the only true ones. For Luther, Zwingli who lent a different interpretation to the words of Jesus, "This is my body ... this is my blood", is a heretic, speaking out against the patent truth. It is this faith in the patency, in the universal authenticity which they have perceived, which gives them the strength to fight, gives them confidence in themselves. And it is in this that the nascent dogmatization of the Reformers' thought is latent.

However, at the same time, their thought has antithetical Origins. Whether the text of the Scriptures is divine or ordinary, in both cases there follows a negative reply concerning the possibility to understand it definitively and convey its meaning unequivocally. Firstly, if the text is divine it is at least within the grasp of the intuitive knowledge of faith, which is equally accessible to the theologian and the peasant. But then the text cannot be confined to any formulae which are the fruits of the theologian's limited human thinking. Such formulae are like the translation of the immeasurably great into the language of the infinitely small. They are, therefore, never completely adequate. This translation can never be completely precise. Secondly, if it is a human text, there are no limits to understanding it either. It is not without reason that the Reformers turn from the Latin to the Greek and ancient Jewish texts, trying to understand the historical (i.e., the fortuitous, the human) circumstances surrounding the origin of this or that text. Thus, in both its aspects, both as a divine and a human text, the Bible can never be

completely understood, and it is always open to more interpretation.

This internal logic of the Reformers' doctrine is objectively more important than their subjective and potentially dogmatic confidence in the finality and patency of their interpretations. The Reformers had no internal logical basis for asserting their opinion as dogma. Indeed, the authority of Luther and Calvin fundamentally differs from the authority of those charismatic men who are in communion with God. It also differs from the authority of the Catholic theologian, whose authority is based on the authority of the organization which he represents. Their authority is nearest that of the scholar. They can be regarded as scholars to a certain extent, for their way of thinking is significantly closer to that of the scholar, than, for example, that of the alchemist of the Middle Ages, if only we make one assumption—that the Bible plays a role in their thinking similar to the role of empirical reality in the scholar's thinking. Indeed, just as the scholar is sure that empirical knowledge contains the sum total of all accessible knowledge, the Reformer is sure that the Bible contains the sum total of the truths of his belief. Just as the scholar believes in his intellect, yet knows that his final conclusions must be empirically verified and, proved wrong on verification, should be mercilessly discarded, so the Reformer believes in his intellect, yet knows that his conclusions must be verified by the Bible and, if not in accord with it, must be discarded. Just as the process of getting to know empirical reality is endless for the scholar, so, too, the process of getting to know the Bible is for the Reformer (although this is rather implicit in their Scriptures than explicit). Just as the authority of the scholar, no matter how high, is infinitely less than the authority of reality, so the authority of the Reformers is overwhelmed by the authority of the Bible and the belief in man's ability to grasp its true meaning. That is why the attitude towards the works of the great creators of the Protestant Church has never been completely dogmatic. It has been always assumed that they might be fallible, be contradicted or supplemented in some things. The authority of the Bible and of reason is higher than their authority.

John Robinson, leader of the separatist community of English emigrants in Holland, a number of whom (the Pilgrims) moved to Plymouth in 1620, said in his speech to those setting off, that it was a great pity that the Calvinists and Lutherans did not go further than Calvin and Luther, "for though they were precious shining lights

in their times, yet God hath not revealed his whole will to them" *(145;* 92). So they had to go further.

And just as the authority of the Bible and the intellect are higher than the authority of the Reformers, so it is higher than that of the Churches they created, which would never be able to produce an ideology necessary for upholding dogma. For it is obvious, that if Luther and Calvin were capable of error, the ordinary Lutheran and Calvinist pastors are even more capable of this. Having from the very outset rejected the principle of the infallibility of the Church, Lutheranism and Calvinism cannot return to this principle ever again.

The problem of attaining "salvation". The Reformers' thinking on the problem of "salvation" undergoes the same acute transformation as it does on the problem of the sources of the knowledge of God. In the latter problem it begins by postulating the worthlessness and impotence of the human mind and ends by making the believer's intellect the highest judge of truth. In the same way, in the problem of attaining "salvation", it begins by postulating man's impotence and ends in something which was earlier inconceivable—by liberating man's will.

As distinct from the Catholic doctrine, the Reformers placed such an emphasis on the damage to man's nature as a result of the fall that man's free will becomes a slave to sin, i.e., it cannot by itself be directed towards good. The Reformers are acutely more pessimistic than the early Christians with regard to man`s nature, which they consider utterly sinful.

Man is absolutely incapable of carrying out God's law, which, above all, demands a boundless love for Him and our neighbor. At the same time, the Reformers liquidate the difference existing in the Catholic doctrine between the commandments and the "evangelic advice". To obtain salvation for one's merits, i.e., for having observed God's law, man has to be like Jesus Christ—something he is incapable of, for only God was capable of this. At the same time, faith by no means gives one the strength to obey this law. Faith means simply the internalization of the ideal, which remains infinite, incommensurate with human strength. Luther writes that the commandments indicate what we should do but do not give us the strength to carry it out. "For example, 'Thou shalt not covet' is a precept by which we are all convicted of sin, since no man can help coveting, whatever efforts to the contrary he may make' *(136;* 967).

Consequently, the will, enslaved by sin, plays no part in salvation and salvation absolutely does not depend on human efforts. This is pregnant with implications. In the first place, the notion that the Church leads man to his salvation is refuted, for the efforts which lead man to his salvation in Catholicism are those laid down by the Church, and the effectiveness of which the Church guarantees.

Secondly, this spells the repudiation of both mutually complementary aspects of the Catholic way to salvation, the formal Church magic, and those efforts which are aimed at attaining a spiritual state in which this magic will work effectively.

In his *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church* Luther writes: "Therefore I advise no one to enter any religious order or the priesthood ... unless he understands that the works of monks and priests, however holy and arduous they may be, do not differ one whit in the sight of God from the works of the rustic laborer in the field or the woman going about her household tasks, but all works are measured before God by faith alone" *(137;* 78). It is highly significant that in saying that the "Papist" rites do not guarantee man's salvation, Luther immediately qualifies this with the warning, that neither can salvation be attained by renouncing them.

A further conclusion is that the idea of salvation and perdition is disposed of, as is the possibility of changing a dead man's spiritual condition beyond the grave—this again with the help of the Church and efforts on the part of the living. Finally, this obviously means the denial of the role of anyone in salvation, of the Virgin Mary or the saints, of anyone except God Himself.

However, if man's efforts do not lead to salvation, inasmuch as they crave this, and inasmuch as they are the efforts of the Church which are actually nothing more than human efforts again, then just how can salvation be attained?

Salvation, according to the doctrine of the Reformers, is possible only because Christ died for mankind. Given that he has already died for people, nothing further is demanded of them. Salvation is not the transformation of the sinner into a righteous man, but the declaration of the sinner as forgiven. Forgiveness is not granted for merit, for the infinitely sinful man cannot possess such merits. It is granted freely, *sola gratia.* The only thing which is required of man is that he accept this gift, that he believe. His forgiveness lies namely in this, *sola fide.* The logical conclusion from this, which,

however, is made only by Calvin and his followers, is that if salvation does not depend on our efforts and if faith cannot be evoked by our efforts, then faith is also a gift from God and the redeemed are already preordained.

Does this mean that "salvation" and ethics are divorced altogether? There was just such a tendency in some of the peripheral sectarian currents arising around the Reformation. However, salvation and ethics in the main schools, Lutheranism and Calvinism, were, on the contrary, rigidly linked. This link is, however, very specific and ethics itself acquires a completely new character.

If no moral efforts on trie part of man give him salvation, then salvation, achieved objectively, through the will of God who grants salvation and its subjective equivalent faith, entails supreme effort by the human will. The believer, who acknowledges his sinfulness and sees it mirrored in the law of God, tries with all his might to overcome it in order to observe, as far as possible, an essentially unobservable law, to embody an essentially intangible ideal. This is done not in some special sphere or other, nor through some special action, but in normal, everyday life—in the family, in society and at work. As Calvin says of the "redeemed", "Whatever they ate or drank ... would still offer a pure sacrifice to God both in eating and drinking and even in warfare" *(207;* 33). But, all the same, just what does a person have to do to realize this ideal?

We can constantly see in the Reformers' thought how the destructive conclusions of their own arguments frighten them, and how they try to limit them in some way, not to bring them to their logical conclusion. Thus, the entire logic of the Reformers' doctrine says that any formulation of the purport of the text of the Scriptures can be only relatively true. Yet, at the same time, they affirm that their formulations are self-evident and definitive truths. In the same way, the Reformers can be seen trying to limit the frightening logic of their own doctrine on salvation.

Thus Calvin (and his followers in particular) stresses the observance of all the concrete demands of the Bible. With the Puritans this amounts to extreme pettiness and distinctive puritan bigotry. Just as the self-evident conclusions of the Reformers objectively become a substitute for Catholic dogma, so with the Puritans, for example, the demand that women cover their heads becomes a substitute for Catholic magic.

However, the internal logic of the Reformers' thinking outweighs the limitations they place on it. The basic demands of the law (the love of God and people) cannot be observed to the limit, although they should be observed

as far as possible. There is no easy answer (nor is there one simple instance capable of giving such an answer) to the question of how this law should be observed in this or that concrete case. Man must devote all his strength to serving God, but just how much strength he has, where and in what he is to serve God, man himself decides. Luther's double thesis is: "A Christian man is the most free lord of all, and subject to none; a Christian man is the most dutiful servant of all, and subject to everyone" *(136;* 363). So far as man, even the believer who is "redeemed", remains a sinner, so far as the ideal is not fully realizable, he is not only a prey to sin and error, but he will necessarily sin and commit errors. However, in falling, in making errors, man ought to pick himself up again and continue his ascent. It is only in this constant struggle with himself, not in anything concrete, that a sign can be seen of man having been redeemed. Thus having begun by postulating the absolute sinfulness and impotence of man, the Reformers end up by liberating man's will and freeing his ethical intuition.

The non-formalistic potential of Christian mythology, brought to light and to a certain extent actualized by the very dogmatic formulations of the Reformers, disrupts the tendency towards dogmatization. Dogma disintegrates before it crystallizes. The Church structure develops towards a strict hierarchy and discipline, yet never really achieves them. While the 16th and early 17th century is the era of schisms within the Protestant Church, almost reaching the level of sectarian wars between separate Protestant groups, by the end of the 17th century, the tendency towards dedogmatization and religious tolerance is clearly defined. The main forces fighting for this tolerance were, on the one hand, the sects seeking it as a means to be left in peace, and, on the other, sceptics who tended towards rationalism and religious indifferentism. However, we mustn't forget that the reason why the efforts of both were crowned with success was that opposition to tolerance increasingly weakened, for dogmatization and a rigid organization failed to gain the upper hand as the very content of dogma stood in the way of dogmatization.

And so, Protestantism set out along the road of the constant and gradual decay of dogma, and constant secularization from within.

The Reformation and Protestantism are the results of the social situation of Catholic Western Europe of the 16th century. But as Marx and Engels repeatedly pointed out,

ideology is not a direct reflection of the social situation. Ideology is not a simple derivative of the social situation and itself affects it. Engels wrote: "The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure ... also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles." Among these elements are "religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas" *(11;* 394-95). Just what kind of influence did Protestantism have on social development?

Protestantism, as Christianity in general, did not proclaim any socio-political ideal, nor did it demand the reconstruction of society according to any plan. Indirectly, it had, however, a colossal socio-political influence. This is found, first of all, in the fact that the individual with a Protestant view of life represented a new, bourgeois type of personality, with a new relationship with the world.

In discarding the doctrine of the various degrees of salvation and of salvation by redeeming deed of both types, i.e., expressed either in monastic ascetism or magical formalism, Protestantism carried salvation into the realm of everyday life, of daily and hourly actions. On the one hand, there turned out to be few things of dogmatic and magical significance. On the other, the things of no importance were just as few, for a sin is a sin, and you can neither atone for it, nor expiate it. Great scope was given to moral intuition, but more was demanded of it. Man, freed from magical and dogmatic directives, lays down rules for himself, plunges himself into the strictest of self-disciplines. As Marx wrote: "Just as Luther ... superseded *external* religiosity by making religiosity the *inner* substance of man ... he negated the priests out side the layman because he transplanted the priest into laymen's hearts..." (3; 290). Instead of a mere group or monks and a far from ascetic crowd of laymen there appeared a great number of lay ascetics who worked persistently not in order to amass money and have a good time on it, but in the name of duty and self-discipline, tight-laced people who did not give themselves a moment's respite.

These people, rigidly self-disciplined, were, at the same time, looking into the future. For they knew that perfection was unattainable, that errors and sin were unavoidable, but that he who would do everything possible not to let them take place and to put them right would be redeemed. Calvin wrote: "Our life is a road, and we must keep going along it, for he who stops thus shows that he has never known his goal" *(68;* 151).

A man brought up in the spirit of Protestantism had a more rigid attitude to questions of morality than a Catholic, was a more persistent worker, more independent, placed greater trust in his reason and intuition, was less traditional and more open to the future. In a word, he was a new type of individual. Naturally, through the education of this new type of individual Protestantism had a colossal influence on the social structure. It worked against traditionalism, stagnant feudal hierarchies, ignorance of the masses with only a tiny enlightened elite minority against its background, the tyranny of kings and the anarchy of feudal lords. And it led to greater cultural equality and the cultural development of the masses, it undermined feudal hierarchies and curbed tyranny and anarchy by bourgeois law and order.

First and foremost, Protestantism released capitalist free enterprise from moral and psychological restrictions, having levelled out the religious significance of all types of human activity (including those directly linked with making money which in the Middle Ages were considered specifically "base"). It proclaimed any activity, aimed not at satisfying the "lust of the flesh", but at "serving God and man", as a holy and divine calling. The activities of the capitalist thus acquired moral sanctity, becoming, thereby, not a means of amassing piles of money and enjoying life on it, but an absolute end in themselves, a way of man's existence.

Protestantism was also conducive to what could be called the educational base of capitalist production. If Catholicism or Orthodoxy required a cultural elite of the clergy and were capable of functioning no matter how low the cultural level of the masses, literacy was essential for Protestantism with its cult of the Bible. Just as the believer should strive to become literate and should reach the Bible through literacy, so the Bible should reach the believer by being translated into living spoken languages. This led to national languages being developed, culture being democratized and the culture of the masses and that of the elite brought closer together. The masses got used to a minimum of intellectual activity—to thoughtfully reading the Bible and mulling over the pastor's weekly sermons.

Protestantism was also conducive to the development of empirical knowledge—by the fact that it abolished the stagnant medieval dogmas and created new religious and moral stimuli for scientific activity. While "empty philosophizing" was a sin, for it represented an attempt to comprehend through one's own reasoning what could only

be perceived through revelation and was, therefore, the working of that reason which Luther called "the devil's whore", modest empirical knowledge (and capitalist production needs just such knowledge) is the apotheosis of God in his creations. This is just a duty and endless process as is any activity in fulfilling one's duty. There is probably no one who better expressed this specifically Protestant attitude to scientific cognition than Johannes Kepler, who said of himself: "I wanted to be a servant of God ... and worked hard to become one; and here I've come to glorifying God by my works in astronomy" (*131*; 206).

Finally, Protestantism was also conducive to the emergence of a political structure founded on bourgeois law and order adequate for capitalism. On the one hand, it helped weaken the traditional subservient attitude towards superiors and the magical ideas connected with the power of the "Lord's Anointed" sovereign. On the other, the freer and, at the same time, utterly serious attitude to everyday life also spread to the sphere of daily social and political life. Calvin writes that God is the true master and sovereign and, "had this idea been well known the kings and princes would not have ruled so arbitrarily today... For those of the lofty nobility think that this world has been created for them and, as they say, for their beautiful eyes. And, therefore, they reject all remonstrations, all laws and statutes, and cast the yoke off their neck..." *(68;* 248). At the same time, the idea of right, of the law is set up against that of the free will of the people. In another place, Calvin says, addressing the Geneva citizens, that the random choice of the city council is an insult to God. People should pray to God to send the Holy Spirit who would indicate whom to elect *(68;* 253-55).

The influence of Protestantism through religious institutions followed the same trend. The triumph of Protestantism naturally meant the weakening of the Church organization and the power of its hierarchy. Therefore, in many countries, monarchs made use of Protestantism which strengthened absolutism by undermining the power of the rich Church hierarchy dependent on Rome. On the other hand, however, since the Protestant Church greatly enhanced the layman's importance in Church life, a strong tendency arose to limit the tyranny of sovereigns and of temporal power in general in Church affairs. It was inspired neither by the bishops nor the Pope in Rome, but by the awakening consciousness of the laymen and by the pastors relying not on wealth and power, but on their own personal influence. As the Protestants were not indifferent to the structure of

life in society (it, too, should serve "the glory of God"), their Churches came to exert influence that limited (in a new way, otherwise than the Catholic hierarchy) the tyranny of temporal power in purely temporal affairs.

Calvin wrote: "In obedience, which the superiors should be accorded, there should always be one exception, or, rather, a rule to be observed in the first place. It consists in that obedience should not divert us from the obedience to the one whose will in truth and justice all wishes of the kings should be subordinated to, whose commandments overrule their orders and whose majesty overcasts their hauteur" *(68;* 257).

Protestantism, in this way, undermined feudal hierarchies and furthered the bourgeois development of society. The influence of Protestantism on bourgeois development is so patent that it can in no way be seen as a discovery or a theory of Max Weber. For example, in the mid-1850s, long before Weber, S. Colwell, in no way considered a classic of the sociology of religion, wrote: "All Europe and the world soon felt the activity and life infused into business by Protestant energy." He further wrote that religion was unable to control this energy, particularly "in the form of that intense selfishness which is manifested in the pursuit of wealth and power" *(48;* 5). Many such examples could be given (see *1/6;* 190).

Marx and Engels never directly touched upon the active role of Protestantism in progressive bourgeois development. But, since they frequently stressed the active role of ideology and of religion in general (the reverse influence) and the progressive nature of the ideology of Protestantism, it will be fair to say that the recognition of Protestantism's active role is implied in their works.

Actually, in Weber's view the influence of Protestantism is reduced to the psychological influence of the idea of salvation predestined, and the sphere of influence is reduced to the "spirit of capitalism". That is what, in our opinion, is a very narrow and one-sided view. Protestantism influenced every sphere of life in the modern age with all the strength of its ideology, in which the idea of predestined salvation is far from being central. These spheres cannot be reduced to the "spirit of capitalism" for they are connected with the development of science and technology, with the specific features of the political and legal structure, etc.

The Protestant countries were, in those circumstances, the first to develop along the path of bourgeois democracy. Their development was basically evolutionary, and the bourgeois tradition of anti-clericalism typical of Catholic

countries was practically foreign to them. On the contrary, the bourgeois development of those countries where the Reformation was quashed took place at a characteristically slower pace. This later resulted in political and spiritual explosions. Engels wrote: "In France, the Calvinist minority was suppressed in 1685 and either Catholicized or driven out of the country. But what was the good? Already at that time the freethinker Pierre Bayle was at the height of his activity, and in 1694 Voltaire was born" *(8;* 374). Catholicism in these countries gradually turned from the ideology of the nation into that of a part of the nation (basically, of the reactionary part). Meanwhile, the ideology of the bourgeois revolutions which always took place later than in Protestant countries, where they coincided with the Reformation to some extent or other, was already anti-Christian and had powerful pseudo-religious elements (the most striking example is that of the ideology of the French bourgeois revolution with its anti-clericalism, on the one hand, and the cult of the Supreme Being and theophilanthropy, on the other). Engels gave a remarkable description of the nature of these pseudo-religious elements of the French revolution. He wrote: "That was a theological Weltanschauung with a secular complexion. The dogma, the divine right, had given place to human right, and the Church, to the State" *(16;* 490).

The above refers to the general trends of social influence rooted in the particular features of the Reformation and Protestantism as a whole. However, these general trends manifested themselves in various ways, depending both on the different social and political "contexts" in which Protestantism found itself (a state Church or the religion of the minority, this or that socio-political structure embracing Protestantism) and on which branch of Protestantism was in question. In this respect, there is a very important difference between the Lutheran and Calvinist branches of Protestantism, which are the most widespread and have most influenced the course of history. These differences are connected with the varying social conditions in which these doctrines arose (monarchic Germany of principalities and the oligarchic republican pre-bourgeois Geneva), and with the fact that Calvin came after Luther and, correspondingly, was more logical, consistent, systematic and went further in taking the myth and magic out of religion. Finally, they are connected with Luther and Calvin as individuals. Here are the most important of these differences.

Luther believed that salvation did not depend on human efforts, but he went no further than this. Meanwhile, Calvin developed the idea of some people being predestined to perdition and others to salvation. Luther strictly differentiated between the "visible" Church (of formal believers) and the "invisible" Church (of those saved). Calvin made the same differentiation, but nonetheless believed, that by depriving the damned of the Extreme Unction, the "visible" Church ought to draw closer to the "invisible" Church. Luther did not refer to the Scriptures to try and substantiate the internal organization of the Church, while Calvin extracted from them a definite and, to a large extent, democratic Church organization; as Engels wrote he "republicanised and democratised the Church" *(8;* 374). Luther drew a definite line between a Church affair (salvation) and temporal life and, therefore, taught absolute obedience to temporal power, whose authority he regarded as particularly great. Calvin, on the other hand, believed that the entire structure of social life should be organized "for the greater glory of God", which, in practice, meant strict moral laws and the Church's constant interference in the affairs of state, and he suggested that the monarch who went against God could and should be overthrown. Of course, neither Calvin nor Luther put forward plans for a state system, but Luther, relying on the princes, clearly preferred a monarchy, while Calvin considered that the best system of all was one in which there was a mixture of aristocratic and democratic elements. This, in his opinion, was during the Age of the Judges in Israel and in the Geneva Republic *(30;* 297-302).

As we can see, these are highly significant differences. They played a major role in the later history of Calvinist and Lutheran countries. The quaint organization of the Anglican Church, which we shall deal with later, stands out completely on its own.

3. The Origins of Secularization in the U.S.A.

The U.S.A. is a Protestant country which has not experienced a Reformation. The religious situation in the English colonies in America, where a number of Protestant denominations resulting from the Reformation in various European countries, primarily England, prevailed, was the starting point in the process of secularization in America. Therefore, in order to understand the special features of this process, at least a few words must be said about the

English Reformation.

While various political elements launching the Reformation in Geneva, Holland, Germany and Scandinavia adopted systems already worked out (Lutheran or Calvinist) and put them into practice the Reformation in England was carried out by King Henry VIII himself, who proceeded from his own theories and not from those of the theologists of the Reformation.

This was obviously one situation in the history of England where much was decided and determined by the features of Henry's character. He declared that, inasmuch as he was King of England, it was he, not a "Bishop of Rome", who was the legitimate head of the Church of England and it was his duty to see to it that Church doctrine and rites were not tinged with superstition. He thereby also implied that he himself had the right to determine dogma, cult and the organized form of the Church *(44;* chs. IV, V).

In our opinion, the situation where the Reformation was accepted or rejected was always one of a great degree of freedom, being for practically all West European countries the opportunity of making of choice which determined a great deal in their subsequent history. The role of the authority of the sovereign in England during the reign of the Tudors made the choice of religion particularly dependent on factors connected with the personalities of the monarchs in this transitional period. It is obvious there were conditions that made Henry's policy possible. However, can we consider this not a possibility but a necessity? In our opinion, no. Let us recall that although sharp fluctuations in religious policy under Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary and Elizabeth I caused uprisings, not one of them was capable of overthrowing the monarchy or of imposing its will on it. Even the restoration of Catholicism under Mary did not evoke a powerful enough reaction. It was only towards the end of the 16th century that the chances of restoring Catholicism disappeared and only towards the end of the 17th century, the chances of replacing Anglicanism by another current of the Reformation. In the 16th century, there were, obviously, real alternatives of a Catholic, Lutheran or Calvinist England. The religious struggle at this time was a real one in which any of the runners in the race could win.

While a professional theologian, in creating a plan of the Reformation, would be guided first and foremost by the logic of his thinking, with questions of political advisability being for him of secondary importance, or none at all, the King, a theological dilettante and a sovereign, was guided primarily by political considerations. This

was a very distinctive form of Reformation and gave rise to a very distinctive Church. This Church was primarily conceived as a means of strengthening the authority of the King, but paradoxically, it was precisely this feature which turned out to be most conducive to the constitutional and evolutionary bourgeois development of England and its colonies. Ludvig Hausser, a historian of the Reformation, wrote that Henry VIII "wanted to establish royal papism, as omnipotent and as permeated with the spirit of persecution as was its purely church brand, which he destroyed in his country. But in fact he only opened the way to freedom" *(135;* 176).

The Anglican Church carries an imprint of its origin, an imprint of ideological compromise, natural when logic is subordinated to political considerations. The King was aiming for a Church which would unreservedly be under his control and, secondly, for one which would embrace the entire nation. This gave rise to the two most important specific features of Anglicanism, which have played an enormous role in English and, what is of particular importance in the context of this study, American history.

First, the Anglican Church is subordinated to temporal power more than any other Christian Church. The sovereign is the head of the Church, this meaning that he not only appoints the bishops, but also that the ultimate instance determining the correctness or incorrectness of any doctrinal formation and any change in ritual is temporal—the King and Parliament. As the authority of the sovereign dwindled away and religious qualifications ceased to apply, this has given rise to a situation which is very strange for a bourgeois democratic country: a Prime Minister who is not even an Anglican (for example, Harold Wilson, a Congregationalist) appoints the Anglican bishops *(28;* 53), and Parliament, whose members are not only Anglicans but also Protestants of other creeds, Catholics, Judaists and even atheists, decides whether the rites of the Anglican Church should be reformed or not *(28;* 57).

The power of the King and Parliament limited the independent actions of the Anglican hierarchy, often preventing it from pursuing its interests and aims. This was of very great significance for the history of the American colonies. The thing is, that the regalist authorities, guided primarily by political considerations, mercilessly fought against heretics when the struggle itself was not dangerous, but the existence of heresy was fraught with dangerous political consequences for the country. When the struggle became dangerous, while the existence of heretics posed no political threat, the authorities took

no action. This was precisely the situation in the colonies. Unlike the Spanish and French Catholic monarchs, who strictly saw to it that no heretics arose in their colonies, the English sovereign calmly watched his colonies turn into sanctuaries for all kinds of heretics (a heretic presents no danger in a colony, but anything might happen if you begin to fight him). The English bishops were powerless to prevent this. The regalist authorities did not even allow the Anglican Church the humble act of sending a bishop to America: they feared this would provoke the Congregationalists and Presbyterians who abhorred the episcopate. As a result, the Anglican Church, the state Church of England and of a number of colonies, was the only colonial Church with no organization corresponding either to its internal structure or the requirements of the situation. All the other Churches, though they enjoyed no privileges, were independent *(74; 187;* ch.2).

The second characteristic of Anglicanism, connected with the special features of its origins and indirectly determining the specific features of religious life in the colonies, is its eclecticism based on compromise.

Although Henry VIII, his successor Edward VI and Elizabeth I carried out a number of reforms along the same lines as the Reformation on the Continent (monasteries were disbanded, the English Bible was disseminated, many superstitions were done away with) and although the prayer-book and symbol of faith were adopted in 1552, treating the question of the sacrament not from the Lutheran (Luther's interpretation was nearer the Catholic one), but from the Calvinist or Zwinglian point of view, they, at the same time, preserved many Catholic rituals rejected in Continental Protestantism. Naturally, in aiming at centralism, they did not introduce any democratic elements whatsoever, but preserved the episcopal rank and the authoritative power of the episcopacy (although now limited by the power of the sovereign). Something very strange resulted: from one point of view, it was almost Catholicism, from another Calvinism, and from yet another even nearly Orthodoxy. Since Anglicanism preserved a great number of archaic rituals, rejected in more consistent forms of Protestantism, and since it had no authoritative founder who gave it its theological basis (for fully understandable reasons they tried to forget about Henry VIII as the founder of the Church), subsequently, when its own particular theology began to take shape in the 17th century, Anglican theologians stressed the role of tradition and paid a great deal more attention to the "fathers of the Church" than the consistent Protestants did *(190;* 44-45). This underlin-

ing of tradition, the preserving of a number of ancient rites, together with the refusal to bow down to Rome led to several superficial similarities with Orthodoxy *(28;* 11-12).

The eclecticism of Anglicanism is linked with the subordination to the authority of the sovereign not only genetically but also functionally. The unity of the eclectic Church at least in the 16th to 18th centuries, when religious questions evoked wide concern in people, could only be supported from without, by directly suppressing centrifugal tendencies.

Naturally, under such eclecticism there were great differences in the rituals of public worship and in the content of sermons. Sovereign power tolerated these differences to a certain extent. Therefore, inevitably, trends sprang up in Anglicanism, striving to bring it to some kind of logical conclusion in one direction or another. In our opinion, A.S. Khomyakov was right when he wrote: "Anglicanism is like a narrow embankment made of sand, on which the mighty waves of two hostile oceans come crashing down and which gradually crumbles away on both sides, now into romanticism, now into dissidence" *(45;* 213). Indeed, a constant struggle went on inside Anglicanism: on the one hand, different Protestant tendencies, striving to push Anglicanism further towards Reformation — the Puritans and their descendants in the Church in the 18th-19th centuries (the major trends broke away from the Church and became what were first called "separatists", and then later "non-conformists"), and, on the other hand, there were tendencies striving to drive the Church away from Protestantism (their most consistent representatives broke with Anglicanism and turned Catholic). There was also a less important trend towards Orthodoxy.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, the most significant trend playing a colossal role in the history of America was Puritanism, a movement striving to bring the English Reformation, yet incomplete, from the Puritan point of view, to a logical end. The idea of this logical conclusion was formed primarily under the influence of Calvin and his followers.

The eclecticism of Anglicanism and the sovereign's tendency for compromise always left the hope that if pressure were somehow put on temporal power Anglicanism could be moved in the direction desired and prevented from moving in that not desired. Therefore, despite the fact that eclecticism resulted from attempts to found a Church as an instrument of absolutism, it was indirectly conducive to consolidating Parliament and developing the constitu-

tional monarchy in England. The Stuarts preferred the forms of Anglicanism closest to Catholicism, or even simply Catholicism itself, and, therefore, Parliament's fight against absolutism merged with the resistance to the attempted spread of Catholicism and became a religious cause and duty.

We shall speak in more detail of Puritanism, a trend which played a great role in American history, a little later on. But before we deal with this, let us list the basic features of the status of Anglicanism in the colonies.

1. The Anglican Church was not the state Church in any colony (in particular, Pennsylvania, and the colonies of New England) nor did it ever enjoy the role of the Church of the majority in them, as it did in England. Anglicanism was the predominant religion only in Virginia, but it lost its predominance even there, not long before the revolution, pushed into the background by Baptism, Presbyterianism and Methodism *(187;* ch. 2; 291-337).

2. The Anglican Church, organizationally under the control of temporal power, was particularly powerless in the colonies, because it had no episcopacy (formally, the colonial Churches were subordinated to the distant London episcopacy). In the colonies, it was very much under the control of the governors and local municipalities, while at the parish level, the priest was subordinated to the parish council *(59;* 126; *187;* ch. 2; *74;* ch. 2).

3. The Anglican Church suffered from a shortage of trained clergy. First, it long had no seminaries in the colonies. Second, if an American wanted to wear the cloth he had to go to London for ordainment—an expensive and risky business. Moreover, good ministers were able to find parishes in England and did not go to America. It was only in the 18th century, after the Society for the Propagation of Gospel had been founded during the reign of Queen Anne, that America received an influx of missionary priests paid by the society *(160;* ch. 3).

4. The Anglican Church in the colonies was represented basically by its most radical Protestant wing. This manifested itself in the absence of an episcopacy (whom local laymen did not want anyway), in the important role of the laymen and the simplified rites (for example, as confirmation could only be carried out by a bishop, the Americans belonging to the Anglican Church did without it) *(103;* 11; *59;* 132). The High Church form of Anglicanism brought by the Anglican missionaries was only disseminated among the upper strata of New England in the 18th century. However, that was Anglicanism of the conservative, subsequently loyal, minority, not the mass Anglicanism of Virginia.

The Puritans were a party, a faction, a current within the Anglican Church, fighting its Reformation consistently.

In theology, the Puritans supported the doctrine of absolute predestination and acknowledged the Bible as the single and perfect source of doctrine, cult and organization. In cult matters, they favored doing away with the vestiges of Catholic superstition; in the sphere of organization, they came out for the abolition of episcopacy; and in the sphere of social morality, for the subordination of the entire life of society to the greater glory of God, i.e., for rigid laws to punish any amorality, for strict observance of the rule of no work or entertainment on Sundays, etc. *(154; 190;* Introduction). Perry Miller writes: "The Puritan held that the Bible was sufficiently plain and explicit so that men with the proper learning, following the proper rules of deduction and interpretation, could establish its meaning and intention on every subject, not only in theology, but in ethics, costume, diplomacy, military tactics, inheritances, profits, marriages and judicial procedure" (790; 43).

The Puritans were basically Calvinists, but since Calvinism, as we have already said, yielded to dogmatization only with difficulty, and since, up until the revolution, they on the whole did not break up with Anglicanism nor formed their own organization, they were a rather amorphous tendency uniting rather different points of view. Miller aptly describes the Puritans' attitude to Calvin: "But if the New Englanders were Calvinists, it was because they happened to agree with Calvin, they approved his doctrine not because he taught it, but because it seemed inescapably indicated when they studied scripture or observed the actions of men" *(190;* 56).

The following problems were the main watersheds in the Puritan camp:

a) Church organization.

Some of the Puritans supported Presbyterianism—the system prevailing in Scotland, founded on the rigid hierarchy of collective bodies where the clergy and laymen were equally represented. Others supported Congregationalism, based on individual congregations being independent of each other and any higher bodies. The Baptists were united with the Congregationalists on the question of Church structure and even more rigidly observed their principle of the independent congregation.

b) Church membership.

Presbyterians were prepared to recognize all believers as Church members, depriving only blatant sinners of the sacrament. The Congregationalists, on the other hand,

recognized only those who, on the basis of their inner experience my inose wr conceived as the subjective equivalent of being "chosen", or of redemption which the congregation judges on the basis of what those "reborn" have to tell) and exemplary behavior, could most probably be judged "chosen", or "holy". They admitted the baptism of children, but christened only those of "holy" people. The Baptists went even further, refusing to christen children at all. They christened only those adults who had experienced a "rebirth" while being taken into the bosom of the Church.

c) The attitude towards the Church of England and the problem of the state Church.

The extreme Puritans—the Baptists and a section of the Congregationalists—broke with the official Church, regarding it as hopeless and no longer capable of reform. The majority, however, remained inside the Church, leading a more or less active struggle within it for reform. The rejection of the official Church did not mean rejection of the principle itself of an official state Church. However, voices were already being raised among the Baptists disclaiming the state Church in general *(153;* 77-78; *147;* 53-102).

"Covenant theology", which regarded the relationship between God and man as a covenant was very widespread in Puritan circles (see the analysis of covenant theology in Peter de Jong's book—*119).* There were many such covenants. There was the covenant between God the Father and God the Son, that God the Son should die for man and that God the Father should release man from Hell in return. The Church, i.e., the congregation, arises from a covenant among the people themselves and between them and God: the people pledge they will lead truly Christian lives and God pledges he will grant them and their children salvation. If not a Church but political society results from the covenant among the people establishing this society "for the glory of God", for the maximum enforcement of the laws of the Bible and for upholding the true Church, then that society enters into a covenant relationship with God, similar to that between ancient Israel and God. It becomes "the chosen people". As long as this covenant is observed, it is rewarded not only with the salvation of its members in the other world, but with their material wellbeing on earth as well *(149;* ch. 1). At the same time, once this society has entered into a covenant, it cannot break it. Yet it is difficult to keep and deviations from it are inevitable. Punishment follows, but repentance is again rewarded. Such a society, to a certain extent, determines

its own fate by its ethics, when the fate of other peoples is determined only by the inscrutable workings of God.

It is highly important that the idea of covenants was also transferred to the relations among people themselves. The Church is not only a covenant between the people and God, it is also one of people with one another. The relationship between the believer and the pastor is one of mutual agreement and, most importantly, so also is that between the ruler and his subject. In 1645, one of the spiritual leaders of the American Congregationalist Puritans, John Cotton, wrote that "to pass by natural Relations between Parents and Children, and violent Relations between Conquerors and Captives, there is no other way given whereby a people ... can be united or combined together into one visible body, but only by mutual Covenant" *(52;* 25). These ideas, on the one hand, mitigated the original Calvinist doctrine on predestination, while on the other, they developed the anti-absolutist potential of Calvinism. The idea of covenant is taken from the Bible. If viewed simply, without any theological contrivances, it obviously is in sharp contradiction with the idea of "absolute predestination". The Congregationalists, however, reconciled these two ideas, maintaining that the covenant was the exterior while predestination was the essence. God gave his age-long decisions on people's fate the form of covenants.

Locke and the 18th century doctrine of the social contract are genetically linked with the ideas of covenant. Naturally, although the Puritan doctrine is a religious, not a social one, its entire logic drove the Puritans to fight against the "High Church" and absolutist tendencies of the royal authority. As a result of this, Puritanism was, as Engels put it, the ideological costume ***(8;*** 374) of the English revolution of the 17th century.

The founders of the Plymouth colony, the Pilgrim Fathers, landed in America in 1620. They were ultra-Puritans—Separatist Congregationalists who had earlier lived for a while in Holland. Baptism arose from another such group which remained in Holland and later returned to England *(201;* ch.2). The great migration began in 1629 and led to the emergence of the New England colony of Massachusetts and later Connecticut, New Haven and Rhode Island. This migration was headed mainly by Congregationalist Puritans, although this time they were not Separatists *(147;* 119-28). It was linked to the fact that in England King Charles I was attempting to govern without a Parliament and at the moment the affairs of the Puritans took a turn for the worse. The problem of separatism in the New

England conditions very quickly became purely theoretical; since the communities were, to all intents and purposes, cut off from the Anglican Church, then it was very easy to consent to a politically useful piece of fiction, namely, that the Puritans had separated themselves not from the Church of England but from its vices, and were representing, to some extent, the true Church of England. Therefore, the differences between the Plymouth colony founders and the post-1629 arrivals quickly died away.

Aside from the attendant economic considerations, the Puritans set out for the colonies for two reasons: to escape persecution, and to create a true Christian Church and society in America which would serve as a lighthouse for all English Puritans and for the whole world in general.

As a result of the revolution which soon broke out in England, and then the civil wars, the New England colonies were practically independent right up to the period of the Restoration and could develop their inner potentials and according to their internal laws. Various chance happenings played an enormous role in the history of colonization: whether the ship of a given nation discovered a given land or not; or how the diplomats divided up the territory in concluding agreements, etc. A circumstance of great importance in the history of America, which a number of American historians hold to be purely accidental, was that the company set up by the Puritans somehow or other managed to get Charles I to grant it a charter not only for the colonization and governing of the lands which became later New England, but which did not specify London as the residence of the company's management *(147;* 102, 145; *153;* 45-48). The Puritans left with the charter in hand and set about creating what was practically an autonomous state. The government soon realized what it had done and was already preparing to take certain measures—too late, for revolution and civil war were already brewing in England.

The Puritans, naturally, entered into covenants among themselves and with God, they founded their congregations and, making use of charter provisions and practically unchecked, adopted legislation called upon to create a society whose purpose was the "glory of God". They were, henceforth, the "New Israel". This legislation established a very unique political system, under which all bodies of government were elected, but only Church members, the "holy ones", had the right to elect or be elected, i.e., the minority of the population (acceptance into the Church depended on the pastors and those already in the Church). All, of course, were to obey these bodies. This religious

and political system, very strange and, probably, unparalleled in history, turned the Congregationalist Church into a state Church and the Congregationalist ideology into a monopoly dominant one *(147;* ch. 7).

The Congregationalist system, the fruit of theoretical constructions, soon came to be amended and modified in practical matters. Two trends are to be seen in this evolution, which, in our opinion, are often confused by American researchers who tend to characterize any departure from the original model as the decay of New England Puritanism. In particular, this is a feature of Perry Miller, author of a series of excellent works on American Puritans *(149; 150).*

The first of these is the church trend, in which a structure similar to the Catholic one is produced at a new stage; the second trend is that of inner secularization.

While New England was, to all intents and purposes, independent, Congregationalism moved rather rapidly along the lines of this first trend. The principle of Church membership being open only to those few who had experienced a "rebirth" gradually gave way to the right of membership depending on having parents who were Church members. There arose a strong tendency to extend the membership to all inhabitants of the colonies. Centralization was taking shape in practice: synods, congresses were convened which, in point of fact, controlled the Church; they specified its theology and drew up lists of heresies. Heterodoxists and heretics, Baptists and Quakers, were banished, flagellated, imprisoned, and a few Quakers were even hanged. However, although such a tendency was manifest, the basic principles of Protestantism had a constant and powerful counter-effect on it.

As soon as the specific, hot-house conditions disappeared, with the English government imposing religious tolerance and granting civil rights to non-Congregationalists, a different tendency, that of disintegration, appeared. Congregationalism with its decentralization and the layman's major role turned out to be even less capable of establishing an ideological discipline than any other form of Protestantism. Therefore, from the end of the 17th century there was greater tolerance both towards those outside the Congregationalist current and towards the different viewpoints within it. In the 18th century, extreme rationalistic forms of theology were already in evidence. That was Arminianism, the doctrine of salvation through one's own efforts, understood not as they are in the Catholic doctrine, but as moral efforts, self-education. It was represented in the New England of the 18th century

by Jonathan Mayhew and Charles Chauncy, pastors of the aristocratic Boston congregations *(50).* Arminianism arose in Holland in the early 18th century in the intellectual bourgeois upper crust, and the struggle between Arminians and Calvinists almost brought the country to a sectarian war. In the New England of the 18th century, Arminianism was not so much adopted, rather it sprang up independently in the same social stratum. This aristocratic Arminianism ought to be differentiated from the later popular religious movements, such as Methodism, which also contained the Arminian doctrine of the role of the will in salvation but taking other, non-rationalistic forms. In the post-revolutionary period, Arminianism was followed by the spread of Unitarianism, an extremely rationalistic form of theology disclaiming the doctrine of the Trinity and the divinity of Jesus Christ.

Both of the emergent tendencies were linked with the gradual weakening of the originally extremely rigid criteria for being accepted into the Church.

Anglicanism, weakened and represented in its most graphic Protestant form, in the South, and Congregationalism in the North are the major Churches of colonial America; they alone were the state Churches. However, there were many other religious currents apart from them, the majority having been brought to American soil by people who yearned to find deliverance from religious persecution.

Thus, Catholics striving to escape persecution in England founded Maryland and assumed the role, unusual for them, of supporters of religious tolerance. Quakers, a sect with an extremely amorphous theology and very democratic structure, founded Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

From the beginning of the 18th century, Scottish and Irish Presbyterians came flooding to America. They were running both from the consequences of London's economic policy, which was bolstering England's industry at the expense of Ulster's, and from its religious policy, for, in supporting the Anglican Church of Ireland, London deprived the Presbyterians of the right to hold government posts and their pastors of the right to marry *(187;* 248-52).

When New York fell into the hands of the English, a large group of Dutch Reformers numbered among the colonies' inhabitants, as did a group of Swedish Lutheran settlers who had earlier found themselves under the power of the Dutch. Among the new arrivals were Baptists of various persuasions, German Reformers and Lutherans, Mennonites, Moravian Brethren, Judaists and representatives of tiny

German sects, Dunkers and Schwenkfelders (one of such sects, the Ephrata Society, was formed already in colonial America). In the same way as the structure of Anglicanism in the colonies was more democratic than that in England, the organization of the Swedish and German Lutheran Churches, which back home had been state Churches with an episcopal structure, were democratized in America and became similar to the Presbyterian or Congregationalist Churches *(144;* 177). The Methodists appeared before the revolution. Religious pluralism was thus consolidated. Pennsylvania was especially tolerant in religious terms, with the greatest religious pluralism. In 1776, it had 106 German Reformer congregations, 68 Presbyterian ones, 63 Lutheran, 61 Quaker, 33 Anglican, 27 Baptist, 14 Moravian Brethren, 13 Mennonite, 13 Dunker (German Baptist), 9 Catholic, and 1 Dutch Reformer *(187;* 163).

However, pluralism increased primarily through disseminating Protestant Churches that were relatively close to each other. The theological doctrines of these Churches were purged of mythological and magical elements (although to varying degrees); they were democratically organized (also to varying degrees); they had a very strong tendency for secularization from within and for religious tolerance. Inasmuch as they were not state, official Churches, but voluntary organizations, membership in them depended, to a large extent, on the individual's decision.

There were a number of reasons for the religious tolerance in America. The first was the secularization processes going on in the Protestant Churches there. However, there were other factors, too: the natural desire of the persecuted religious minorities to use the slogan of tolerance to put an end to persecution; the immigrant nature of the ethnic Churches; the possibility, then existing, of avoiding religious struggles by resettling, when the group which found itself at variance with the Church orders simply moved to another place.

The separation of the Church from the state and the freedom of religion existed in colonial America: 1) for a short while in Maryland while it was governed by the Catholics persecuted in England; 2) in Quaker Pennsylvania; 3) in Rhode Island, founded by Roger Williams who was driven out of Massachusetts, provided the theoretical and theological substantiation of religious tolerance and, right up till the end of his days, did not join any Church.

A religious movement, known as "The Great Awakening" or "The Great Revival" and which permeated all the colonies

before the revolution, played a major role in consolidating pluralism and further weakening the church forms of Protestantism. The Great Revival, as revivalism in general, is a very complex phenomenon. It has no direct analogy in Catholicism or Orthodoxy.

Externally, it consisted in the following: as a result of a sermon, generally by some visiting preacher, people would repent their sins and make up their minds to change their lifestyle and become true Christians. (For instance, George Whitefield who had come from England to go preaching around America played a major role in the Great Revival.)

Strictly speaking, that mass repentance and "rebirth" was the essence of the Revival, while the pattern of its implementation could be modified. The revival would sometimes arise through the preaching of a local pastor, which met with no response before and then suddenly evoked it. This was how the Jonathan Edwards revival came about. Revivals even came about not through sermons but perhaps through Bible studies. Revivalist meetings were generally accompanied by mass hysteria, though not in every case and largely depending on the composition of the audience.

What lay behind this exterior? First of all, let us note that although there were no mass Revivals before the 1730s, something very close to this was originally present in American Puritanism (in Congregationalism). As we have already said, the Congregationalists accepted into the Church only those who had experienced an inner "rebirth". In our opinion, although this principle has a profound theological basis, it is, primarily, the theological, organizational (and psychological) equivalent of the social situation of English Puritanism, which long existed as a trend and, partly, as an organization of an integrated minority. Such a religious current, unlike the religious doctrines and organizations of an ethnically or quasi-ethnically segregated minority, exists through voluntary and conscious decisions, conversions.

A completely new situation arose when Congregationalism became the dominant ideology in New England. Children were already brought up in the ideology which their fathers consciously accepted and there were no more conversions. Congregationalism was, in point of fact, no longer a voluntary organization. However, as its theology and organization evolved in a voluntary situation, and since, in order to become a Church member, according to the regulations, one had to tell the congregation of one's "conversion", this resulted in the paradoxical situation

where the Church, having become dominant, was because of this in danger of disappearing, for even in the second generation there were few who could tell of their "conversion" in all honesty. This gave rise to theological currents whose aim was to move the idea of conversion into the background and to the tendency to extend Church membership to include all believers and those whose sins were not blatantly manifest (as in the more church-regulated Presbyterianism).

In the same way, although in covenant theology any misfortune of the "chosen" people is interpreted as punishment for sins, and, correspondingly, repentance is constantly preached, this theme quickly became a routine hackneyed phrase and, for the time being, led to no Revivals.

Subsequently, however, under the influence of the changing political situation and secularization, Congregationalism not only stopped being the totally prevailing ideology, but America altogether became a country of many and various voluntary religious organizations. Then along came the Revival. This Revival took different theological forms (both as a return to pure Calvinism—Jonathan Edwards, George Whitefield, and something completely different—Arminian Methodism) and spread through very different religions, areas and groups. The motley theological forms of the Revival indicate that its causes lie not in theology, but in something else.

In our opinion, the Revival became necessary with people breaking away from the Church or purely formally belonging to it, with no ideology available that provided an alternative moral basis. For many people in the 18th century the old forms of Congregationalism and other religious ideologies became a medley of empty words. At the same time, as a result of the growing official tolerance, even the state Churches increasingly became voluntary organizations. This led to the formal, factual and spiritual rejection of religion. However, if morality is based on religion, and if rejection of religion does not mean adopting an ideology giving another basis to that same (or another) morality, then the rejection of religion is the rejection of morality. This is not a conscious negation of it, but merely people acting in ways which they themselves ought to regard as amoral, inasmuch as there are no other criteria of morality than those religious values which have been instilled in them in childhood. Amoral actions, if the person is aware of them as such and has no means of disregarding them or explaining them away, bring about the disintegration of the self. In this situation, the Revivalist preaching is a means of reintegration. (The

psychology of sudden religious conversions is described by William James in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. He is, however, poorly acquainted with the non-American forms of religion and, in our opinion, exaggerates their role in religious psychology.) The Revival is a mass crisis of the kind when many people, recognizing themselves to be sinners, are "converted" under outside influence in the form of Revivalist sermons. The ideological system created by the American revolution was, as we shall see, founded on voluntary religious organizations and the lack of ideologies alternative to religious ones. This led to Revivals later becoming a permanent feature of religious life in the U.S.A., giving it a pulsating, feverish character.

The Revival implies re-focussing from abstract theology to ethics, from the regulated, logical sermon to emotionalism and even showmanship, from regulated organization to charisma. Therefore, Revivalism is fraught with schisms and especially dangerous for the most established church forms of Protestantism.

The Great Awakening gave rise to a number of schisms and provoked an invasion of Revivalist persuasions, primarily the spread of Baptism and, subsequently, Methodism, in the Anglican South. In this way it consolidated religious pluralism and the positions of the Church laying less emphasis on dogma and cult.

4. The Social Influence of Religion in Colonial America and the Formation of the American Bourgeois System of Values

When people really do believe in the truth of a certain dogmatic theological system, and in the 17th and even 18th century Congregationalist, Presbyterian and other dogmas were real objects of faith, the most abstract theological ideas have a living and real influence on people's behavior, not only where this or that mode of behavior is simply and dogmatically prescribed, but also in those spheres where a theological system contains no such direct precepts.

Firstly, the very absence of dogmatic precepts in one sphere or other also influences a man's behavior in this sphere. Secondly, a precept in one sphere influences other spheres inasmuch as all areas and aspects of human activity are interrelated. Thus, Calvinism does not dogmatically define any concrete state structure. Moreover, it teaches that the Christian must accept the structure existing in his country and always unquestioningly obey authority

when this authority does not contradict religion. However, at the same time, it demands that the individual and society devote their whole life to the "glory of God". The Christian must destroy all that is sinful, everything that is fraught with temptation, while concern for public morality is his duty. In practice, however, these demands were incompatible with the arbitrary rule of absolute monarchy. There were no direct precepts: there could be a constitutional monarchy, a republic, but with Calvinism dominant an absolute monarchy was practically impossible, although it was not forbidden. Influence here was neither immediate nor uniform, but it was present.

Where religion prescribes something direct and dogmatic its influence is naturally the same. If the social situation does not allow this direct and unequivocal precept to be carried out, religion simply disappears. However, where there is no such direct demand, religion acts as one of the factors determining the social result.

Let us take the same example of the influence of Calvinism on the state structure. Its influence everywhere had the same tendency—towards limiting the arbitrary power of authority, consolidating the pastorage's political significance and enforcing strict moralistic laws. But the results were different in different historical and social conditions. In Geneva, this took the form of the consolidation of an oligarchical republic which had come into being before Calvin's time, and which was in keeping with the structure of the Swiss towns with which it formed an alliance. In the Netherlands, oligarchical republics were likewise consolidated, but they were bound up by the authority of the hereditary Statthalters, for the Netherlands, arising as an independent state and differing from Switzerland in its geographic position, international status and social structure, required a more powerful central authority. In Scotland and England, this resulted in the authority of the sovereign being constitutionally restricted. The result everywhere was determined by both Calvinism and the local situation.

Therefore, if we are to understand the social role of American denominations during the colonial period, we must take into account both the influence of religion and the effect of the social factors unconnected with religion.

The growth of knowledge and the special attitudes to knowledge. We have already said that Protestantism, in its Calvinist variant in particular, by placing the believer

face to face with the Bible, by demanding that he read it every day, increased the importance of the knowledge and intellect of the common believer. Therefore, on the one hand, Calvinism spread more successfully among the literate strata of society and in those traditional areas of literacy. It is common knowledge that Protestantism spread primarily among the urban population and was resisted by the peasant masses in the countryside. The traditionally literate areas in 16th-century Europe were the cantons of Switzerland and Holland *(189;* Vol. III, 450). On the other hand, Calvinism furthered education and literacy, spreading it to areas with a pre-Calvinist low level of literacy. The 17th century Calvinist Netherlands, notable for a high level of education in comparison with other countries, was a country of general literacy with a Latin school in every town and a university in every province *(53;* 142). In Scotland, Calvinism brought about a real revolution in the people's education (*138;* 209).

Schools were set up in every settlement in the Puritan colonies of New England and their inhabitants became one hundred per cent literate within a very short space of time.

Unlike several other religious currents, for which literacy was just as important, but which attached no importance to higher education, the Puritans demanded that the pastors explaining the Bible be equipped with a thorough, up-to-date knowledge, that they be well-versed in classical languages, logic and theology. Just six years after the settlers had first arrived on the American continent, the Massachusetts authorities allocated funds for founding a university, Harvard, whose degrees and diplomas came to be on par with those of Oxford and Cambridge. Harvard was founded at a time when wolves still stalked the streets at night in the towns of Massachusetts. The percentage of illiterate people in Anglican Virginia in the colonial period was significantly greater than in New England *(59;* 289). Typically, the level of literacy in Presbyterian Ulster in the 18th century was considerably higher than in England *(187;* 26).

In America, by the time of the revolution, 9 colleges and 40 printing works had been set up. By the year 1800, 180 newspapers were in circulation, that is, over two-thirds their number in England although the population of America was half that of England (all these facts have been gathered and analyzed in Daniel Boorstin's book *(59).*

At the same time, as researchers into colonial America note, it is not only the major role of knowledge and the great craving for it which were typical there, but also

the untraditional nature of science, which developed rather rapidly, relying on experience and without taking traditional principles and theories into account, not so much refuting as disregarding them.

This lack of respect for theoretical tradition in science turned into a lack of interest in theory in general and was logically and psychologically linked with utilitarian, pragmatic attitudes towards knowledge, when practical results are the most valued.

Boorstin gives a good account of these specific features in the development of American science and American attitude towards knowledge in the colonial period, explaining them as the result of the specific features of the colonial situation—the shortage of professional bearers of scientific tradition, the unexpected problems arising in a new country, rendering the old theories useless and calling for emphasis on practical work, etc. He clearly shows the difference between English and American physicians in the 18th century. The English physician never practiced midwifery or surgery and always used one method of healing, dictated by one of the rival theories. The American physician, often an amateur with no diploma, cured toothache, delivered babies, carried out operations and was prepared to use any, most "unscientific" popular methods as long as they worked *(59;* ch. 8). In our opinion, however, Boorstin exaggerates the significance of the colonial situation. After all, all of this—the new conditions, shortage of professional people—existed also in South America and in Siberia, yet did not lead to similar results. It is rather the interaction of the colonial situation and the special religious features of the colonies which was in evidence here.

By refuting the value of tradition in the sphere of religion, Protestantism was obviously conducive to forming such non-traditional thought in general, to an open-mindedness to the new knowledge. The special features of the colonial situation actualized a certain potential in the attitude to knowledge inherent in Protestantism; the open-mindedness born of the colonial situation merged with that inherent in Protestantism, and the two strengthened each other.

In our opinion, at the same time, a specifically pragmatic, utilitarian attitude towards knowledge, which Boorstin talks of, was linked not only with the colonial situation, but also with the specific features of the American variants of Protestantism. Firstly, such an attitude was related to the measure of social success, which in turn was determined by the American form of Calvinist ethics, something

we shall speak about at a later stage. Secondly, this pragmatism corresponded to the Calvinist idea of dedicating the whole of one's life to the "glory of God": if the discovery of something new and useful is a blessing, for it glorifies God in his works, then "empty" philosophizing, as any "empty", "pointless" action, is a sin. Thirdly, the American Churhes did not place such heavy fetters of dogma and ideological discipline on man, as the majority of European Churches did, and by this very fact did not evoke a particular desire to shatter these fetters. A disinterested, non-utilitarian attitude to science obviously exists when people are seeking the answers to "world enigmas" and existential problems in science, in knowledge; when they are seeking an integral world outlook, revealing the purpose of life. Theory, philosophy takes first place in this case. However, if religion is not felt to be fetters which man has to free himself from, then no special interest is shown towards theory.

The disappearance of the vestiges of the feudal system of hereditary status and the rise of legal equality values. Protestantism in general and Calvinism in particular do not demand legal equality, as they in themselves generally do not define a socio-political structure. However, the Protestant principle of universal priesthood proclaims equality in the religious sphere, while the democratic organization of Congregationalism establishes factual equality in Church organizations to a considerable extent (this also concerns other American denominations, especially the Baptists and Quakers). At the same time, the idea of devoting the entire life of society to the "glory of God", covenant theology and membership in the Church of only the "converted" are somewhat at odds with established hereditary status. All these features of Protestantism in general and Calvinism and Congregationalism in particular tip the scales in favor of legal equality. However, the extent of this influence, the moderate or, on the contrary, radical character of the socio-political doctrinal conclusions, depends on concrete conditions.

The conditions in colonial America were conducive to the maximum development of the tendency towards legal equality. Firstly, the socio-political system in New England was created by the settlers themselves, and New England was practically independent for a long time. And although Congregationalism could assimilate an already existing system of hereditary status to one extent or another, when the Congregationalists founded their own society themselves,

they naturally did not strive to create institutions which did not reflect their own doctrines. They founded a society which, in the 17th century, stood out for its egalitarianism in legal terms. It is typical that the least democratic of the Protestant Churches, the Anglican, had another effect on the social structure. Society in Anglican Virginia was the most aristocratic, taking aristocratic England as its model. Virginian aristocratism and Virginian Anglicanism were rather unstable and the Virginian aristocracy, hemmed in by the trading policy of England, sided with the revolution. In New England, on the other hand, all the aristocratic and pro-English elements, all those who considered the English order to be the ideal and who later became loyalists, consciously embraced Anglicanism.

Secondly, aside from religious and political factors, colonization and immigration in themselves are conducive to weakening and even destroying feudal hierarchical links. This was the case in South America, French Canada and in Siberia. If colonization happens not at once, but, as it was in America, ever new settlements are constantly being founded in the wild lands, the creation of a new hierarchical system of hereditary status is considerably impeded.

Religion and the social situation had an effect along the same lines. Gradually, the idea that all men are equal emerged more and more clearly already in the colonial period, i.e., the idea that innate differences are neither essential nor important, that hereditary differences in status conditioned by one's circumstances at birth should not exist or should be as insignificant as possible. Of course, in the pre-revolutionary period this value did not completely supplant the traditional English piety towards the aristocracy, but all the same, the whole idea of equality was immeasurably stronger here than in England.

However, this value of equality seemed to strangely coexist with a feature common to the majority of Americans (with the obvious exception of the Quakers)—their inhumane attitude towards Indians and blacks. They were considerably crueller in their attitude than the Spaniards, Brazilians, and French Canadians brought up in the authoritarian, hierarchical Catholic tradition. The latter had a rather significant number of mixed marriages, whereas there were practically none among the Anglo-Americans. These by their cold attitude towards converting the Indians and blacks to Christianity, contrasted rather sharply with the Catholic missionaries, who, despite all the difficulties and dangers, cropped up in all cor-

ners of America.

This feature, to which Louis Hartz drew attention, is in many ways connected with the Calvinist roots of the American value of equality. Just as for Catholics the hierarchy of salvation was logically and psychologically linked with the hierarchical structure of the Church and society, so for the Calvinists, the absence of a hierarchy of salvation was linked with the full equality of the redeemed, with equality which knows no degree of legality. Calvinist equality within the religious community was originally that of the redeemed who had no traditions, no hierarchy of salvation. This equality implied the absolute inequality of the damned who were just as equal among themselves in their perdition and, unlike the Catholics, had no hierarchy of perdition.

The theological idea of the equality of the redeemed can be transformed into a political equality during the process of secularization. However, if for some reason or other the idea of equality leaves out some groups of people, no semitones are possible. These are no longer people. It is easy for the Catholic to recognize someone as a human being and Christian, without recognizing him as his equal. For the Calvinist, however, this is impossible. Let us note that the idea of the equality of whites and of democracy, combined with the refusal to acknowledge the equality of blacks and whites, still exists in yet another Calvinist society—that of the Boers. In South Africa today, the system of apartheid is condemned by the Anglican and other Churches, while the Reformer Boer Church does not condemn this svstem, but, on the contrary, supports it.

The attitude towards social success. Strict Puritan morality demanded that man labor constantly and arduously. In Protestantism, especially Calvinism, labor, as everyday life in general, became the main sphere where salvation is apparent, visible. However, this also changes the attitude towards the success brought by labor. According to Max Weber, Calvinism turned wealth gained by honest work (which is aimed at the salvation of the soul and not the mere enjoyment of wealth) into the external sign of salvation. It is now becoming increasingly clear that Weber exaggerated in many ways *(218;* 61-115; 76; 88-111), vulgarizing and simplifying Calvinism. It never did maintain that wealth would lead to salvation, that the poor would perish, and that the honest, "redeemed" and hard-working man would always achieve social success as the external sign of his salvation. Nevertheless, the fruits of his labors, success, acquired another meaning. To waste one's

talents, to do less for the "glory of God" than one can is a sin, and, conversely, work and the achieving of success is the road to salvation, one's duty.

Let us turn our attention to yet another instance which must have consolidated the significance of social success in the eyes of American settlers. Social success should be all the more valued, the more society is seen as being correctly organized. The Puritan's lack of social success under Charles I in England, when the "tyranny of the prelates" reigned, was naturally not the sign of his damnation, but very likely, just the opposite, of his salvation. However, the lack of social success in New England, where nothing stood in the way of the honest Christian, was another matter altogether. The very fact that he acknowledged the correctness of the social structure (no clearly established status) ought to have signified the striving for success. However, it is money that is the measure of success. Therefore, although Weber exaggerated and simplified Calvinism he correctly indicated the direction of Calvinist influence. It encouraged the growth of bourgeois attitudes, which, in their turn, consolidated the value of success. The concern for the salvation of the soul falling into second place in the process of secularization did not mean that the value of success was lessened. On the contrary, as we can already see in Franklin, it was moved to the fore and transformed into a self-sufficing value.

The influence on the growth of bourgeois-democratic institutions and the attitude towards the law. The Puritans, once in America, set up what was, to all intents and purposes, a republican form of government. This not only concerned the New England colonies as a whole, but also every individual town, community, which in itself represented micro-republics. What was the source of this republican form of government? They were many.

Firstly, it was obviously the natural form of government in a situation where the monarchy, although present, was far across the sea, and the settlers, in accordance with their charter and the actual state of affairs, made their own laws themselves. Here, the question arises: is not immigration and colonization in itself predisposed to republican forms in the political structure? The analogy suggests itself with the political structure of the Cossacks in Russia—immigrants, colonists in the outlands, who also set up elective bodies where members could be removed by, and were answerable to, those electing them. If this analogy holds true, then it clarifies the effect of the religious

factor. The republics of the American colonists had their prototype in the structure of their religious communities, and the republican system was connected with the values arising from the special features of religion. So, here republicanism was easily transformed into the principle of answerability of the rulers, into the idea whereby the law should not apply to those who did not take part in adopting it (via their representatives), into basic republicanism and anti-monarchism. Meanwhile, the "republican" system of the Cossacks had absolutely no connections with the Orthodox faith, and rather contradicted it. Nor was it transformed into a principle, a value. With their extreme fidelity to their electoral institutions, if the Cossacks rose in revolt, it was not in the name of the republic but in the name of the good, kind tsar.

Secondly, the republican form of government already existed in the congregation. This form was naturally transferred to the political structure.

Thirdly, covenant theology implied that the relationship between the government and the governed was contractual, which conformed most to the republican form of government.

The settlers established their own laws, determined their own taxes and paid them to those they themselves elected. Gradually, the idea of the people as the only natural source of power and law became a principle no longer directly depending either on theology or the needs of the obtaining situation. The battlecry of the American revolution "No taxes without representation" was nothing new, the ground for it having been laid by the entire development of religious thinking in the colonies.

However, together with the inclination for republican forms of government and the idea that the law should be established by those to whom it applies, there were other tendencies modifying this attitude to law. The Puritan leaders limited the right to vote by religious qualifications and countered any attempts to widen the people's role in the process of law-making, concentrating it in their own hands. They were extremely averse to the terms "democracy" and "republic" and called their own system "the monarchy of the Lord God". William Ames, one of the pillars of English Congregationalist theology, said the following of the congregation as a form of development: "The forme of this polity is altogether monarchicall in respect of Christ, the head and King, but as touching the visible and vicarious administration, it is of a mixt nature, partly as it were aristocraticall /meaning here not hereditary status, but in this case, the power of the elected minority—*Auth. /,* and partly as it were democraticall" *(147;* 172).

This was not only a question of striving to retain their power, or fear of the English monarchy. They were ruled by the fear that democracy meant the rule of the people who would then be controlled by nothing except their own will. Meanwhile, the aim of the system which they wished to set up was the "glory of God". The purpose of their laws was not to satisfy the "caprices" of the people, nor even their happiness, as the leaders understood it to be, but still the "glory of God", the maximum possible realization - of Christian principles. Therefore, the source of law was not only those who established it and to whom it applied; it was also God, the Bible. As John Cotton said: "The more the law reeks of man, the worse it is" *(43;* 159). The law was, therefore, to a certain extent higher than those who drew it up and passed. The law was higher than the will of the people and God alone was higher than the law.

Covenant theology gradually died away in the process of secularization. However, the idea of social contract did not and, moreover, it finally turned into principled republicanism and anti-monarchism. The idea of devoting the entire life of society to the "glory of God" also died away, but respect for the law and viewing it as something greater than the consolidation of the will of the people were preserved and modified, with the value of democracy and the idea of people being the source of power thus downgraded.

The attitude towards the past and the future. An immanent feature of Christianity is that it is future-orientated: the Last Judgement, the Resurrection of the Dead, the Second Coming. These are a certain potential of progressivism. However, it is merely a potential, for the age from redemption to the Last Judgement is not conceived of as one of progress, of gradual improvement. The Last Judgement will come unexpectedly. Moreover, the era directly preceding it is portrayed in the Apocalypse as one of great horrors. Protestantism, especially Calvinism, as it were, actualized the progressivist potential of Christian ideology, primarily by the very fact of the Reformation. The Protestant cannot regard the past as the ideal, for this would deny the necessity of the Reformation. The ideal lies only in the pre-historic past of the early Christian community, the immediate past being the rule of "papist insanity". The "Light of the Gospel" only began shining out a relatively short while ago and grew as the Reformation spread to new lands, and, an even more important factor, "deepened". Since Protestantism, having rejected the dogma, suggested that the process of the Reformation had

not ended with Luther and Calvin, the "Light of the Gospel" should shine even brighter in the time to come. For the New England Puritan, creating the true Christian society at last, the era before Henry VIII was that of impenetrable darkness. Then the light shone, and ever more brightly, and finally with all its might in New England.

At the same time, the idea of the Last Judgement was relegated to the background. The tense expectation of the "Second Coming" was peculiar only to the sectarians, not to the Calvinists. The idea arose that the "Second Coming" would take place once the true Christian society had triumphed everywhere on earth. This is already close to progressivism. The future should be better and better, as is God's plan, but it is realized through people and, ultimately, by people.

This future-orientation was nourished by the real economic, territorial and cultural growth of America. To the American settler progress was real and manifest, for towns now existed where wild animals had earlier stalked. There was no doubt that they would spring up tomorrow where wild animals still stalked.

This is very close to the progressivism of the French Enlighteners. Nevertheless, there was a limit as to how close they could come to this, for "pure" progressivism would mean a break with Christianity.

The aim, the thousand-year kingdom, remained rather transcendent, movement towards it not fully depending on us, and moral rebirth, rather than an instrumental action, turned out to be the means of achieving it. Progress remained a vague, indefinite and uncertain orientation into the future.

Attitude to society. The Puritan aim of building a true Christian society in America was not only their own, but also that of God, their "Manifest Destiny". They were the new Israel, the chosen people. Did this mean that their society was the ideal, the supreme value to which all other values were subordinated? Yes and no. This was, of course, the optimum earthly society, yet, at the same time, not quite the ideal. The ideal remained transcendent, it could not be fully realized on earth. All men would have to be reborn for this, something which, in the Calvinist's belief, did not depend on man himself. Although, to be sure, during the Great Revival, a time of mass conversions, there were many who believed it was the beginning of the thousand-year kingdom and that God had initiated it in his chosen land—America. Meanwhile, individuals and society as a whole continued to sin all the while. However, this did not mean that it stopped being the "chosen people".

Israel had sinned but had remained the chosen one. However, this meant that society not only could, but also should be criticized, just as the prophets in the Bible exposed Israel's sins. Criticism of the vices of society was a constant theme in Puritan sermons, which were filled with talk of complete moral degradation and of universal degradation. However, this in no way meant that society was not the chosen one. It was God's will that chose and no matter how sinful society might be, it undoubtedly remained the best one on earth and was undoubtedly the chosen one. Thus, the attitude towards society was very complex, combining its absolute and unconditional acceptance with constant moral criticism.

There was one more complication—ambivalence. Since New England was a "model" society, the lighthouse of the Reformation, this implied expansionism and propagation. However, it was well known that salvation did not depend on man, that together with those predestined to be redeemed there were those predestined to be damned, and "saints" should separate themselves from the sinful world. New England itself arose as a means of such isolation.

In the process of secularization these attitudes to society became divorced from their theological basis. America had been appointed to realize great, albeit not quite clear, goals, it should be the lighthouse of freedom for all mankind. While the Revivalists expected that the thousand-year kingdom was about to begin in America, Jefferson wrote: "Even should the cloud of barbarism and despotism again obscure the science and liberties of Europe, this country remains to preserve and restore light and liberty to them" *(116;* 241). And there is the ambivalence of these attitudes. On the one hand, America was a light-house, a model. On the other, in order to preserve its purity, it ought to stand out, remove itself from the dirt, separate itself from England which was rotten through.

And so, the special features of the American Protestant Churches, Congregationalism in the first place, had a great influence both on the life of society and on the people's attitude towards it, an influence all the stronger since other factors, the specific conditions of colonial America, were operating along the same lines.

These conditions are those of colonization, when a society springs up in an empty place, when there are no traditional institutions which have arisen under the domi-

nation of another ideology and which have to be reckoned with. This absence of traditions actualizes the potential inherent in the religious ideology.

To this must be added: a) the conscious yearning of the founders of the colonies of New England to put their religious principles into practice to the utmost; b) the rather great opportunities for so doing, connected with the remoteness of the English government and the considerable independence from the mother country.

When no particular obstacles lay in the way of this, neither on the part of the traditional institutions, nor of a foreign power, the theological conclusions were consolidated in the social institutions. The influence of these institutions, in turn, consolidated these conclusions in people's minds, turning them into self-evident "values", principles of conduct and attitude towards the world, which already in many ways did not depend on theological substantiation. Thus, the idea of the value of social success, legal equality, the sanctity of the covenant and the law furthered the development of the bourgeois relations, and, reciprocally, the development of these relations consolidated the values. The values of legal equality and sanctity of the law helped the development of elective institutions of colonial self-government. Again, these same institutions consolidated these very values.

That which is instilled in daily sermons, in books and tracts, by the very life of society, instilled from the very childhood, becomes, naturally, a lasting feature of mentality, already in the realm of semi-instinctive. Even when the old ideology turns out to be incapable of changing under the influence of the new knowledge and of society's progressive development, collapses and is replaced by a new ideology, its values do not disappear without a trace. They are preserved in many ways and can even transform the new ideology (example—Confucianism and Maoism in China). However, in colonial America secularization took a completely different path. It took the form of the internal modification and corruption of a group of related Protestant religions, not the negation of theological systems as a whole, but only their certain modification (the transition from old Puritanism to Edwardianism or Arminianism), of increased religious tolerance and the diminishing importance of specifically theological problems. The system of values remained intact in this form of secularization. Moreover, it sprouted from theology and began to exist independently. The writing and life of Jefferson, Adams, Washington and other half-believers contain that very system of values arising out of

Protestantism in the form it took in American beliefs and conditions. This system of values was all the stronger for its roots, for it was shared by both Calvinists, Deists, Baptists and Unitarians. This means it was interpreted not as the outcome of a certain ideology, in which, ultimately, one could be disappointed and which could be rejected, but as something natural, common to all of America and the whole of mankind.

5. The American Bourgeois Revolution and Religion

The American bourgeois revolution sharply differs from the bourgeois revolutions in Europe by the extreme stability of the political structures it created. While the Great French Revolution of 1789, the first in a series of French revolutions, marks the beginning of constantly changing forms of government during the entire history of France in the New Age, the American revolution, the first and the last in the history of the U.S.A., created a constitution which has functioned throughout the nation's entire history. This distinctive stability of the outcome of the revolution must be linked with its very nature which, in turn, is inseparable from its distinctive ideological content.

One of the most important features of the American revolution was the relative easiness of the tasks before it. It was by no means such a grandiose revolution encompassing every sphere of life as the French one did. American colonial society, on the one hand, did not bring along the more traditional feudal elements of English society, because these elements were generally only transferred to the colony with difficulty and because the settlers did not belong to the traditionalist, conservative strata of English society. On the other hand, they brought with them new, non-traditionalist religious ideologies that gave rise to the system of values described above. With no strong control exercised by the mother country due to both the long distance geographically and to England's bourgeois and constitutional evolution, the colonies developed in many ways independently. By the time of the revolution in America there were practically no feudal landowners, no class divisions, no guild privileges. The state Churches were extremely weak. Bourgeois relations were developing rapidly. The political system in the colonies was that of a limited, but, nevertheless, bourgeois democracy. The American revolutionaries did not have to destroy the existing institutions right down to their foundations and

create essentially new ones, since they already corresponded to the demands of the bourgeois development of America to a great extent.

However, the colonial system resting on a bourgeois-democratic foundation was crowned with a traditionalist, feudal roof—that of the power of the English monarchy. This power in 18th-century England was already very weak and was controlled by Parliament. However, the members of Parliament itself were in many ways connected with the traditional privileges of various English boroughs. The settlers had no representatives in Parliament. The economic policy of the English government and Parliament took no account of their interests and ran counter to them. The prime target of the revolution was, therefore, the liberation from the English royal authority and from that of the English Parliament. The revolution turned into a war of independence. Comparing this task with that of colossal reconstruction which lay ahead of the French revolution, we can see that it was relatively minor. Just as the task in hand, the ideological content of the revolution was relatively minor, too.

By their attitude towards religion, the European bourgeois revolutions can be divided into two categories: 1) denominational (the Netherlands, England); 2) anti-clerical (France, and various Catholic countries subsequently). The difference between these revolutions is not only confined to time (although the denominational revolutions took place earlier), but is also typological, connected with the various paths of secularization, the various forms of the bourgeois ideologies, the various paths of bourgeois development.

Meanwhile, the American revolution belongs neither to one group nor the other. It was neither denominational nor anti-clerical for a very simple reason: there was neither a religion capable of uniting the American bourgeoisie, the American people, nor one, in the struggle against which the American bourgeoisie and people could have been united. Only traces or never developed embryos of anti-clerical and denominational forms of bourgeois revolutionary ideology are to be seen in the American revolution.

The anti-clerical tinge on the ideology of the revolution is to be seen in the spread of deism among its leaders (in a mild form in Jefferson, in a glaringly un-Christian French form in the deism of Paine), in the struggle of Madison, Jefferson and others imbued with ideas of the Enlightenment and deistic tendencies, who fought to abolish the state

Anglican Church in Virginia and, later, for the adoption of the first amendment to the Constitution, separating the Church from the state and abolishing religious qualificat-ons. To be sure, the sectar far from deism and the ideas of the Enlightenment, played no less a role in this struggle *(106;* ch. III). Such an alliance of highly educated, free-minded men, whose tolerance and demands for freedom of conscience arose from their scepticism, with barely literate sectarians, whose demands for freedom of conscience arose from their desire to be left in peace, was made more than once in the history of Protestantism. (See the article by Waldo Beach "Secta-rianism and Scepticism: The Strange Allies of Religious Liberty" *(171;* 199-211).

Traces of the denominational forms are to be seen in the anti-Catholic slogans connected with the publicity-targeted fantastic interpretation of the Act of Quebec, in the pre revolution struggle against th Anglican loyalists of New England, and, conversely, the Congregationalists' and Presbyterians' unqualified support for the revolution. The attitude of individual denominations to the American revolution depended to a large extent on how close they were to the Church and the democratic poles of the Reformation. It is interesting to note that the American Lutherans (Lutheranism was less radical than Calvinism, although it was less church-regulated than the High Church wing of Anglicanism) basically took a neutral stance towards the revolution. Not because they were Germans. The German and Dutch Reformers (Calvinists) supported the revolution *(188;* 45).

Thus, only traces of the anti-clerical and denominational forms of ideology are to be found in the ideology of the American revolution. What did this ideology represent?

The denominational and anti-clerical forms of the ideolog- of the revolution are rela and political ideas of each logically following from its world outlook. The ideology of American revolutionaries was not such an integral system. Strictly speaking, it was precisely that system of values spoken of earlier, which had broken away from its theological foundations. Therefore, if we wish to explain wherein lies the difference in the ideology of the two warring and killing parties and armies, on the one side the revolutionaries, on the other the English and the Loyalists, it is a rather difficult task, strange as it may seem.

On the one hand, we can point to the differences in how they evaluated the problems: the English and the Loyalists were more aristocratic and paid more attention to the hereditary status than the Americans did. The former, however, by no means supported the caste system, whereas the latter were not so opposed to any hint of aristocracy. The differences here were rather of degree.

The Americans attached greater importance to the governm-nt's answerability to its authority, its independence. However, Locke, whose ideas nourished the American revolution, was by no means prohibited in England. On the contrary, although time moved him somewhat into the background, he nevertheless had been the ideologist of the 1689 revolution, which had established the then existing structure in England. Then again, such a man as Alexander Hamilton figured among the American revolutionaries. The Americans were more progressive, whereas the English and the Loyalists were more traditionalistic. Here, however, there were also nuances and degrees. In the ideology of the revolution a distinctive conservatism existed alongside the progress-ve tendency. The revolution their ancient rights and privileges safe from the tyrannical innovations of the sovereign's authority.

On the other hand, we can point out a series of rather narrow legal and politico-economic questions, on which the opposing sides were divided: whether a parliament which the colonists did not elect should have the right to represent them; whether it was possible and how to organize their representation in Parliament; which taxes Parliament had the right to impose on them and which not, etc.

On the one hand, all this looks too amorphous, on the other, too sober and utilitarian for the ideology of the revolution. The European would find it difficult to understand how one could take up arms and lay down one's life not for the sake of the True Faith, not for the sake of establishing the Age of Reason, but so as not to have to pay what seemed to be an illegal tax.

This can be interpreted both as amazing idealism and as amazing pragmatism, but in any case, not what we are used to.

In our opinion, the explanation for this soberness, this "pettiness" and amorphousness should be sought in the distinctive relationship between the ideology of the revolution and religion.

First of all, we can establish a link between this soberness and "pettiness", and certain features of the Americ-n Protestant religion whic

tion, broke away from their theological basis and were consolidated in the system of values, in psychology. The Calvinist doctrine, by transferring salvation into everyday life, obliterated the lines between the temporal and the holy. Although private and public life were neither dogmatically nor formally regulated, their every aspect took on a religious significance. The entire life of man and the community should be subordinated to the "glory of God". Therefore, although the Bible uses no direcdy dogmatic terms in laying down what the social structure should be, any legal question became a matter of religious principle. A social contract was not only a contract among people, it was also one between them and God.

This type of theology cultivates an extremely serious attitude towards legal questions, the attitude that can survive even when theology falls into the background and is no longer of any special significance. Just as the structure of a Puritan community (not of a congregation, but of a political community) was not a question of dogma, yet did not imply religious indifference either, so the legal questions of the revolution, neither philosophical nor dogmatic ones, were, nevertheless, matters of principle, of extreme psychological significance.

What was the relationship between the revolutionary solution of these questions and religion? Religion in the colonies was such that it could provide a revolutionary answer to these questions, could recognize them as important from the religious point of view and sanctify revolutionary principles by its authority. True, answers would not be obtained directly from some denominational tenets, for the ideology of the revolution did not take a denominational form. But the religious consecration of revolutionary principles did not become the weaker for this. These principles were consecrated not by one, but practically all denominations existing in America at that time. The American revolutionaries remained practicing Anglicans, Congregationalists, Presbyterians and even Catholics and Judaists. The pastors and priests of these Churches said in their sermons that the cause of the colonies was God's cause and that it was the Christian's duty to fight against the tyranny of the King and Parliament. The revolutionary principles and slogans were thus consecrated by religion in general. This consecration of political and legal principles by the authority of *religion in general* was expressed in that famous phrase in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,

Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" *(161;* 125).

In this situation the ideology of the revolution could not be turned into an integrated ideological system and (from the viewpoint of the interests of the bourgeois revolution) was unnecessary. The American revolutionaries were aware of these features in their revolution. Some of them directly contrasted them to the "philosophical" character of the French revolution, which character they unambiguously condemned. John Adams, referring to the French revolution, wrote: "The precipitation and temerity of philosophers has, I fear, retarded the progress of improvement and amelioration in the condition of mankind for at least one hundred years" *(59;* 154).

The American revolution separated the Church from the state, the first case in history. In the U.S.A., however, this was not the result of the revolution's anti-clericalism. It resulted merely through the fading away of denominational differences and religious pluralism: there was no dominant Church which could have become the state Church. Therefore, in separating the Church from the state, the revolutionaries, at the same time, stressed their piety in every way, having constant recourse to Christian symbols: Congress heard regular sermons from its own chaplains, declared days of public fasting and thanksgiving when the entire Congress went to church. In Washington's army, blasphemers (the concept of blasphemy was given extremely wide treatment) wore wooden collars *(188;* 51).

The combination of political and religious elements in the ideology of the revolution was just as distinctive as that of the ideology of the revolution and national awareness. The American revolution was both a political revolution and a war of independence. The revolution's main enemies were in England, not America (although there were also supporters of the King in America); the War of Independence was something between a civil war of the type which broke out in England in the 17th century and the national liberation movement, such as the war the Algerians waged against the French. Nationalism, however, did not become the ideology of the revolution for one simple reason—the Americans were, as yet, not a united nation. National self-awareness had not yet been formed in them; they did not regard themselves as one particular nation, but as Englishmen living in Virginia, Maryland, etc., and also as Swedes, Germans and Irish. Therefore, while independence in India, Burma, Algeria and Iraq was conditioned by national self-awareness in these countries, it was the American Declaration of Independence, on the contrary, that gave rise to national self-awareness, the feeling of "we

Americans" in an independent state. George Washington, in proving to the Americans that they were indeed one nation (something which did not have to be proved to the French or Germans) appealed to their common ideology and to the fact of the revolution: "The name of AMERICAN, which belongs to you, in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of Patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local circumstances. With slight shades of difference, you have the same Religion, Manners, Habits, and political Principles—you have in a common cause fought and triumphed together" *(161*; 32).

The consecration of the ideology of the revolution by religion, and, to a certain extent, by national feeling made up for the revolution's emotional poverty, amorphousness of the ideology and the weakness of its pseudo-religious aspect characteristic of the French revolution. This weakness was reflected in the very course of the revolution and in its character.

Unlike the French revolution, it was less cruel, not as bloody. Although Loyalists were killed, sent into exile and deprived of their property, there were no mass executions, no guillotine. The revolutionaries and the Loyalists saw each other as political enemies, but, nevertheless, as humans, not fiends against whom any and every means were justified.

The difference in relations within the revolutionary camp was especially striking. In the French revolution, the differences between the revolutionaries immediately assumed major proportions, led to a series of attempted coups, and successful ones, too, and the representatives of all revolutionary groups followed the counter-revolutionaries on the road to the guillotine clearing the way for the Thermidor and, later, Napoleon. This has no parallel in the U.S.A. The differences between the supporters and opponents of the federal constitution, and, later, between the Federalists and the Republicans, can be compared with those within the French camp; Jefferson's victory can be interpreted as the continued development of the revolution, as a phenomenon similar, in the French revolution, to that from Mirabeau to the Girondists, later to Danton and, finally, to Robespierre. However, the "revolution of 1800" was Jefferson's victory *at the polls* and did not signify the establishment of the dictatorship of a more revolutionary party and destruction of a less revolutionary one. Rather, it was the first time the world had seen power peacefully handed over from one party to another as the

result of parliamentary elections. The leader of the victorious party said in his inaugural speech: "Every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We are all republicans, we are all federalists" (709; 152). Adams, the second President of America and one of the leaders of the Federalists, defeated by Jefferson, remained his true friend; they corresponded regularly and unburdened their hearts to each other in their letters, something which had no equal in the history of the French revolution.

Just as the dictatorship of a revolutionary party (like that of Robespierre) was unknown in the American revolution, so was the military non-party patriotic dictatorship (like that of Napoleon). The presidency of Washington is a striking phenomenon. This general, army commander-in-chief, a national hero, symbol of the nascent nation, elected President on two consecutive occasions and having no adversaries, could not, nor did he want to establish a dictatorship, retired and lived out his days on his estate.

At first glance, everything in the ideology of the American revolution is unclear, unstable, transitory. It could be assumed that the American bourgeois ideology was crystallized and systematized, that national self-awareness was gradually formed, free of ideological shades. Meanwhile, nothing of the sort took place.

It was precisely this indefinite ideological situation which turned out to be the most permanent and stable, having been preserved in its basic features up to the present day. A specific, complex bourgeois ideological system, which by its authority consecrated the longest-lasting of the bourgeois systems known, stems from the ideological situation existing at the time of the American revolution.

Part II

RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN BOURGEOIS SOCIETY

1. American Bourgeois Ideology and Religion

What is the reason for the amazing stability of the foundations of the American social and political system?

Naturally, American society has not seen such stormy catastrophic events associated with wars and foreign invasions as the majority of European countries have. The history of the U.S.A.'s foreign policy was calmer, not catastrophic, because of its geographic position. However, the same cannot be said of its social history. American society is by no means stagnant, always reproducing every element in exactly the same form. On the contrary, it changes rapidly. It has progressed from being a predominantly agricultural society, the farmers in the vast majority of the population, to modern production and the age of the rapid growth of the "new middle classes". It is a society, which opened up vast tracts of land, expanded its territory severalfold, absorbed and became a melting pot of millions of immigrants from many races; a society which has experienced the war of the North and the South, the abolition of slavery and acute racial conflicts. However, all these great social changes did not lead to a new Constitution. They were all carried out within the framework of the Constitution, to which amendments were only adopted according to the procedure specified in the Constitution itself.

Perhaps the reason for the stability of the system should be sought within the system itself, in the very characteristics of the American Constitution? In our opinion, no. The American Constitution is a bourgeois-democratic one. Unlike bourgeois dictatorships, which can exist for a relatively long time through the use of terror and without being supported by the majority of the population, the bourgeois-democratic system can exist only as long as the majority of the population supports bourgeois-democratic principles. Or, in any case, while a certain parity exists between different ideological and political forces which attach no great importance to bourgeois democracy and have their own socio-political ideal which is an alternative

to the existing structure, as was the case under such an unstable variant of bourgeois democracy as the Weimar Republic. If certain ideas (religious or socio-philosophical) acquire a greater value than those of the system, they may have such a strong grip on people that it becomes more important to realize these ideas than to preserve the system. Therefore, when such ideas become widespread, the system has no means of self-preservation: as soon as its defenders have recourse to dictatorship to preserve it, to the use of constant terror, this is the very cause of its downfall.

This is true of any bourgeois-democratic system, but particularly so of the U.S.A. This system arose before the political parties emerged, against a background of considerable unanimity (as is known, no one ran against the first U.S. President, George Washington). And the system was not only not designed for a passionate struggle between opposing social ideals, it was not designed for such a situation whereby, for the majority of the population, some of its particular aspirations (directed not at realizing an integral ideal, but at carrying out some narrow measure) would outweigh the value of the system.

Indeed, under the American Constitution, for instance, the decision of the Supreme Court, whose members are appointed for life, on whether a law is constitutional or not, is final. Throughout the history of the U.S.A., these decisions have often run counter to government policy and to the opinion of the majority of the nation. The Presidential and Congressional elections in the U.S.A. run parallel and independent of one another. This often leads to the President and the government he forms belonging to one party, while the Congressional majority belongs to the other. In granting major rights to the states the Constitution allows individual states to be an active and effective counter to governmental policy. The Constitution thus places various obstacles in the way of the aspirations of the majority. If its values and those of the system had not taken precedence in the minds of the majority over those aspirations which are not realized because of legal, Constitutional impediments, the U.S. state structure could not have existed.

Thus, the reason for the stability of the American political system does not lie in the system itself. Such a system could not last long in a situation, where the people had a different mentality and with a different type of ideology. This can be seen from the series of unsuccessful attempts to transfer the American political organization to the soil of the U.S.A.'s southern neigh-

bors, the Latin American countries, or from the U.S. failure to foist the same state structure on the peoples of South Vietnam and South Korea.

Obviously, the reason for this stability has to be sought in the specific features of the ideological organization of American society, in its system of ideological control and self-control, upholding the importance of the Constitution and forcing people to voluntarily vote in a secret ballot for that party that does not question the Constitution and the foundations of the bourgeois system, that prevents the spread of ideas hostile to the structure and belittles every ideological alternative to the point where it no longer outweighs the values of the system. What does this ideological system consist of?

First of all, throughout the entire history of America we can see the same system of values that took shape back in the colonial period, only somewhat modified.

1. We have already said that, in the colonial period, the Americans displayed a great "open-mindedness" to new knowledge and experience and, at the same time, only a slight interest in philosophical and theoretical systems, and were poorly receptive to philosophy itself. We link this with the special features of American Protestantism, which did not encourage the attitude towards scientific knowledge as being something of a world outlook, existentially significant. The development of capitalism and the specific features of the American ideological system, which will be described in more detail later on, consolidated the specifically American attitude towards knowledge which was typical of the colonial period.

The thirst for knowledge has been characteristic of Americans throughout the entire history of the U.S.A. While the Wild West was being won a college or university was often founded even before a town was built *(60;* ch. 20), most of them set up by various Protestant organizations. Boorstin gives the following figures. In 1880, England had a population of 23 million, and 4 higher educational establishments where one could study for a scientific degree; the state of Ohio, with a population of 3 million, had 37 such institutions *(60;* 155). And even if the quality of the teaching in Ohio was incomparable with that in Oxford, this was not the central issue. The main thing was the thirst for knowledge. Today, too, the percentage of students per head of population in America greatly exceeds the corresponding figure for Britain, Canada, Australia and the majority of European countries *(133;* 300).

However, the thirst for knowledge amazingly and distinctively combined with the contempt for this same knowledge if it was divorced from practical use, with the rejection of any philosophizing and abstract theorizing. Engels often pointed to this feature of the American consciousness, calling the U.S.A. a country dominated by a general disregard for any theory *(18;* 533), a nation "of so high an opinion of its 'practicism' and, at the same time, awfully backward theoretically" *(21*; 52). He said that "for people interested in theory there is still little space in America" *(19;* 133). Quotations, from old American textbooks, cited by Richard Hofstadter, are a splendid illustration: "While many other nations are wasting the brilliant efforts of genius in monuments of ingenious folly to perpetuate their pride, the Americans, according to the true spirit of republicanism, are employed almost entirely in works of public and private utility" *(109;* 306); "There are none of those splendid establishments such as Oxford and Cambridge in which immense salaries maintain the professors of literature in monastic idleness... The People of this country have not yet been inclined to make much literary display—they have rather aimed at works of general utility" *(109;* 307); "A book which is torn and mutilated is abused, but one which is merely read for enjoyment is misused" (*109;* 308).

Hofstadter's *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* is a kind of reference book of American anti-intellectualism, summarizing its various everyday and theoretical manifestations *(108).*

The attitude towards knowledge mirrors the attitude towards those who expound it. Since it has a utilitarian, not supreme value, the teacher, professor, intellectual is not as esteemed in the U.S.A. as he is in Europe. Thus, throughout the entire history of the American education constant complaints have been made as to how badly paid educationalists are. American schools are renowned for their lack of discipline, which is linked with the poor prestige enjoyed by teachers.

Anti-intellectualism stands in need of intellectual justification. Just such a distinctive tradition exists in the U.S.A., a tradition of the intellectual negation of the value of the intellect, cultural proof of the uselessness of culture, satirically depicted in Sinclair Lewis' *Babbitt.* There is, however, the opposite reaction by the intellectual to the prevailing anti-intellectualism.This is a kind of traditional flight from America (both spiritually and literally) of the American intellectual. This manifests itself in various ways—in Hemingway's wanderings, in the

Catholicism of Thomas S. Eliot, escape for reasons contrary to those for which European intellectuals fled to America. The European intellectual fled to the U.S.A. because of the too serious approach to theory, because of the fact that the differences on points of theory might cost one one's life. Meanwhile, the American intellectual fled to Europe because of the too light-hearted approach to the sphere of ideology and the intellect.

The specifically American attitude to knowledge is genetically linked to the specific features of the American religious tradition. However, this attitude, sprouting from this tradition, has already become an independent factor, which, in turn, actively influences the sphere of religion. Such specific features of American religion as the relative weakness of theology against the Church's colossal practical activity are, of course, linked to the specific American attitude towards knowledge. This attitude manifests itself in that comparative ease with which the fundamentalists defy liberal theology in the U.S.A. and create their numerous dubious biblical colleges. Finally, American pragmatism says that it is not important how and why, it is important to have results, and knowledge should first of all yield practical results; this pragmatism, no doubt, makes for an easier spread in the U.S.A. of various sects with their magic aimed at achieving tangible, often very worldly results, and of every type of superstition (astrology, I Zin, etc.), among the intelligentsia, too.

2. The revolution consolidated and reinforced the importance of legal equality following the emigration of the majority of pro-English, aristocratically inclined American Loyalists to England and Canada, the increased activity and awareness of the popular masses and the adoption of a democratic federal Constitution. The various qualifications gradually disappeared from the states' Constitutions and universal suffrage was established. L. Hartz said of the easy and natural manner in which universal suffrage was established in the U.S.A.: "Just as Macaulay and Guizot are proclaiming that the day of universal suffrage will never come, Chancellor Kent and John Quincy Adams are bemoaning the disaster it has already brought" *(106;* 91).

The conquest of the West obviously played a major role in consolidating the values of equality, as Frederick J. Turner first showed *(112),* when the democratizing influence of colonization, destroying the status hierarchy, affected American society from its very inception, and was later frequently repeated within society.

Of course, the practical inequality of the individual, born of capitalism and consolidated by the heredity of status, education and connections, constantly gave rise to aristocratic tendencies, as is graphically shown in Lloyd W. Warner's research and John O'Hara's novels. However, the values of parentage, of a "good family", which arose in the upper circles of the bourgeoisie were recognized in America to a much lesser degree than in England, Germany, Sweden and even Canada. "Equality of opportunity", "war on privileges", etc., quickly became the watchword of the most extreme political opponents.

We have already said that it was the basic importance of legal equality, even religious significance attached to it, that determined the full non-recognition of the equality of blacks and Indians. This, in many ways, determined the aspect the racial problem took in the U.S.A.

First, the emancipation of black slaves in the colonies of aristocratic England and in Catholic Brazil was a considerably less painful process than in democratic America. Economic factors, naturally, played a very important role in the Civil War. However, they hardly explain the truly religious passion with which it was waged and whose analogy is only to be found in the passion with which the Boers opposed, and still oppose, any hint at equality with the blacks. This passion can only be explained by the fact that the idea of equality had quasi-religious significance, and the hostility of the Northerners and Southerners, whose ideologies agreed on everything except the interpretation of the Constitution and the idea of equality, is something like that of two dogmatic parties, which is all the stronger the nearer these two parties are to each other. L. Hartz gives a good account of the ideology of the Southern slaveowners with its artificial and unfounded pseudo-traditionalism and deep-rooted all-American liberal basis *(106).*

Second, as Hartz shows, the relatively painless abolition of slavery in countries such as Brazil, was connected with the fact that slavery was not such a great matter of principle as it was in the U.S.A. Its abolition did not greatly improve the actual position of blacks, nor gave them actual legal and political equality, nor led to a struggle to establish such equality, a struggle equal in passion to that waged by American blacks and their white friends and allies.

The passion of this struggle, like the passion of that over slavery, can obviously be explained in many ways by the basic, quasi-religious significance of legal equality.

The system of values is an integral whole and the cult of equality is very closely linked with the specifically American attitude to knowledge. Abstract, theoretical knowledge is not admissible also because it in a way implies the inequality, the elitist status of those who possess this knowledge. It is very typical that American textbooks and popular literature stress that Washington and even Franklin were not men of genius, but "ordinary people". Anybody can become a Washington, a Franklin, an Edison *(109;* 308).

Again, the very idea of equality with its religious roots influenced the sphere of religion, manifested here in the tendency towards the democratization of the Church organization, in the extreme attractiveness and wide spread of the Churches with particularly democratic structures and the extensive rights of the laymen (the Baptists, the Missouri Lutherans), and in the way the laymen and the lowest clergy could rebel against the Church leaders.

3. The value of legal equality and the non-recognition of all privileges by birth did not lead to the ideas of economic equality, of interfering with private property. This value was balanced by another, that of social success and of money as the measure of success. This value was in many ways strengthened and consolidated as a result of the U.S.A.'s rapid economic and territorial growth, and of the influx of immigrants of low social status, which led to a rather high degree of social mobility. The ideal arose of a persistent person who did not lose heart, was not inclined to pensiveness, was practical and plucky, enterprising and taking risks, but who was honest and, starting out with nothing, might attain a high position in society. This ideal was consolidated in a particular mythology, formed around such personalities as Washington, Lincoln, Edison, Ford, who became symbols of social success and of the U.S.A. as the land of equal opportunity. This ideal was propagated by such literary classics as Jack London and Mark Twain. Although the latter made fun of the stories of poor boys becoming senators, he himself created Huckleberry Finn and Tom Sawyer—magnificent incarnations of this ideal. This ideal is widely propagated in the cinema, in endless variations of the story of the honest, plucky fellow who ultimately makes a pile of money and marries a rich beauty. Just like the value of equality, that of success in many ways forms the American's very manners, his external appearance— his constant, notoriously broad, cheerful smile, which is bound to show that everything is OK and that he is in the best

of spirits. Film stars smile this smile, we see it in the photographs of Presidents, Senators, businessmen and even in those of the most ordinary people.

American religion is greatly imbued with the value of success. According to the data of one survey, 60 per cent of white Protestants and 55 per cent of Catholics consider God wants man to aspire ever higher up the social ladder *(130;* 95). Success and wealth achieved by true Christians are a constant theme of the popular sermons preached by Billy Graham, Norman Peale, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, etc., which comes as something of an unpleasant surprise to the European listener who is used to piety and the pursuit of money being uneasy companions, if not mutually exclusive. A journalist from *Harper's Magazine* summed up the basic content of the sermons of P. Robertson, a popular conservative preacher, in the following way: "The more cash you give to Jesus the more cash he will give right back to you... And Robertson suggests that the most effective way to give to Jesus is to give to his slave, Pat Robertson" *(Harper's Magazine,* February 1980, p. 45). These same preachers also cause an uneasy feeling: they consider it essential for them (in any case in front of photographers) to smile that same broad smile, which is often in striking contrast to their affirmations about the world being corrupted and about its end being high, while boasting about the millions they make.

4. We have already spoken of the dual nature of the attitude towards the law and authority as it arose in the colonial period: on the one hand, the people were recognized as the source of power, on the other, the law was conceived of as something more than the means of satisfying the aspirations of the majority. They had an independent value. This ambiguousness towards the law and authority was consolidated by the American revolution.

The revolution leading to the victory of bourgeois democracy, consolidates the value of democracy, the idea of the opinion of the majority being the natural source of authority and any crucial decision. However, as Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: "Up to the present, there has not been a single person in the United States who would dare advance the maxim that everything is permitted in the interest of society" *(199;* Vol. II, 217). This inner ideological limitation of democracy, the modification of the idea of the majority, of the people as the source of the law and authority, which under the typically American lack of piety for tradition and for those higher up the social ladder is fraught with tyranny over the minority, with the persecution of dissidents and with the "direct

democracy" of Lynch law, results from the great significance of religion and religious morality and from the particular ideological significance of the law, the Constitution in the first place.

The revolution created the Constitution. This Constitution became, to certain extent, a fact of national consciousness. It was given ideological significance incommensurable with that of the Constitution of, say, the Fifth Republic in France, which existed for a very short period in the nation's history. Let us recall that the Civil War between the North and the South ideologically arose in the form of a row over the interpretation of the Constitution, which is indicative of the extraordinarily vast ideological significance of legal matters. It can be said that the Constitution has a quasi-religious significance, and the analogy suggests itself between the members of the Supreme Court, verifying the conformity of practical measures in the circumstances of the second half of the 20th century to the spirit and letter of the document compiled in the 18th century, and Judaist Talmudists—an analogy which is not entirely superficial.

The value of the Constitution is reaffirmed a thousandfold in miniature in the ability of the Americans to compile the statutes and laws of various organizations and regard them very seriously. During the conquest of the West the situation of covenants, ecclesiastical and social, of the Puritan immigrants to New England in the 17th century arose once more in the secularized version. Groups of settlers intending to set off for the West created their written legislation regulating procedure of elections and courts *(60;* 65-66) and those laws were observed.

In the religious sphere, the value of the law and the Constitution manifested itself not only in their ideological assimilation, which took a coarsely mythological form in a number of sects (for example, the Mormons considered the Holy Spirit to have directly imbued the authors of the Constitution with its text—*159;* 169), but also in the major role of legal aspects in the Churches' internal matters where constitutions were often worked out with no less care than those of the U.S.A. or of individual states, and quarrels on constitutional issues sometimes led to Church schisms to be resolved by national legal bodies.

5. We have noted that a very indefinite and vague progressivism arose long before the revolution. The revolution and the subsequent development of the U.S.A. consolidated it.

Indeed, the Constitution and the American system cannot be linked in the American consciousness with the nation's specific features. The Americans are a nation of immigrants, with no endless past like the Germans have. American bourgeois values cannot be conceived of as the incarnation of some kind of mystic national spirit, rather, they look like values applicable to all of mankind. However, the U.S.A.'s social structure arose relatively recently. This very fact presupposes the recognition of a progressive historical process leading to American bourgeois democracy. However, since there is room in the American bourgeois system of values for individual efforts aimed at achieving social success, and likewise in science and technology, this system should also admit the value of the development of science and technology resulting from these efforts, of progress and, consequently, the continuation of the progressive development within the framework of American bourgeois democracy.

Such development, however, is not conceived of as leading to any goal, to the realization of some social ideal. First, development towards a definite ideal would contradict the basic tenets of Christianity, for, although Protestantism carries the germ of progressivism, it cannot deny such all-Christian ideas as the impossibility of realizing the ideal on earth through human efforts. Second, the idea of such development would call the value of the very American system into question, for if the ideal lies in the future, then the laws are no more than a means, a weapon of no intrinsic importance, and can be replaced or rejected. Progressivism is, therefore, bound to remain indefinite and ambiguous.

6. The revolution consolidated and modified the idea of America's Manifest Destiny, which arose as far back as the colonial period. This idea, just like at the time of the New England colonies, was that of being the lighthouse for the whole of mankind, yet no longer that of the true Reformation and true Christianity but of those universal human values which allegedly found their purest and most adequate reflection in the socio-political structure of the U.S.A. The ideologies of a number of sects, primarily, the Mormons, contain, in an extremely mythological and crude form, several ideas typical of American bourgeois society in general. They are expressed in a rather ridiculous and yet more vivid form, bringing into relief what is not so obvious in the more serious literature. For the Mormons, America is God's chosen land and it is precisely there that the reign of the thousand-year kingdom of Christ will begin.

All the nuances **and** ambiguities peculiar to the Puritan idea of predestination are preserved in the secularized form.

First, the same as the idea of New England as the chosen land and of its special relations with God presupposed constant moral criticism and the call for repentance (for, even chosen, society is never equal to the call), so the idea of the U.S.A. having been chosen, of its distinctive, extraordinary qualities and purity does not exclude, but rather presupposes constant criticism, never spreading, however, to the system's foundations.

Second, the complex, ambivalent attitude to the non-American world remains. The values of American society are viewed as universal, but the world did not share them in the 18th century, nor does it today. They are viewed as universal, and, at the same time, as specifically American. Therefore, the idea of Manifest Destiny contains both the idea of expansion and of the "purity" of America against the filthy and depraved world, which corresponds to the pendulum of expansionism and isolationism, of crudely mercantile and moralizing tendencies typical of U.S. foreign policy. As George Kennan wrote, "Americans seem to oscillate between fleeing from the rest of the world and embracing it with too ardent a passion." *(61;* 286)

What indeed are these values? They are a definite system of people's attitudes towards each other, towards society and the world. This system was formed, under American conditions, on the basis of the modification of those conclusions which logically and psychologically follow from Protestant, primarily Puritan, theology. It is now, however, a matter of history, of origins. These values broke away from their theological foundations. They became embodied in the system of institutions of the bourgeois society and have turned out to be more lasting, more stable than the theology on which they were once founded. They create their own basis. A new, temporal mythology has sprung up around them, substantiating them. It has arisen in historical science, for history is written in such a way as to show that the gradual development of the ideals of freedom found perfect embodiment in America, in its economy showing that capitalism is logical and gives advantages, in sociology and journalism, and is disseminated through the mass media.

However, all this is not adequate substantiation. No system of values can exist without being based on a general world outlook. Values can be accepted only if you believe

in them, believe that people are equal, that everyone should aspire to success, etc. However, if the belief does not rest on certain universal ideas about man's place in the world, about the meaning of human life, these values are left hanging in the air. Then, where does the American bourgeois system of values find this substantiation?

It is provided by religion, but not by Puritan theology, which has long disappeared, nor even Protestantism or some other definite denomination, but by any and all denominations, inasmuch as they are included in the system of American bourgeois ideology, imbued with American bourgeois values.

Religion is, thus, not a vestige of the past, but something essential to the existence of the American bourgeois system of values—an immanent part of the ideological system of American society. Although official rhetoric does not usually evoke esteem and interest, it does, in our opinion, deserve the greatest of attention. A great deal lies behind the stereotype, ritual formulae which have crystallized in the course of history and often provide the key to understanding very important aspects of the life of society. Here are two almost identical statements made by U.S. Presidents, although a gulf of almost two hundred years lies between them. Despite their sacramental nature, they, in our opinion, correctly reflect the relationship between individual elements of bourgeois ideology. John Adams, the second President of the U.S.A.: "A patriot without religion in my estimation is as great a paradox, as an honest Man without the fear of God" *(87;* 23). Dwight Eisenhower: "Our government makes no sense ... unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith—and I don't care what it is" *(173; 91).*

Representatives of the religious establishment are in complete agreement with the politicians. A statement by a most eminent rabbi, Israel Goldstein, reveals exactly the same philosophy: "I believe the Free World is bound to win because it accords with the precepts of 'Religion'... Under Religion are to be subsumed not only Judaism and Christianity, with which we happen to be most familiar, but other great religious systems whose fundamental teachings are not essentially different from those of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Herein is the essence of the thesis that the Free World rests primarily upon spiritual foundations" *(203;* 454). De Tocqueville wrote: "I do not know whether all Americans believe in their religion, for who can read in the hearts? But I am sure that they recognize it as necessary to main-

tain the republican institutions" (799; Vol. II, 217-18).

Naturally, the system of the substantiation and consecration of the American bourgeois values by the authority of religion in general, without distinction of denomination, could only arise when, originally, there was an only small gap between the values logically following from the most widely spread, prevailing denominations and the given values, as was the case during the American bourgeois revolution, when still comparatively weak secularization processes in the group of closely related Protestant denominations led to the emergence of the given system.

However, since there was no such clear and established connection with the given denominations, since as a result of the processes which will be described later, a great many very different denominations (such as Catholicism, Mormonism, Judaism, and Orthodoxy) began to share these values, recognized that the Constitution of the U.S.A., the principles of American social and political life were good, did not contradict the principles of the given denominations, but rather corresponded to them, it turned out that they were substantiated by all religions of the world. This connection between religion and the bourgeois system of values has been constantly postulated throughout the entire history of America by American political leaders.

Thus, if we compare the phraseology of early American political leaders with that of Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, we can see a striking similarity: "God", "the Bible", "Faith", "the Constitution", "democracy", "America"—all these words are endlessly repeated together in an integral whole. We shall refer to just a few examples. Washington said in his first inaugural speech: "It would be peculiarly improper to omit, in this first official act, my fervent supplications to that Almighty Being, who rules over the universe... No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand, which conducts the affairs of men, more than the people of the United States. Every step, by which they have advanced to the character of an independent nation, seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency" *(189,* Vol. I, 151). And here is the inaugural speech by Gerald Ford. He begins by saying that he was not elected by vote. "So I ask you to confirm me as your President with your prayers." He says further that recent events (Nixon's resignation) have shown that there is the law and the authority of the people in the U.S.A. "But there is a higher power, by whatever name we honor him, who ordains not only righteousness but love, not only justice but mercy."

He, therefore, asks that prayers be offered for Nixon and his family. His speech ends: "God helping me, I will not let you down" *(Time,* April 19, 1974, p. 7).

Official rhetoric is very often expressed in a stream of pompous phrases, where the meaning of words is constantly substituted and religious terminology is used in a way completely foreign to it. This applies to the inaugural speech of Lyndon Johnson. He begins by speaking of the distinction of the idea of Manifest Destiny from the idea of Holy Russia, for the first implies the nation's answerability to God, while the second puts the nation in place of God (possibly an echo of the idea of R. Niebuhr). The following fantastic words follow: "...We are a nation of believers. Underneath the clamor of building and the rush of our day's pursuits, we are believers in justice and liberty and union, and in our own Union. We believe that every man must some day be free. And we believe in ourselves" *(Time,* January 29, 1965, p. 14). Eisenhower said of himself: "I am the most intensely religious man I know. That doesn't mean I adhere to any sect. A democracy cannot exist without a religious base. I believe in democracy" *(61;* 146).

There is one other spiritual force, apart from religion, strengthening the American bourgeois system of values (and inasmuch as the value of religion forms part of this system of values, consolidating religion)—the distinctiveness of American national awareness.

As we have already said, the Americans gained independence at a time when national awareness was a mere germ. The revolution and the Declaration of Independence greatly accelerated and were mighty catalysts in the formation of national awareness, the feeling of "we Americans". National awareness should, however, be based on some real specific features of common identity, and, likewise, national pride should be founded on some facts, on some glorious moments of the past and present of the given community. The national awareness of the Germans, for instance, is based on the obvious unity and unique character of their language and culture, and their national pride can be based on various facts of their immensely rich national history—on Friedrich Barbarossa, Goethe, Martin Luther, Thomas Mann.

What could provide the basis for the nascent national awareness of the Americans? Only one thing—the fact of the revolution and the Declaration of Independence and, in addition, several facts of the pre-national, colonial past, inasmuch as they were connected with the revolution and paved the way for it. Thus, from the very beginning

national awareness was connected with a definite system of values, an ideology. "We Americans" turned out to be a definition by no means ideologically neutral.

The U.S.A. gradually acquired its history. Various types of heroes multiplied, its literature, science and social thought were formed. Owing to the durability of the American structure and the American system of values (one of the sources of this durability is the post-revolutionary formation of national awareness), all these heroes and the majority of thinkers, for all their differences, remain within the framework of the given system of values. The entire history of America is subordinated to the constant rhythm of Presidential and Congressional elections.

If a Frenchman or a German casts a glance back at his past he sees an amazing ideological and socio-political diversity, which imparts a sense of relativity to the current system and prevailing ideology. The past is a constant source of danger, for the opponents of the given system can always appeal to the national greatness and Golden Age of Culture under a system and ideology in the past, different from the present. If the predominant ideology tries to strike out some aspects of the past, to represent them as fortuitous and regrettable misunderstandings, or force them to be forgotten, it never completely succeeds in this: the German fascists could ban the books of Marx and Heine, but they themselves had recourse to Goethe and Schiller.

Now, if an American casts a glance at his past, he invariably sees a great uniformity. He sees a gallery of statesmen, such as Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln or Roosevelt, who all, without exception, either created the Constitution in force or swore to be true to it. Therefore, while the bourgeois system of any European country fears the past, it is in any case less dangerous for the social system in the U.S.A. As Engels wrote, "America is a purely bourgeois country devoid of even feudal past and proud, therefore, of its purely bourgeois organization" *(20;* 353). Cause and effect constantly change places. The post-revolutionary formation of national awareness and the gaining of independence strengthen the system, but that very strength, in its turn, consolidates the link between national awareness and the system itself. Alain Touraine, a French researcher, points out this special feature of American national consciousness: "There is nothing as striking for the European visitor as the sense of continuity in the United States, as abundant and constant references to the past and the cult of eponymic heroes and collective values" *(202;* 186).

It is the link between national awareness and ideology which gave rise to such concepts incomprehensible to Europeans as "100 per cent American" and "un-American activities". The "100 per cent American" is not an ethnic entity, rather he is a Greek, Turk, Pole, Jew who shares the American bourgeois system of values 100 per cent. In Evelyn Waugh's satire *The Loved One* an American girl writes about a young Englishman she loves, but whose ideas she disapproves of: "First he is British and therefore in many ways quite Un-American. I do not mean just his accent and the way he eats but he is cynical at things which should be Sacred. I do not think he has any religion... He also has no idea of Citizenship or Social Conscience" *(210;* 82). Likewise, un-American activities is also a concept which requires explanation. A Frenchman would never call activities aimed, for instance, at overthrowing the bourgeois-democratic system in France anti-French. In the U.S.A., however, the House Committee on Un-American Activities investigated the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, which considers itself to be truly American.

This interrelation of cause and effect can be seen in yet another fact connected with the specific features of American national awareness. Since the Americans were originally a mixed nation of immigrants, with no specific factor uniting them other than the specific event of the revolution and the Constitution, and since national awareness acquired ideological undertones, this helps immigrants of many races adapt to life in America. Adaptation in these conditions means primarily assimilating a definite system of values, the "American way of life", and no one is surprised to find an American Italian, American Russian. This, in many ways, encouraged the influx of immigrants to the U.S.A. and the Americanization of a huge number of people of the most different nationalities. However, this in its turn diminished the significance of such aspects of national awareness as "blood and soil" and strengthened the significance of the unity of values because the majority of Americans' forefathers had no connection with the revolution or the Declaration of Independence, and were linked with the Pilgrim Fathers and Founding Fathers not through blood, but through common values.

All this taken together, the American bourgeois system of values, religious ideologies and the distinctive American national awareness, is one specific and complex

ideological system. Like any mass ideology it has its own system of rituals—the cult of heroes, saints, primarily George Washington; a system of national holidays with their own rituals; a cult of sanctified and unique artefacts—Freedom Bell, Plymouth Rock, banners, the text of the Constitution, songs, etc.

Two characteristic features of this ritual should be stressed. First, it is very widespread, magnificent, possibly by way of compensation for the amorphousness of ideology. D. Boorstin describes the ritual at an assembly of the Oklahoma High School which he attended. The ritual is comprised of the following: "pledge of allegiance to the flag of the United States, singing of the 'Star Spangled Banner', singing of the state anthem, recitation of the 'Student's Creed' (which went: 'I believe in honest work, generous comradeship and the courage of high convictions...'), recitation of the 'Student's Prayer', and reading of a passage from the Bible. This was often climaxed by an inspirational talk" *(61;* 153-54). High-flown bombastic ritualistic speeches, the equivalent of Church sermons, are very widespread, glorifying freedom, America, the Constitution, etc. The U.S. flag is displayed in any suitable place.

Second, this ritual system is an odd intertwining of state-ideological, national and religious symbols. The combination of these symbols is clearly seen in the system of American holidays. Government establishments are closed on the following official holidays: New Year's Day, Washington's Birthday, Remembrance Sunday, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas *(208).*

Religious symbols back up those of state ideology, lend them an additional religious significance. This is most clearly seen in the President's glittering inauguration ceremony, where he swears an oath on the Bible and a Protestant pastor, a Catholic priest, a rabbi and, since 1957, an Orthodox priest offer up prayers to bless the President *(56;* 12). A chaplain opens Congress with a short prayer service; in the House of Representatives, aside from prayers, passages are read from the Bible before a session is opened. Prayers open the conventions of both parties, and in 1955, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Henry Cabot Lodge, proposed that U.N. assemblies be likewise opened *(56;* 23-25). The examples of this merging of symbols throughout the course of American history are too numerous to mention; they have gradually shed off first specifically Protestant and are now ridding themselves of specifically Christian undertones. This merging

has always penetrated every aspect of life in the U.S.A. (even U.S. money bears the famous inscription: "In God We Trust").

The gradual purge of denominational undertones gives rise to utterly abstract forms of religious symbols, which seem very strange to Europeans. Thus, in 1955, a special room was opened for the Congressmen's worship in the Congress building. There are no Christian symbols, but a stained-glass window portrays George Wasbington at prayer and there is a gold candelabrum presented by a rich Jew *(56;* 21-22). In 1951, the prayer was introduced in New York's schools which can be said by Protestants, Catholics, Judaists, and Muslims likewise: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country" *(158;* 149-50). There is also another phenomenon, of state ideological symbols penetrating the system of specifically religious symbols. The American flag is flown in many churches and at all major religious congresses. Just as the use of religious symbols in state rituals increases the religious significance of the state symbols, so the flag in the church or at a religious congress increases the ideological significance of specifically religious acts.

The American bourgeois ideological system, whose constituent elements are the system of values and denominations substantiating and sanctifying it by their authority, the distinctive American national awareness and ceremonies with their interweaving of symbols of religion, state ideology and national pride, is the functional equivalent of an integral ideological system. This distinctive and complex system provides the answer to questions of world outlook and brings together the individual and society just like various integral religious and philosophical systems do. De Tocqueville wrote: "All clergy speaks the same language there; opinions are in accord with the laws, and a single current dominates, so to speak, the human mind" *(199;* Vol. II, 211).

Unlike any integral system, however, the given system is considerably less cohesive, and more amorphous. But then, in the conditions of a rapidly developing, dynamic bourgeois society this amorphousness is a positive rather than a negative feature.

It is relatively easy to modify individual elements in the amorphous American ideological system. Thus, throughout the history of America more denominations were in-

corporated into this system, the nature of these denominations changed, as did the concept of individual values.

Further, the rejection of one element in a system where all the elements are closely linked, implies the rejection of the entire system. This does not necessarily happen in the amorphous system. It is possible to be a Baptist and reject Catholicism, or to be a Catholic and condemn Protestantism and yet remain within the framework of the system.

Finally, the stability of the system is connected with the power of such elements as religion and national awareness. As a great many different denominations are included in the system, this gives it a general religious sanctification. The system is universal. Since it has existed throughout the entire history of the whole nation, it is common to the nation as a whole.

Although this amorphous and complex system is more lasting than any integral bourgeois ideology, it is, on the contrary, highly difficult for it to spread beyond the confines of American society. The educational tasks of the integral ideological system which is written in the books are clear and obvious. Those of the American ideological system, however, are essentially vague and indefinite. The propaganda of American values when isolated from their general ideological foundations invariably leads to boasts of American freedom and success, often giving rise to an inferiority complex in peoples who do not have this success, which turns against the Americans themselves. Meanwhile, the propaganda of the general ideological foundations would imply that of a particular religious tradition and religious pluralism, i.e., that which, unlike the external attributes of Americanism, does not, by its nature, lend itself to propaganda and adoption. Therefore, other bourgeois societies attained stable bourgeois-democratic institutions by their own particular path, and it was never achieved by adopting the American bourgeois ideological system.

The complex and amorphous character of the system presupposes means of ideological control other than those of an integral and rigid system. In the latter system, the compulsory discipline of ideological organization is just such a basic means. The mechanisms of pressure by the mass followers of the system and conformity with their opinion are secondary and derivative. On the contrary, in the American system, conformism plays a major role, while compulsory ideological discipline has a minor, derivative one.

However, the stability of the ideological system is

manifested primarily in the fact that it provides for the kind of ideological make-up of society's social conflicts which keeps these conflicts within the framework of the basic values of the given society, so that they do not lead to the revolutionary destruction of social and political institutions, i.e., they are channelled into a course which is safe for the existing system.

The U.S.A. is a dynamic, rapidly developing society, a society in which the alignment of class forces changes all the time, with old social strata dying away and new ones appearing, in which living conditions rapidly change, and, consequently, so does the very content of social conflicts. For the basic principles of the American bourgeois system to remain unchanged under these conditions, this society (and the ideological system sanctifying it) should have protection mechanism, a strategy for safely extinguishing or channelling these conflicts. We shall try to show a number of such strategies or defense mechanisms in which religious ideology again plays a major role.

First of all we shall deal with two basic methods which are linked with the ideological format of conflicts as ones between denominational organizations or within them. Their solution is found in the modification of denomina tional teaching in accordance with the American bourgeois system of values and incorporation of a denomination in the American bourgeois ideological system. Throughout the history of America, more and more denominations have constantly been drawn into American bourgeois ideology. This was, at first, a group of Protestant denominations, then Catholic ones, Judaist, Mormon, Christian Science, Orthodox and a number of others, earlier considered to be "un-American", were also incorporated into this ideology. Two circumstances must constantly be borne in mind if this process is to be understood. First, although at any given moment this or that denomination could be considered "un-American", "not respectable", there are no limitations on widening the sphere of religions in the American bourgeois system of values which implies great importance of any religion and freedom of religion. Second, the relation between the American bourgeois system of values and any religious system is such that a religious system is centered on those problems which are of complete indifference to that system of values. Christian sects differ in their conception of "grace", "salvation", "the emanation of the Holy Spirit" and other such matters, the solution of which, whatever it might be, cannot influence the functioning of American society. On the other hand, political and social issues, from the point of view

of the logic of any religious system whose doctrine is "my kingdom is not of this world", are always peripheral issues. Therefore, the sphere of conflict of the American ideological system with religious systems never spreads to the central, fundamental points of one system or the other. American society never demands that religion reject its fundamental tenets—it merely demands that it stop attaching a higher value to these tenets than to American bourgeois society, and make a certain insignificant modification in those tenets in accordance with this system of values. Therefore, the conflict of American society with religion can potentially always be solved, while the ideological interpretation of any conflict as a denominational one is the safest for American bourgeois society.

We can distinguish two types of denominational interpretation of conflicts (in accordance with two basic types of religious organization): a) the conflict between American society and sects, resolved in the bourgeois integration of the sect and playing a major role in quelling the social protest of the lowest strata of American society; and b) the conflict between American society and foreign national Churches, which is resolved in the Americanization of Churches and has played a great role in helping immigrants adapt to life in the U.S.A.

2. American Bourgeois Society and Sects

No capitalist country in the new era has known such powerful sectarian movements as did the United States. In no country did quaint, fantastic sectarian ideologies acquire such importance, such nation-wide significance as in the U.S.A. It is enough to point to the Mormons, Adventists, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Black Muslims who hit the headlines in the 1960s. The U.S.A. attracts all kinds of "prophets", such as Moon from Korea who has a large following, and seems to be the breeding ground of the sects. Let us recall that such sects as the Adventists, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses came to Russia from the U.S.A. English researcher Bryan R. Wilson writes: "Sectarian ideologies ... have been a major American export, particularly successful since the end of the Second World War" *(216;* 230). What is the reason for the sect being of such great importance, what is the role of the sect in American society?

The sect, in the narrow sense of the word, is that type of religious organization which was the beginning of the

development of Christianity, was repeated in the Middle Ages and in the modern era, and gave rise to many movements which never achieved what Christianity did by becoming a Church. The emergence of a sect is the beginning of a newly declared religious doctrine. We feel that there is confusion in the use of the terms "sect", "church" and "denomination" in American sociological literature. We give our definition of the term "sect", which does not completely coincide with the meaning of this term in a number of sociological works, in which the term "cult" is used to designate what we sometimes call the most distinct and purest sects.

The very fact of the appearance of a new religious doctrine determines the specific features of the organization. First, the emergence of a new doctrine implies the charismatic authority of its founder, who has to convince people that he is the first in history who has seen the truth, or that the eternal, absolute truth has first been revealed to him. Second, belief in the newly acquired redeeming truth implies great enthusiasm. Enthusiasm and charismatic authority of the founder preclude the rigid formalization of any doctrine or organization.

At first glance, sectarian ideologies are endlessly varied in content. However, if we look closely, we find that one scheme in many modified forms lies behind this diversity, either vivid and clearly visible or in mitigated, veiled versions. One gets the impression that different versions of the same tale have been told by different people, or that the same drama is being staged in different ways. Here, the following must be kept in mind. While some philosophical doctrines can be set forth, essentially dissociated from the personality and life of the founder and, the more so, from the personality and life of his followers, this is impossible with sectarian ideologies. Sectarian ideology (the more distinct and pure the form in which it is represented, the more this applies to it) is not a doctrine logically worked out (such a doctrine is present only in an embryonic form). It is like a drama in which the founder of the sect and the believers play set roles. The more independent the founder of the sect is from the authorities and the more charismatic he is, the more rigidly is he linked to the given scheme. What sort of scheme is it and how can the declaration of a new doctrine determine its content?

First of all, the very fact of the promulgation of a new doctrine, as we have already said, implies the charismatic authority of its founder. This is one aspect of the organization of the sect. It is, however, also the cardinal

point in its ideology. Belief in the Truth having been revealed to its founder is the cornerstone of sectarian ideology.

Since the Truth was revealed to its founder, it logically follows that no one had known it before. The era before the founder appeared is regarded negatively, as one of suffering and error. This is another element in the ideology of the sect arising from the very fact of its promulgation. It is difficult to explain one more ideological element, which we constantly come across and which is obviously an intrinsic part of sectarian ideology. It is that an era regarded as positive precedes the one considered in a negative light. Sectarian ideology is conceived of not so much as something new as much as a kind of revival, or as a means of reviving an originally positive situation. This may be connected with the desire to show the reality of what the founder of the sect has promised. It is not a figment of the imagination, for it *did exist*, but was *lost*. However, in one way or another, it is obviously an intrinsic element of sectarian ideology.

The transition from a good situation to a bad one is usually connected with a certain sin, committed while under the influence of hostile forces. In the more distinct sects, this is the original sin or its close analogy. In the reformist sects, this diverging from the original purity is influenced by non-personified evil, the "world".

Belief that the founder of the sect has pronounced the Truth implies belief in certain proofs he presents, manifest truths, utterly convincing, miracles. The stories of these miracles are also an integral part of this ideology. In the reformist sects, this involves pointing to various paragraphs in the Bible, earlier forgotten about or incorrectly interpreted.

The founder is, however, not recognized by anybody, save for only a few *chosen* ones (he cannot be recognized anyway, despite the self-evidence of his teaching and his proofs, for the power of the devil is great, etc., etc.). It is simply a fact, but this fact is, at the same time, an ideological element.

However, the founder is still recognized by a few. Again, this is a fact, and, at the same time, an element of the ideology ("the chosen few").

The founder gives believers the means of salvation. And this is the content of the new doctrine, in the narrow sense of the word, this is the founder's contribution. It is, however, inconceivable without all the other elements. They are a means of salvation in the "world to come" and

in the "Last Judgement".

He must also present some empirical proofs of the truth of his teaching which are not connected directly with him as a person, which also will hold good after his death, and which are also proof of the salvation of the believers.

The epoch begun by the coming of the founder of the sect is regarded as "transitional". But again, it cannot be otherwise. What the founder promises has not yet been realized, but he has already walked the earth, has already provided the means of salvation.

Those who believe in the Truth declared by the founder are oppressed and persecuted, the fact that they are the chosen people not recognized. We again see fact and the ideological element concurring: they really are not recognized as the chosen ones, are even persecuted, but that is as it should be, for the world is the devil's kingdom and one must display fortitude, etc.

A radical change must take place in the world order, a world catastrophe, then, as the founder has promised, the lost ideal will be made real again for his believers, moreover, it will be so once and for all, never to be lost again. A final and great battle waged by the faithful against the forces of evil is often to precede the world holocaust, and the faithful will triumph with God's help.

All this can be written as follows: 1) a good situation in the past; 2) sin and transition to a bad situation; 3) bad situation, reign of evil; 4) the coming of the founder; 5) the founder presents his proofs; 6) he is not believed, he is persecuted; 7) there are, however, a few who believe in him; 8) he gives them the means of salvation; 9) he gives them eternal proofs; 10) a new, transitional era comes; 11) the faithful, the redeemed, are not believed, they are persecuted; 12) Armageddon, the "final battle"; 13) a world revolution, the original good situation is restored once and for all. On the face of it, this is something like a rough draft of early Christian ideology. This is, in fact, not the case, for this scheme is most vividly embodied in precisely those doctrines which completely reject Christianity and whose founder sets himself up in place of Jesus Christ.

Sectarian ideologies in their pure, most distinct form are very rarely encountered in the U.S.A. These are, primarily, the black sects which reject Christianity, such as the Black Muslims in the early stages of their evolution. Here is the ideology of the Black Muslims as it had developed by the 1960s, following the above scheme: 1) the black race—an age-old, great race once ruled the

world; 2) Allah, for the sins of Jacub, a great scholar of genetics, and, of course, a black who bred a race of white sub-humans, placed the blacks under the power of the whites; 3) the white devils oppressed the blacks; 4) Allah, having pity on the blacks, came down to earth in the person of Wallace D. Fard; 5) he taught the Truth and worked miracles; 6) the white devils persecuted him, he returned to Heaven; 7) however, some of the blacks believed him; 8) he told them of their origins and great predestination and taught them how they should act and observe various rites, and gave them back their real names; 9) the great force of his teaching is seen primarily in the fact that the believers are completely reborn, former bandits and the fallen become pure, holy people; 10) not all blacks now are the meek slaves of white people, there are also the Black Muslims who do not recognize the authority of the white devils, but the latter continue to reign over the world; 11) the white devils are particularly cruel in their attacks on the Black Muslims, but they do not give in to the white devils; 12) the last battle of the blacks against the whites will soon take place, the blacks will win with the help of Allah, who once again will walk the earth; 13) the white devils will be destroyed and the black race will rule the earth. Here we see how simply and naturally the ideology of the Black Muslims fits in the above scheme and how reality in it is fundamentally inseparable from the myth.

However, sects such as the Black Muslims, whose founder appears as God or a prophet (or God's messenger; more often than not the status is indefinite—just someone very great) and utterly denies Christianity, are few. This concerns some black nationalistic sects, such as the Moors, officially known as the Moorish Science Temple of America (their founder, Drew Ali, will soon be resurrected according to their belief, and those loyal to him kept watch over his grave) *(87;* 43). The Black Muslims recognize Drew Ali, but only as the forerunner of Fard *(87;* 43). Obviously, the later sect incorporating the earlier and similar one is a typical, unconscious device of sects. Drew Ali himself considered Marcus Harvey, a black religious nationalist, to be his forerunner *(88;* 48). Something similar to this possibly took place in ancient Christianity with regards to the followers of John the Baptist.

In this bracket are also several sects which have arisen from the Pentecostal Movement, such as the sect of Bishop Grace (who healed the blind and even resurrected the dead) officially known as the United House of Prayer for All

People *(88;* 22-23). There is the sect of Father Divine who, again, was capable of resurrecting the dead, and also a number of other sects. In these sects, the imagination of their founders runs riot. Miracles are performed, they give their believers wondrous, magical means, they completely and radically reject the world. Their visions reveal to them the impending destruction of the world by the wrath of God. They see all this very clearly and in very great detail, as they do the "thousand-year kingdom" which is to follow. As well as the Bible, contemporary life provides stimulants for these visions and for sectarian mythology in general. The data of modern science and technology, have strangely become part of these mythologies. Thus, A. Allen, the founder of one of the Pentecostal trends, had a vision which he described in his book *My Vision of the Destruction of America.* It was revealed to him in this vision that the U.S.A. would perish by the atomic bomb and nerve gas as the result of a war with the U.S.S.R. *(84;* 407), and that would be the beginning of a world catastrophe followed by the Last Judgement.

However, as a rule, the Christian tradition is not utterly rejected, but is supplemented. This automatically implies a lower status of the founder of the sect. Jesus Christ has already been, which means he himself is a lesser person. There is a continuum of various possible statuses, beginning with one where the significance of Jesus Christ is practically overshadowed and finishing with a very modest claim.

Thus, ranging the sects from the most distinct, purest forms to the mildest, the Mormons, evidently, come immediately after the anti-Christians. And the Mormon ideology is something like the above scheme twice over. They recognize Jesus Christ and the Bible and, accordingly, this scheme is present, inasmuch as it is present in Christianity. However, an angel appeared to the founder of the Mormons, Joseph Smith, and revealed to him a book supplementing (and overshadowing) the Bible— *The Book of Mormon.* Then he repeatedly saw various angels. And the scheme is repeated, with one story introduced into another with a similar subject. Such revelations, not ousting the Bible, but rather supplementing it, came to the founder of the Seventh-Day Adventists, Ellen White, who, therefore, although not equal to Jesus Christ, is still a prophet. The same happened in a number of Pentecostal trends.

A considerably more widespread variant of sects is the one where the founder does not claim to have experienced

a revelation, only declares that he was the first to correctly understand the true meaning of the revelations already contained in the Bible (the scheme is again repeated, but the second, inserted story is a very mild version of the first). Such are Jehovah's Witnesses who consider their founder to be the first to have correctly understood the meaning of the Apocalypse, the Plymouth Brethren and many other sects whose aim is to re-establish the original Christian doctrine in all purity. A number of them recognize not only Christianity, Dut the Reformation as well, considering it, however, to be incomplete.

Finally, many sects recognize not only the Reformation in general, but a definite type of Reformation, considering Christianity to have been truly embodied in it. But, subsequently, following an incorrect turn in the development of the Reformation, the Truth was again lost. Here one theme repeats itself again and again in ever milder versions (the scheme of the Bible, then the one implicitly contained in Protestantism as a whole, then follows, say, Methodism and, finally, comes the given sect). This takes us beyond the limits of the sect. It is something in between the sect and that type of organization which is dominant in America and which we shall speak of in section 4.

The nature of the sects is thus found in a continuum of forms, from the most distinct, truly sectarian to the mildest, Reformationist ones. A great many modifications are possible within this scheme. Thus, in the pure, distinct sects it is miracles that generally serve to prove the truth of a doctrine, and they are performed by the founder and by his followers—miraculous healings, glossolalia, prophecies, etc. The milder forms employ no miracles and only the doctrine's accord with the Bible and the purity of the lives of the believers are considered proof. The Black Muslims is a very distinct sect (founded by God), but the Truth and salvation are morally proved and there are no miracles.

On the contrary, many Pentecostal sects, whose aim is to revive early Christianity, only have mild cults of the founder of the sect. They can, however, combine this with the very distinct nature of the proofs of salvation—glossolalia, and, in a number of sects, manipulating poisonous snakes.

Generally, the given scheme, applicable to any sectarian ideology and, at the same time, providing for a classification of sects, does not in the least rule out a specific character of sectarian ideology in which each point of the above scheme exists in a particularly individual and unique form.

Still, why is this scheme? The logical link between its elements is clear. It is clear that if an absolute, redeeming Truth is declared, it was not known prior to this, whereas it is now known, only not by all. It is also clear that if a manifest Truth is not sufficiently widely known, this means there are forces running counter to it. Finally, it is clear that it is these same forces which completely dominated before the absolute Truth was declared. However, if we examine the scheme in more detail, we shall see that this ideological complex conceals a certain psychological one.

First of all, the sectarian ideology regards the recent past and the modern age negatively. The negation ranges from total rejection of the world ruled by the devil—in the most distinct sects, to dissatisfaction with several contemporary forms of religious life in the mild, reformist sects. Even if we assume that the man who has adopted this ideology has had his eyes opened and that he begins to see evil in what earlier seemed to him to be the norm, it is impossible to imagine this ideology adopted without him being dissatisfied, clearly or vaguely, with reality. Therefore, as a rule, sects are not widespread in the upper circles of society, among those who have every reason to be satisfied with life. Sects are mainly organizations of the poor. There are, however, a number of sects to be found among the well-off strata of society (for instance, Christian Science). These, however, are sects with: a) a very scientific sounding ideology, and b) particularly concentrating on problems of diseases and their healing, problems that can drive rich people to despair, too. It should also be borne in mind that, recently, sects (for instance, the Moonists) have also been attracting young people from the middle-class who have become lumpen-proletarians (see part IV, section 5).

The more distinct the nature of the sect and the more negative its view of the world, the lower the strata of society its members come from. The most distinct sects are those of the black urban poor, while reformist sects, like the Disciples of Christ, are to be found among farmers—not very rich, but, still, propertied.

Let us note that the most distinct sects which totally reject the world are those with the most mythological ideology. This places another limitation on the acceptability of such ideologies, in no logical connection with the former. An educated man will not become a Black Muslim, even if he is extremely dissatisfied with the world, simply because his mind is too free of mythology. However, there is a social connection. Although there is

no direct simple link between wealth, status and education in the U.S.A. (neither Nixon, Carter, nor American multi-millionaires are the embodiment of the heights of American culture), the least educated strata of society coincide more or less with the poorest.

There are two more features which speak of the indubitable link between acceptability of sectarian ideology and the dissatisfaction with society and one's place in it. It is, first, a great proportion of all types of physically and psychologically handicapped people in the sects, who, naturally, suffer the most in this world. Secondly, it is the link of the spread of the sects with social mobility. It has been noted that the sects spread rapidly when social mobility grows in a country. Thus, in Russia the sects were not particularly widespread among the peasants during the period of serfdom. But an extremely rapid growth of the sects is seen in the late 19th century. Latin America is being rapidly urbanized and industrialized today, and, consequently, the region has become more socially mobile. As a result, the Pentecostals, Mormons, Adventists from the U.S.A. penetrate it in great numbers. A great growth of the sects is now to be seen in Africa. The most distinct, purest forms of sects spread among the black population of the U.S.A. not during the period of slavery, but after emancipation, especially among the blacks in the Northern towns, of Southern extraction, people who were already full of the desire to improve their situation, but who saw no real way out *(88)*.

In a stable class society, a low social status does not greatly belittle the individual, for it is in no way connected with his personal worth. On the contrary, in a mobile society, a man who comes from the lower stratum is faced with the problem of finding an explanation for his humble social position, an explanation which would not downgrade his human dignity. The set of ideas offered by sectarian ideologies corresponds splendidly to this psychological requirement. Therefore, the U.S.A., not only a country with a relatively high social mobility, but also one where the system of values makes mobility a duty and a merit, that country while proclaiming "equality of opportunity" greatly humiliates its poor. Therefore, the sectarian ideas are reproduced there again and again.

However, sects do not simply reflect the existing vague dissatisfaction nor simply substantiate it. Such simple reflection and substantiation would only aggravate the psychological torture of a humiliated and dissatisfied man. They also point to a way out, a means of deliverance. Naturally, the more a man is crushed by life and the less

he sees the real opportunities for changing his unbearable situation, the more joyously he seizes fantastic means. Sectarian ideology promises him that if he believes and carries out certain actions, his social status will change after the world catastrophe (which will happen soon). "The thousand-year kingdom of Christ" and other similar forms of the ideal world to come in the near future are essentially a form of society with a fantastically reversed status system. The rich, the educated, the beautiful, etc., all those whom sectarians hate and envy end up in Hell, in fiery Gehenna. The sectarians themselves, now despised, humiliated, wretched people, will find themselves at the peaks of glory.

The sect, however, does more. It not only promises that there will be a change in status if certain actions are carried out. It also says, that inasmuch as these actions have already been carried out a change in status has already taken place. You are a chosen one. The world does not recognize this. However, for God, in fact, the present-day elite is the pseudo-elite, they are scum casts, you are the true elite. The world does not recognize this, but you know it. There are various proofs to back this up. They can be, as with the Pentecostals, miracles of no real benefit, like glossolalia and manipulating snakes. But primarily it is that real benefit which is derived from sectarian ideology right at the moment. What you dreamt of but could never achieve is now made real by some miracle. There are miraculous recoveries. God sends you a job, etc. The moral rebirth of the sectarian is often the basic proof: he gives up drinking and smoking, his attitude towards his family has changed, etc. These are no longer miracles or figments of the imagination, these are facts. However, these facts would have been impossible without belief in the sect, for it is only this belief which has made the changes possible. Thus, sectarian ideology itself creates the proof of its truth. Belief brings about real changes in life, and these changes prove the truth of one's faith and consolidate it.

It is noteworthy that most of the sects are non-segregated. Malcolm X., the leader of the Black Muslims, said in his *Autobiography* of the Adventists he met in his childhood: "They were the friendliest white people I had ever seen" *(139;* 17). There are not only predominantly white sects which also have black members (such as the Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses), but predominantly black sects which have white members, such as the sect of the Father Divine *(88;* 64) and a number of **Pentecostal** trends *(174;* 677). This absence of racism, generally very

typical of the white poor, can be explained only by the fact that the belief in having been chosen, in one's imaginary status is so great that there is no psychological need to prove at the expense of a black that you are not the dregs of society, that there is someone inferior to you.

Thus, we see that logically interconnected thematical points of sectarian ideology are also psychologically connected, that the sect fulfills a major psychological role for the sectarian—it reverses his social status in his mind, thus freeing him from his agonizing social and personal inferiority hang-ups.

One can be a Hegelian and not meet with other Hegelians. Ideology and organization can be divorced here. But, this is impossible with sectarian ideology. It is too strange, too unacceptable and hostile to society for one person alone to be capable of carrying the burden of it without the psychological support of others who believe. Furthermore, it contains no formalized doctrine which can be easily extracted from books, and the doctrine it carries is inseparably linked with collective action and experiences. It is a drama in which the founder and the members play definite roles. It is obvious that the scheme drawn up here is very close to the structure of the fairy-tale. To a certain extent, the sect is a fairy-tale played in life. The sectarian cannot be alone—he belongs to a collective of like-minded people, people for whom he is not a social outcast, but a saint. This gives him a feeling of calm, a feeling of mutual fellowship, strength, self-confidence, the belief that he is right, that he is one of the "chosen".

What lines can the sect develop along and what are the motivating forces of its development?

The sect cannot but be radically reconstructed after the death of its founder, when it can no longer be held together by his charismatic authority. Sects are most prone to dying away in the period immediately following the death of the founder, when believers go their own way or when many conflicting charismatic figures arise in the struggle for power among the founder's successors, laying claim to being his true heir and thus tearing the sect apart. This may lead to a number of milder sects arising, for their leaders, the founder's successors, recognize themselves to be his juniors, as was the case with the Mormon leaders who succeeded J. Smith. Sometimes, however, it may lead to very distinct sects arising, if the successor is able to create a cult of his own which overshadows that of the

founder, as was the case, for instance, with the Churches of God which arose following the sermons of Ambrose Tomplinson.

However, the emergence of new sects around the charismatic authorities of the founders' successors only delays the fundamental problem which new sects come up against sooner or later—that of the inevitably dampening enthusiasm of the children of the first believers who have already been brought up in the sectarian ideology, yet been deprived of the charismatic authority of the founder. While the fervor of belief and the authority of the founder were present, he resolved all issues, absolutely, once and for all. A period of reflection, of doubt sets in, and if the sect wants to be preserved, it must somehow put its organization in order and systemize its ideology, replacing charisma and enthusiasm with the ideological control of organization. However, although the transition from charisma to ideological control is inevitable, it can be brought about in many forms and trends.

Naturally, the more distinct, the purer the sect, the more difficult it is for it to become institutionalized. The variety of forms and trends depends on which strategy the sect chooses when solving the problems facing it. These problems are as follows.

The sectarians see society as the kingdom of the devil and themselves as the elite. However, while rejecting society the sectarians are, nevertheless, part of it. They await the downfall of the rich, but themselves cannot help aspiring to wealth. They affirm their imaginary status, but themselves cannot help aspiring to improve their actual situation. Moreover, very often the improvement is, for them, proof of the truth of their belief. However, their ideology which, to a certain extent, is conducive to improving their situation, at the same time places severe limitations on it, for just as it rejects society, so society rejects it and cannot fully recognize those who adhere to it as its own. Likewise, the leaders of the sect strive to consolidate their position within the sect, their authority over its members and to improve their social status. These aspirations can only be satisfied and not contradict each other if the sect is turned into a predominant Church. But until this ideal is realized (and it cannot be at the present time) these aspirations do contradict each other, and whoever the sectarians recognize as the second Jesus Christ will not be allowed to drink tea in a respectable house, precisely because of this.

Therefore, the position of the sect vis-a-vis society is

contradictory. The sectarians and their leaders aspire to things **which** are mutually contradictory. Consequently, the sect, while being institutionalized, may choose alternative strategies, giving preference to realizing one aspiration or another. Theoretically, we can point to a logically possible strategy, which, nevertheless, has never been used by the sects of the U.S.A. This involves an attempt to overcome the gap between the imaginary and real status by means of a revolutionary coup to establish the sect's monopoly rule. The Anabaptists in 16th century Germany had recourse to such a strategy, as did the people of the Fifth Monarchy in 17th century England. In the U.S.A., only the Mormons had recourse to armed struggle in the last century—to a limited extent and as a means of defense; ideas of a coup, rather vague and fantastic than real, were entertained by the Black Muslims at the outset of the movement. For plans such as these to appear, plans on the whole contradicting the transcendental trend of any religious doctrine, not only great fervor of belief is needed, but also a great degree of pressure from society, which does not recognize the sect's right to exist, a situation that has never arisen in the U.S.A.

Going back to the alternative strategies, they are as follows:

1. The strategy of isolation, which, in turn, may be represented in a number of versions.

a) Escape and the founding of their own society and state in a remote area. An element of this strategy was also present in the founding of the Puritan colonies in New England, in the flight of dissenters and sectarians to the outlands of Russia.

Only one sect in the history of America has taken this path—the Mormons, undertaking the heroic trek to the wild West and founding their theocratic state in what is today Utah. Thus, through great effort the sect rids itself of all problems connected with its relations with society in one fell swoop and becomes a Church. The authority of its leadership is thus consolidated to the maximum. A number of elements in the organization remind of those of Catholicism: the president, the head of the Church, elected for life and having the right to introduce new dogma; the supreme electoral college that he appoints. Two conditions are essential for the sect to take this path: first, a great deal of pressure from society. As far as the Mormons are concerned, such pressure was relatively great because of the very un-Christian nature of their doctrine, and, in particular, polygamy, which they dogmatically adopted. Second, they had to have a place to run

to. At the time of the Mormons' trek, the wild West was just such a place. However, not for long. A wave of colonization soon overtook the Mormons, and after a brief attempt at armed resistance, they were forced to adopt other survival strategies. They now had nowhere to run. There were no countries more favorably disposed towards sects than the U.S.A. The Mormon experience was, therefore, not repeated.

The Black Jews' (a Harlem black sect) emigration from the U.S.A. to Israel is similar to the Mormons' flight *(62;* ch. V). In this case, however, the church-state is not set up in an empty place but its features are ascribed to the real state. Sects founding settlements in the jungles of Guyana, far from the U.S.A. and the towns of Guyana, where there were practically micro-states of the People's Temple and several small sects of Black Jews, chose a strategy similar to that of the Mormons, but on a smaller scale (see *The New York Times,* Sept. 27, 1978, p. A-12).

b) A milder form of the strategy of escape was the founding of settlements and suburbs near large towns. Practically all American sects have such suburbs. In sectarian settlements the tendency may arise for "communism" of sorts, for a community of property. However, generally, such "communism", even if introduced by the founder himself, is a secondary phenomenon—a means of unifying the sect and separating it from the world. The most distinguished and successful example of this type of "communism" is the German Hutterian Brethren, an offshoot of Anabaptism, whose "communist" settlements are to be found in the U.S.A. and Canada even today *(216;* 125). The striving for territorial isolation can sometimes be combined with that for maximum economic autarchy, whereby the sect sets up enterprises where sect members work and whose products they buy mandatorily. The Mormons set up such enterprises and now have a real industrial and financial empire (see the article on the financial empire of the Mormons in *U.S. News and World Report,* Dec. 19, 1977, pp. 59-62), similar enterprises of the Black Muslims were valued at $80 million *(The Washington Post,* Feb. 26, 1975, pp. A1-A8).

c) Isolation through intensifying the external aspects of it. The sect escapes from society not by moving to another place, but, so to say, psychologically, creating special rituals, customs, etc., encouraging the maximum alienation of the sect members from society at large. The most striking examples of this strategy of isolation are: the Quakers' difference in clothes, manners, their

refusal to bare their heads; in language, their use of "thou" in place of "you"; the German sects of Amishes and Hutterians preserving up to this day in the U.S.A. the Middle Ages cut of their clothes with hooks instead of buttons; the Mormons' attempt to introduce their own alphabet; the cultivation of the Arab language by the Black Muslims and of Hebrew (and even Yiddish) by the Black **Jews;** the preservation of Old German by the Hutterians.

This strategy may be combined with that of territorial isolation, as with the Hutterians, or not, as with the People's Temple whose members founded their settlements but had no special customs which isolated them from the rest of society, or as with the Black Muslims who have a great many such customs, but not settlements of their own. Both in the strategy of flight and in that of inner isolation, quasi-ethnic elements of a sectarian community arise. This "ethnicization" of the sects is reflected in their terminology—"a people of Quakers", "a nation of Islam". A variant of the strategy of inner isolation is the practice of excommunication, most typical of the early Mennonites (and now of their conservative wing) and of some of the Plymouth Brethren, where the smallest doctrinal or cult difference immediately leads to all ties being broken with the "heretic"—no eating or drinking in his company nor even talking to him.

2. The strategy of adaptation to American bourgeois society and joining the system of American bourgeois ideology. The possibility of taking such a path is rooted in the sect's psychological effect. The sect, as we have already said, reassures man, instills in him confidence in himself. The feeling of being chosen and of belonging to a group of people who recognize this and are always ready to help, allows a man to stand up more staunchly to the adversities of life, makes it potentially easier for him to adapt to society and is conducive to his upward social mobility.

This, however, is not all. While completely rejecting society a sect cannot completely reject social morality. It is very rare for sectarian morality to contradict social morality, as it does in the Mormons' rejection of monogamy. Sectarian morality is usually an extremely rigorous variant of social morality. The sectarians reproach society for being amoral according to its own, Christian and universal standards (this amorality is generally exaggerated). Society wallows in debauchery—chastity is demanded of the sect member, hard drinking reigns in society—the sect member should neither drink nor smoke, etc. William Garrison, a researcher into the

Pentecostal movement, writes: "When Pentecostals say that they 'separate themselves from the world' they will also paraphrase this immediately to something like: 'We don't drink, smoke, gamble, play around with women, or waste our time and money in idle pursuits like movies'" *(174;* 322). However, by strictly observing these standards people are saved from utter fall and degradation. As a result, there can be a change for the better in the social standing of the sect member: from being a member of the lumpen-proletariat he becomes a part of the petty bourgeoisie; he comes by some money, even if because he does not drink *(174;* 719-20), he has a stable family. The attitude towards him changes, not only on the part of sect members. (All this is conceived as proof of the truth of sectarian ideology.) Certain changes are possible in the average status of the sect as a whole.

Sect members usually have a good reputation as workers (from the bourgeoisie's point of view). They are teetotal, are not trade union members, do not go on strike. This helps them find a job. W. Garrison writes that when New York Puerto Rican Pentecostals go to look for work, they take with them a document showing they are Church members *(174;* 309). For the reputation of Jehovah's Witnesses see *174;* 714. The praising of Black Muslims by Richard Daley, Mayor of Chicago, by no means a liberal or champion of black rights, although on the face of it paradoxical, can be explained. For all the dreams of the Black Muslims of the fall of the white race, in practice they do not rise in rebellion, but are industrious workers and open up their own small businesses (see *Time,* March 10, 1977, p. 11).

The confrontation with society diminishes, the ideology of the sect is gradually reconstructed. The sectarian ideological complex is reconceived and moves into the background. The sect renounces both the unreserved rejection of society and glorifying itself as a society of the chosen few. It gradually assimilates those values of American bourgeois society which it at first rejected. At first, art, education, entertainment, participation in political life are rejected and put in the same category as hard drinking, debauchery and smoking. However, these values gradually find their way back. An example of the evolution is provided in the analysis of the Church of God (Anderson, Indiana) in Robert Lee's book *(129;* 196-98). Something similar, although in a very distinct and modified form, takes place with the Black Muslims: the dissolving of their paramilitary corps, and the abolition of the special clothes their women wore. Ideologically,

the Black Muslims are drawing nearer the ordinary Muslims *(Nation,* April 11, 1977, p. 729).

When the sect is thus transformed, when it has evolved along these lines, the sect leaders do not dominate the sect to the same degree to which they might have had the sect taken the first path: sectarian organization is democratized to closely resemble the major Protestant denominations. But at the expense of status within the sect, the general social status of the leaders rises. Just as the sect begins to be similar to the major denominations in its doctrine and organization, so the standing of its leader begins to come close to that of the Congregationalist or Presbyterian pastor.

The sect loses its social character: it stops being an organization of the poor. Respectable, rich and educated people join it; some of the poor make their way in the world, others leave the sect which no longer satisfies their psychological demand. The sect becomes a normal, respectable denomination. "Decent" denominations in the U.S.A., such as the Baptists and Quakers (the Mormons now also belong to this group) were once sects of the poor. Yet, in leaving the low social strata, the sect leaves behind a spiritual vacuum, which is subsequently filled by other sects. John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, wrote: "I do not see how it is possible in the nature of things for any revival of religion to continue long. For revivals of religion necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and they cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase so will pride, anger, and the love of the world in all its branches" (*72;* 18).

The above-described strategies, the evolutionary paths of the sects are alternatives, in the sense that the special stress laid on maximum isolation, on quasi-ethnicity excludes successful adaptation to bourgeois society. Therefore, the choice of strategy is always accompanied by a struggle and often by schisms, when those dissatisfied with adaptation set up their own pure, orthodox organizations where the elements of isolation are intensified. One strategy may follow on another. The sect may first follow one path, then another and, generally speaking, strategies of adaptation take the place of those of isolation, and not the other way around. Thus, the Mormons first took the path of quasi-ethnic isolation, creating their own settlements within the country, then they took the path of escape, creating their own society, and, subsequently, they took the path of adaptation. The Quakers at first actively followed the path of quasi-ethnic isolation and partly of territorial isolation, then

that of adaptation. However, the transition from isolation to adaptation is relatively easy only when isolation has not already gone too far. If a sect has been preserved, as, for instance, the Amishes or Hutterian Brethren, in a quasi-ethnic form, it is extremely difficult for it to leave this path.

The question arises: why is this or that path chosen? Why did the Mormons take the path of flight, while the Methodists and Disciples of Christ chose adaptation right away? This, to a certain extent, may depend on chance circumstances. For example, the Mormons might not have gone on their trek had the place of Smith not been taken by a man like Young, who was able to unite them and organize their migration to Utah. However, on the whole, in our opinion, the choice of this or that strategy is determined by the sect's primordial distinctive features. The purest sects, those which consciously put the greatest distance between themselves and Christianity, objectively nearest early Christianity and widespread among the poorest strata of society, are in bitter conflict with this society. Furthermore, these are sects whose doctrine and organization are very amorphous, for when God himself or the sect's prophet walks among the believers, doctrine and organization are fluid and can be supplemented or changed. Therefore, the process of the institutionalization of such sects is very complicated and they often break up after the death of their founder. And, therefore, it is rather the strategy of isolation which is suitable for their survival. Only after a relatively long time in isolation, after institutionalization in conditions of isolation, can sects such as the Mormons successfully embark on the path of adaptation. The Reformist sects, such as the Disciples of Christ, are not so strikingly different from the fundamental denominations, nor do they come into such acute conflict with society as do the sects of the first type. Therefore, they embark on the path of adaptation more quickly and advance along it more successfully.

We shall now deal with the questions posed at the beginning of the chapter, concerning the reasons for the spread of the sects, their significance and functions.

First of all, U.S. society creates extremely favorable conditions for sects to spring up. On the one hand, being a society dominated by the cult of social success, it subjects its poor and its losers to particularly acute psychological torture, which prepares the ground for the spreading of sectarian ideology. On the other hand, a

number of features of this society—the Protestant tradition of the layman's active participation in Church matters and his independent meditation on the Bible, the tradition of revival, the universal spread of religious symbolics, broad religious tolerance—all this is conducive to channelling social protest towards sectarianism.

While furthering the emergence of sects, these special features of American society also further the evolution of sects along the path of adaptation, of bourgeois integration. Embarking along this path, as we have already said, is made easier or more difficult, depending on the degree of the sect's conflict with society. Meanwhile, the degree, the extent of this conflict is determined as much by the distinctive features of the sect (the contradiction between its ideology and the values of society) as by the distinctive features of society. For instance, the sect and society were in an utmost conflict in tsarist Russia because of the official nature of ideology of the Russian Orthodox Church, and any sects followed the path of territorial or quasi-ethnic isolation. This conflict in the U.S.A. is, on the contrary, very mild. Its society treats sects patiently, even those which are very hostile towards it. This is something more than government neutrality in religious matters. It is a considerate attitude. For example, the children of Jehovah's Witnesses refuse to salute the U.S. flag in school (this is idolatry). The Supreme Court ruled they should not be forced to do this. (See the articles by Leo Pfeffer and John Burkholder *(174;* 8-53) on U.S. legislation on sects. Only in rare cases of a blatant infringement of the law does a conflict arise, and it never goes further than this infringement. Therefore, the path of adaptation and bourgeois integration is the main path of the sect's development in the U.S.A.

Meanwhile, it must not be forgotten that sectarian ideology expresses a terrible hatred for society. The inflamed imagination of the sect members carries pictures of the destruction of the U.S.A. including destruction by the atomic bomb, and these pictures are admired. It is even terrible to think what this hatred might lead to if it were reflected not in sectarian dreams, but in real actions. For the sect is one of the many forms of expressing a protest. Other such forms might be banditry which is widespread in the U.S.A., basically in those strata in which the sects are widespread (that sectarianism and banditry are alternatives is seen in the fact that many of the leaders and rank-and-file members of the Black Muslims are former bandits), or political extremism (which

is most dangerous for society).

Meanwhile, while offering its poor sectarian forms of protest, American society channels this protest in a way least harmful to it, and turns the sect, an ideological organization with an anti-bourgeois and anti-American protest thrust at its inception, into a tool for assimilating American bourgeois values. While the sectarians are dangerous, while they are burning with hatred, they are far from politics. The sect of the Adventists awaiting the destruction of society day after day demand faultless and selfless work from their members for their bosses *(184;* 129). The Jehovah's Witnesses, also awaiting the end of the world, forbid their members to take part in any ornizations. The Black Muslims abandon themselves to dreams of Allah soon giving blacks power over the whites—and do not take part in civil rights movements. Even Jim Jones, who created his own sect specially with revolutionary aims, reckoning on armed action in the coming social cataclysm, led his sect members into the Guyanese jungle and, in the end, ordered them all to kill themselves there. If the sect members, having evolved along the lines of adaptation, begin to vote again, take part in trade unions, etc., they are no longer the same old sect members, they are no longer dangerous and their political conduct differs little from that of the members of the major denominations.

3. American Bourgeois Society and the Churches

It can be said that the U.S.A. breeds and generates sects. However, it by no means generates Churches. Rather, it is a receptacle of Churches: immigration from all countries brought literally all Christian Churches there, and others as well, Judaist, Buddhist, Islamic, and they all took root in the U.S.A. The adaptation, like the rapid appearance of the sects, tells us that the Churches, like the sects, obviously fulfill some functions which are vital for American society.

In analyzing the role of the Churches, just like that of the sects, we should first of all define the term, in this case the term "Church". All denominational organizations, including the most distinct sects, call themselves Churches, understanding by this a union of true believers. We, however, use this concept as a sociological term, not a theological one. In a number of American works, the term "Church" is identical to that of "denomination" (see, for example, Nicolas Demerath, *75).* We consider it necessary

to distinguish these two concepts. ("Denomination" as a term and concept is discussed in section 4 of this part.) To find out what is meant by "Church", it is best to compare the Church with the sect. Let us now list the main differences between the Church and the sect.

1. The sect is an organization of a new doctrine proclaimed by a charismatic leader. The newer the doctrine and the less the founder is guided by the authority of the previous religious figures and the Bible, the more distinct is the character of the sect. The Church, on the contrary, is an old, established organization. The purest, most classical Churches, the Catholic and the Orthodox, are the results of the evolutionary, uninterrupted development of the sect of the early Christians, i.e., they have existed for twenty centures.

2. The sect is an organization of the persecuted, not ruling, minority. The Church is formed once and for all, having become an ideology which totally dominates society, i.e., the ideology of the majority and that of the ruling classes. Although subsequently, with various historical changes, it can become the organization of the minority, it preserves its organizational and ideological structure designed for it when it was the dominant religion.

3. Charismatic authority and enthusiasm are prevalent in the sect; doctrine, cult and organization have not yet been formed in it, they are unformalized and amorphous. A hierarchical bureaucracy prevails in the Church, separated from the mass of believers who are subjugated to the ideological discipline established by this hierarchy; doctrine, cult and organization are completely formalized and have a dogmatic significance. The purer a sect is in form, the less it is dogmatically determined and, on the contrary, the purer a Church is, the more rigid, the more dogmatically determined is its doctrine and organization. The Lutherans can change over from an Episcopal to a Congregational structure, radically change their service, yet still remain Lutherans. Such a thing is impossible in Catholicism.

4. The sect rejects society. In the Church, the ideological complex at the basis of the New Testament is partly moved into the background, partly reconceived in connection with the Church being dominant in a society of social inequality.

Along with these distinctions in the ideology and organization of the sect and the Church, there is a feature they both share that distinguishes them from the basic American Protestant religions and makes the Church and the sect equally unacceptable to American society in their

pure forms. Both the sect and the Church strive to have total control over the lives of believers, but use different methods to achieve this, both are intolerant towards those who think differently from them.

Besides, the Churches were formed and became dominant in societies whose social organization was totally different from that of America, and Church ideologies in many ways contradict the American bourgeois system of values.

Finally, in the U.S.A. Churches are linked with different national cultures and a different national patriotism. The Church is organizationally subordinated either to an international center (the Vatican) or to centers located abroad.

Just as we can range sects from the most distinct ones to the blandest, similar to the basic Protestant denominations, we can do likewise with the Churches. There is no doubt that the most distinct, the purest Churches are the Catholic and the Orthodox, the less pure, bland forms are those predominant Protestant denominations which have a rigid hierarchical organization—Anglicanism and Lutheranism. There are still milder, blander forms—Presbyterianism and Dutch Reformism.

The term "Church" is usually used only in connection with the Christian religions. But, strictly speaking, there is nothing specifically Christian in this sociological term. All the world religions began from a stage similar to that of an early Christian sect, and all of them, in the course of their evolution and in becoming the ruling Church, tackled similar problems. Therefore, obviously we can speak of the Muslim or Buddhist Churches. Judaism is a specific form of ideology and organization, which is in a number of aspects similar to the ideal type of Church (extremely rigid formalization of doctrine and ritual and uncharismatic leadership).

The evolution of the Churches in the U.S.A. is complicated by their special immigrant nature, which greatly heightens the contradiction between the specifically religious (dogmatic) and the ethnic-cultural aspects of Church ideologies. What do we mean by this?

The dominant Church in an ethnic society is subject to various modifications, which adapt it to the ethnic culture of the given society. In the consciousness of the representatives of the given nationality the Church merges with nationality (Russian is Orthodox, Polish is Catholic) and becomes an element of national awareness. As the Churches in the U.S.A. are immigrant Churches, and im-

migrants have come up against enormous psychological and cultural problems of adaptation, the Church in the U.S.A. came to fulfill special functions which it did not in the motherland. First, the Church is an aspect of national culture and a symbol of nationality (the adhering to which, unlike political loyalty to one's homeland, for instance, does not exclude Americanization). Second, it is an island of one's own in a sea of strangers, a group of people of the same origin, faith and culture, placed in the same psychological situation of having to adapt to the conditions in the U.S.A. (a function of the Church analyzed by Helmut Niebuhr *(155;* ch. 8).

This leads to the national aspects of Church ideology being particularly stressed at first and coming to the foreground.

In those religious ethnic groups in which religion coincides with nationality, there arises a strong tendency **to replace the religious** functions of the Church's activities by those of a cultural center and social ethnic community. This happened to a vast extent in Judaism, where the synagogue became the natural center and meeting place for various community organizations. The synagogue's ethnic function was theologically founded in reconstructionism—the teaching of the Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan. The Armenian Church in many ways presents a similar picture.

In the Protestant Churches, where there is no united international organization, this also results in the national character of the Church being stressed, and in all plans for unification with other ethnic Churches of the same tendency being resisted. Therefore, Churches distinguished by nothing except their national origins (the Lutheran Churches—Icelandic, Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, German, Latvian, etc.) have for a long time maintained their independence in the U.S.A., while the German Reformers at first preferred to draw closer together and were prepared to unite with German Lutherans rather than Dutch Reformers *(155;* 229).

Tensions and schisms arose in the internationally organized Churches, because their members of different nationalities which had earlier little contact with each other, were now neighbors in the U.S.A. The Russian Orthodox Church had no single dogmatically sanctified center. This multinational Church had been headed by the Russian Church hierarchy appointed by Synod. After 1917, it relatively painlessly split into many national Churches which were under the canon of various patriarchs. Typically, the Albanian Orthodox Church arose in the U.S.A. even before the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church arose in Albania.

Catholicism is particularly varied in national composition, but it is centrally organized, and this centralization is of dogmatic significance. This led to: 1) the endless struggle of various national parties for the leading position in the American hierarchy; 2) the plan, condemned by the Vatican, for organizing ethnic, not territorial, dioceses in the U.S.A. (Kagenslism); 3) the split accompanied by the emergence of new ideologies of the Polish and Lithuanian ethnic Catholic Churches, close to Protestantism; 4) the organization of parishes according to nationality, with the territorial principle and the organization of the diocese retained. There are still very many such national parishes. In Chicago in 1959, there were 138 out of the 279 (43 Polish, 27 German, 12 Italian, 10 Lithuanian, etc.) *(206;* 114).

Another factor complicating the evolution of the Church in the U.S. was the acute aggravation of ideological differences within the Church, inevitable under the conditions of immigration. In the official state Churches these differences were concealed and suppressed. Moreover, those of different opinions and religious tendencies, often belonging to different social strata, could be more or less out of contact with each other. In the U.S.A. they found themselves side by side, and, in addition, there was no controlling authority over them. This led to a great number of schisms which had purely European, not American causes and roots. What in Europe was a Church faction or a movement often became an independent Church in the U.S.A. This is, for instance, how the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (from the Norwegian revivalist Hauge movement), the Apostolic Lutheran Church of America (from the Finnish revivalist Lestadins movement in Sweden) arose in American Lutheranism. Elements of European (German) differences also played a role in the emergence of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod.

While sectarians reject society (at the same time striving to improve their position within it), Church members and their spiritual pastors, naturally, did not come to the U.S.A. to reject American society. Nevertheless, their aim as far as society is concerned, is both ambiguous and contradictory: they want to adjust, to achieve recognition, and, at the same time, retain their religion, whose values contradict those of American society. Therefore, they are faced with a choice between adaptation or isolation, the only difference being that they can go only timidly and relatively not very far along the path of isolation.

There can, of course, be no talk of the territorial isolation of the Church, like the flight of the Mormons, that had not been the goal of the immigration. Something similar to this, however, can be seen in the orthodox Jews traditional ghettos, setting up their own settlement in the Williamsburg district of Brooklyn *(98;* 143-46).

But there can be spiritual isolation, linked in the national Churches with the struggle to preserve the national language, customs, etc., in the international Catholic Church with the creation of a huge network of all types of organizations—schools, colleges, every conceivable type of voluntary organization, whose aim is to limit the contacts between Catholics and non-Catholics as much as possible. This network is truly vast. In 1964, there were 10,731 Catholic primary schools and 2,477 secondary schools run on Church funds, 300 Catholic colleges, Newman centers in non-Catholic colleges, etc. The various types of organizations are literally innumerable, including ones like the Guild of Saint Apollonnia—a dental organization for Catholic schoolchildren, the Czech Catholic Union of Texas and the Blue Army of Our Lady of Fatima, the latter to pray for the conversion of Russia and for peace *(206;* 225). The Orthodox and the Lutheran Orthodox Churches have similar networks, although not on such a vast scale. The Churches give special attention to their own primary education. The Catholic Church, Jewish orthodox, and also the orthodox Lutherans of the Missouri and Wisconsin Synods set up their own primary education systems.

The path of adaptation means the assimilation of American values, including religious tolerance, democratization of organization, independence from foreign centers, and rejection of one's national language and identity. As we have already said in the first part, the democratic organizational structure of denomination which prevailed in America in the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary period played a major role in establishing bourgeois democracy. But the present bourgeois democracy is already having a reciprocal effect on the organizational structure of the Church. This is the main road of Church evolution in the U.S.A. Different Churches embark upon this road at different times and develop along these lines with differing degrees of difficulty.

The Protestant denominational organizations least identifiable with the pure, classical type of Church found it easiest to adapt to the American conditions. Only the most insignificant changes, connected with the official recognition of tolerance and introduced immediately after the revolution, were required for the adaptation of

Presbyterianism *(111;* 260-64).

The Anglican Church, tainted with Loyalism, broke away after the revolution, changing its name to the American Episcopal Church, rejected the principle of a state Church and domination by the English King, managed, finally, to gain its own episcopate and, thereby, independence from the Bishop of London and introduced a system of conventions with broad representation and extensive rights for the laymen, similar to the two-house U.S. Congress (111; 200-10).

The adaptation of the foreign-language Lutheran Churches presented a great difficulty. Scandinavian Lutheranism was long preserved in isolated Churches, whereas a bitter struggle was waged in German Lutheran Churches between the supporters of adaptation and those of isolation, which led to a number of schisms. New immigrants usually held the most conservative views in the sphere of dogma and cult, and the most isolationist views. They found that the old Lutheran Church was no longer German and created their own orthodox synods—which were also Americanized after a while. Since the new immigrants usually settled in the most western territories, then, as American researchers note, the more western the sphere of influence of the Lutheran synod, the more conservative it is (155; 215). The Dutch Reformers are dogmatically and organizationally very close to Presbyterianism and Congregationalism, but they were a foreign-language trend. The Dutch Reformed Church became the Reformed Church in America, then the True Dutch Reformed Church broke away from it. Later, it changed its name to the Christian Reformed Church (155; 214).

The process of the Americanization of Orthodoxy is much more complex. Orthodoxy has no single centralized organization, yet it is very rigidly organized and organizational changes can only take place with the agreement of all canonical Church centers. Organizational reconstruction is, therefore, very complex. In being broken down into separate national Churches, American Orthodoxy was under several patriarchs, who strove to have their own base in the U.S.A. and hindered the drive of the U.S. Orthodox Churches, undergoing gradual Americanization, for unification and independence. Nevertheless, certain steps are being taken towards this. In 1970, the Moscow patriarch granted autarchy to the Russian Metropolitanate in the U.S.A., practically independent since 1917, but canonically subordinated to him. It was the first American Church after this to renounce its national title and become known simply as the Orthodox Church in America. The independent American Orthodox Metropolitanate might have become the center for

the unification of all Orthodox Churches, and indeed the Albanian Church, one of the Bulgarian, and one of the Rumanian Churches joined it with the rights of autonomous dioceses. However, when the Russian Metropolitanate in the U.S.A. was given autarchy, the other patriarchs protested violently and refused to recognize the act (see *The Washington Post*, Feb. 7, 1970, p. C-9; Feb. 14, 1970, p. B-5). Another way of achieving organized unification and independence is connected with the activities of the Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas, founded in the early 1960s, and the General Orthodox Theological Society, founded in the late 1960s. The Standing Conference is obviously becoming an ail-American center, but the old situation is preserved canonically and probably will be for a long time yet, for it is extremely difficult for the American Churches to induce changes in the Orthodox patriarchates, which rake in all kinds of benefits from this situation.

Although organizational independence has been very difficult to achieve, Americanization gradually took hold of various national Churches. All the basic canonical Orthodox Churches have democratized their inner structure to a considerable extent, and this structure is now, in fact, very close to that of the Episcopal Church. Every Church is gradually switching over to English in liturgy (the Arab Church was the first to do this) and even the Albanian Church, the first in the U.S.A. to create the liturgy in its own national language and an important center for forming its national literary language, was forced to adopt English. There is the tendency to simplify cult (which is very difficult in the Orthodox Church). A number of Orthodox Churches have joined the National Council of the Churches of Christ, while the Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops is playing an increasingly active role in social life, concerning itself with questions which have no immediate dogmatic significance, but which touch directly upon the organizational and social interests of the Orthodox Churches.

Neither did Orthodoxy escape the schisms connected with the process of Americanization and also with the specific problem of the attitude towards the patriarchates in the socialist countries. All the Orthodox Churches in the U.S.A. (except for the Arab and Greek Orthodox Churches) fell into two categories: those recognizing and those not recognizing them as canons, nor themselves canonically subordinated to them (which, however, would not necessarily entail real subordination). Those recognizing the canonicity of the patriarchates in the socialist countries are relatively

liberal and Americanized. The non-recognizers, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (the Karlovac) the most important among them, are religiously orthodox and oppose Americanization. The same rule is largely in effect here again: the orthodox new immigrants break away from the old Americanized Churches. The Karlovac hierarchy left Russia at the time of the Civil War. But its leaders came to the U.S.A. only after the Second World War and a considerable number of them were those "displaced persons" who had collaborated with the Nazis during the war. They are not yet much affected by Americanization and try to preserve their traditional reactionary character.

The most powerful of the immigrant Churches, the exponent of ideology originally deeply hostile to the American bourgeois system of values was, of course, the Catholic Church. Catholicism in the U.S.A. has achieved great success in its organic adaptation to American society. Practically without schisms (except for the relatively small schism of the Polish and Lithuanian national Catholic Churches), the American Catholic Church was able to forge various immigrant Churches into one united American Catholic Church, something which Orthodoxy, having no united center, was unable to do. The united Catholic Church possesses a vast organizational network and powerful financial resources.

The Polish National Catholic Church in the U.S.A. experienced a rapid and paradoxical evolution. This Church, distinguishing itself from Catholicism specially to affirm its Polish affinity, having created a Polish liturgy and canonized Mickiewicz and Slowacki, is now going over to English. In the Polish Roman-Catholic church there is no longer the White Eagle, but the American flag. The evolution of this Church is splendidly shown in the book by Hieronim Kubiak, a Polish researcher. *(122).*

Catholicism met with stiff opposition from American society, which throughout the entire 19th century was shaken by anti-Catholic movements (the last trace of these movements were the doubts expressed in 1960 by conservative Protestants about the possibility of a Catholic, John Kennedy, serving as President of America). Catholicism was able to overcome this opposition and has become an influential and universally recognized institute of American society, no longer raising any doubts as to its "Americanism". The triumph of Catholicism, reflected in the election of John Kennedy, was, at the same time, that of American bourgeois society, which had succeeded in taming, domes-

ticating Catholicism. Catholicism, in fact, was in no way reflected in Kennedy's policy. Moreover, possibly fearing reproaches for a pro-Catholic policy, Kennedy took a severely critical approach to the Catholics' attempts to finance Catholic schools. His policy was revised in favor of partially satisfying the Catholics' demands under Lyndon Johnson, a Protestant.

Nowadays, Catholics differ very little from their Protestant fellow countrymen in their social behavior. They have assimilated the general American bourgeois system of values. Moreover, the American Catholic Church has been a mighty champion of American influence in world Catholicism. At the end of the last century, the Vatican was on the point of declaring the Church contaminated by "the heresy of Americanism" (see *160;* 429-32) comprised of such things as recognizing the separation of the Church from the state as the ideal situation for the Church and the worship of bourgeois democracy, now the Vatican itself has become the proponent of these heretical doctrines, to a large extent due to American influence.

However, this in no way means that the process of the Americanization of Catholicism is complete. Catholicism in the U.S.A. today is to a great extent leading a double life: externally, in its official socio-political stance, it lives according to the laws of American society, in conformity with the American bourgeois system of values, whereas it lives by completely different laws in its inner religious life. It is extremely difficult for Catholicism to overcome a number of contradictions of its doctrine and organization with the American bourgeois system of values which inevitably come to light more and more clearly. Organizational separation from Rome, organizational Americanization is unthinkable (though the creation of a National Conference of Catholic Bishops in keeping with the resolution of the Second Vatican Council was a step in this direction), and the process of the reconstruction of American Catholicism merges with the general process of the extremely complex reconstruction of Catholicism as a whole, begun by the pontificate of Pope John XXIII. The reforms of Catholicism are half-way and timid. The internal organizational structure of Catholicism strikingly contradicts the principles of bourgeois democracy.

The high degree of the development and efficiency of the Catholic organization are turned against it. The more archaic and underdeveloped structure of Orthodoxy allows the laymen and the minor clergy to play a more significant role in adopting general Church resolutions, and it was

the same organizational amorphousness and underdevelopment which made the Orthodox hierarchy powerless before the absolutism of temporal power and also weakened its opposition to the democratic aspirations of the Church members. On the contrary, the highly efficient organization of Catholicism, winning the admiration of American bureaucrats and managers, does not want to, nor can make concessions to the bourgeois-democratic principles in the Church. The organizational authoritarianism of Catholicism determines its strict organizational discipline. The relatively underdeveloped Orthodox dogma allowed and still allows the mass of para-Orthodox theologies to exist, whereas Catholicism, with its extremely finely elaborated doctrine clamps down on heretics with strict disciplinary measures to this day.

The reforms of the Second Vatican Council were essential for Catholicism which had been gradually turning into a kind of rudiment of the feudal past. However, as is often the case with half-way and belated reforms, they gave rise to a long crisis which hit Catholicism in the U.S.A. particularly hard. American Catholicism combined a great exterior business-like efficiency and effectiveness, reflected in the creation of a powerful financial base, educational system and subsidiary organizations, with a profoundly traditionalist basis. The specifically American pragmatism and anti-intellectualism led to the American Church, the richest national contingent of world Catholicism, suffer from extreme intellectual poverty and lag terribly behind the European Churches in terms of theology. All of this only served to strengthen traditionalism. The reforms, which to a certain extent touched this traditionalist base, brought about a crisis of faith, forcing people to meditate over things they had earlier traditionally accepted out of habit. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Catholic Church was torn by a struggle between its lower and upper hierarchies, the laymen and the hierarchy, but, most importantly, it was constantly losing true believers. In 1964, when the Church mass was still read in incomprehensible Latin, 71 per cent of Catholics attended church every week, while in 1970 there was 60 per cent and in 1975—54 per cent *(The Washington Post,* Jan. 9, 1976, p. B-15). In 1963, 72 per cent prayed every day, while this figure dropped to 62 per cent in 1964. In 1974, only 32 per cent believed in the infallibility of the Pope *(101;*127). The number of children studying at Catholic schools is on the decline. They numbered 3,368 thousand in 1977, 104 thousand less than in 1975, and 2,294 thousand less than in 1965; there were 45,300

seminarists in 1966 compared with 15,900 in 1977. There were 1,591 less priests in 1977 than in 1966 *(The Washington Post,* May 13, 1977, p. E-16).

This crisis reflects no general religious crisis in the U.S.A. It is a specifically Catholic phenomenon, there being nothing like it in Protestantism. This is a crisis of modernization and Americanization, the great and difficult path Catholicism still has to traverse.

American Judaism has taken a completely different path and comes up against other kinds of difficulties and other problems. There is no problem of organizational self-identification—Judaism has no single centralized organization, neither is the problem of organizational democratization particularly acute—the laymen in Judaism have always invited an ordained rabbi who, while having the final say in the vast, all-embracing sphere of religious legislation, nevertheless, does not lay down the law in the secular aspects of the synagogue's life. However, there are other urgent problems—of abolishing the extremely complex system of religious taboos, which does not conform to life today, and, most importantly, of renouncing the idea of the Jewish nation being God's chosen, immanent in Judaism.

As with the Americanization of other Churches, the Americanization of Judaism has been accompanied by schisms. The oldest stratum of European immigrants in the U.S.A. were the Dutch Jewish Sephardim who came to New England from Dutch Brazil occupied by the Portuguese. However, the backbone of American Jews, up till the end of the 19th century, were of German extraction, many of them bringing the ideas of reforming Judaism with them, rejecting the ritualism and traditionalism typical of it. These ideas could only arise against a background of emancipation and the hope of achieving the complete equality, the hope which the German Jews entertained in the first half of the 19th century. In the U.S.A., however, where through the special features of American society the Jews were generally not subject to religious repression, and only experienced "unofficial" national repression to a relatively small extent, the same type of ideas arose spontaneously, and those brought from Germany fell upon very fertile soil. The reform of Judaism in the U.S.A. achieved dimensions unseen in Germany, and was most completely reflected in the Pittsburg Platform adopted by American reformers in 1885. The American reformers brought their cult closer to Protestantism, started eating many traditionally forbidden foods and, most importantly, rejected the main myth of traditional Judaism—that of the Messiah who is to come and take the Jews back to the

Promised Land. The idea of the coming was dissolved in liberal progressivism, the U.S.A. was declared the Promised Land. The reform brought Judaism extremely close to Protestantism and to the maximum possible internal secularization of the former.

The reform which created a synagogal society in 1873, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, did not embrace all practicing Jews (among those left out were some representatives of the old Sephardi group), while the mass immigration of East European Jews, which began in the 1880s, brought about an abrupt change in the structure of the Jewish community. The attitude towards religion of the East European Jews, who lived in conditions of ghettos, was different from that of the German Jews. They either strictly adhered to Judaist orthodoxy or broke with religion altogether, providing the members for different types of socialist groups and parties. There was no room for the reform movement in the ghettos of Russia, Poland or Rumania. They brought this type of attitude towards religion, foreign to American bourgeois ideology, to the U.S.A., where it was to be profoundly transformed.

The orthodox Jews who encountered the American reform recoiled from this Judaism which permitted the eating of pork. They created their own synagogal society in 1898—the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America.

However, the orthodoxy of the new immigrants, too, was being gradually eroded in American conditions. Since the transition to reform was very difficult for the orthodoxists, those of East European origin began to replenish the ranks of the rapidly growing third synagogal society, of the so-called "conservatives", the germs of which sprang up in the late 19th century from the reaction of a section of Sephardim and German American Jews to the extremes of the reform. This society, however, was decisively formed only in 1913 and named the United Synagogue of America. It was a kind of buffer between the extremes of reform and orthodoxy, its principle being to retain every tradition which could be, without much anguish, in modern conditions.

Americanization gradually touched American orthodoxy as well, and when, in the 1930s and post-war years, new orthodox groups arrived from East Europe, several of them did not join the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations but formed their own synagogues instead.

At the same time, as one of the extremes, orthodox attitudes brought by the East European Jews, was being smoothed out, so was the other—that of anti-clericalism. Anti-clerical sentiments were on the decline and synagogues

were becoming the center of Jewish communities, uniting not only believers, but also semi-believers and even non-believers.

We can thus see that the process of the Americanization of Judaism, with some modifications, followed the same path of schisms and the gradual Americanization of new waves of immigrants as did the process of Americanization of other immigrant Churches. However, new phenomena, to a considerable extent running contrary to this process, have been appearing in the religious life of the American Jewish society since the 1930s. A wave of anti-Semitism swept Europe at this time, reaching its climax in the genocide initiated by Hitler. Anti-Semitism was gathering in strength in the U.S.A. as well. This was followed by a corresponding growth in Jewish nationalism, with one of its forms, Zionism, practically dominating the Jewish community throughout the Second World War. Jewish nationalism in the form of Zionism is nationalism based solely on religion. In its essence, Zionism is non-religious, moreover, it, in fact, contradicts the basic dogma of Judaism, connected with the Messiah returning the Jews to the Promised Land. It is, however, forced to make use of religion in its nationalistic aims, for this is the only thing which created and still creates the unity of the Jewish people. (Zionism, in this, is very different from German ultra-nationalism, fascism, the nationalism of a people in whose history and culture religion always was a separating factor, and which, therefore, assumed anti-clerical undertones). In Israel, this peculiar relationship between Zionism and religion led to what seems, on the face of it, a strange symbiosis of non-religious Zionism and Judaist orthodoxy, to the subjugation of this by no means religious society to clerical forces and their demands, and to the curtailment of the activities of all non-orthodox forms of Judaism.

In the U.S.A., the growth of Zionism in the Jewish community also led to the strengthening of the nationalistic aspect of Judaism and to it being used for nationalistic aims. In 1937, the Reform adopted a new, Columbus Platform, replacing the Pittsburg Platform of 1885 and to a large extent deviating from its anti-nationalistic and modernistic stance. The Reform generally took a religious stance considerably more conservative than in the late 19th-early 20th century, and adopted Zionism. The majority of Jewish American orthodoxists and all Jewish "conservatives" are Zionists. The anti-Zionist elements in American Judaism today embrace only a few extreme reformers true to the spirit of the Pittsburg Programme who are united in

the American Council for Judaism, and also extreme orthodoxists, the representatives of several Chasidic groups, seeing in Zionism the rejection of the idea of the Messiah and the attempt of people to take upon themselves divine Messianic functions. History, as it were, has been turned back. While in the 19th century, the service in the synagogue was increasingly held in English, for almost nobody understood Hebrew, after the Second World War, Hebrew not only returned to the synagogue, but began to be introduced into everyday life. The desire arose to revive bilingualism.

The triumph of Zionism in American Judaism (and in the Jewish community as a whole) and the reverse reactionary movement in the Reform, in many ways connected with the influence of non-American factors, are a retrograde step in the process of the Americanization of Judaism. In our opinion, the considerable influence and respectability of Judaism in the U.S.A. by no means spells the completion of the process of Americanization of Judaism and Judaists (just as the process of Americanization of the Catholic Church, also influential, is by no means complete). It is sufficient to look at the data of a survey carried out among Jewish schoolchildren in 1977 to see that the Jews are not yet "100 per cent Americans". Only 6 per cent of those surveyed considered their American heritage to be more important than the Jewish, while 41 per cent considered the latter to be more important for them (35 per cent considered both equally important. See *The Washington Post,* May 13, 1977, p. E6). There is no doubt that the process of the Americanization of Judaism will lead to various tensions and conflicts in this religion, and between Judaism and Zionism in the future. One of these conflicts, which, in our opinion, will play a very important role, is gradually developing.

The growth of Zionism in the American Jewish community did not lead to considerable emigration to Israel, while the conservative tendencies in the Reform did not make it orthodox. The religious life of Israel and of the American Jewish community remain very different. Neither the reformers nor the conservatives, to whom the majority of Jews in the U.S.A. belong, enjoy equality with the orthodoxists in Israel, while the clericalism of Israeli society significantly contradicts the American principles of the separation of the Church from the state and the equality of religions with which the mass of American Jews are imbued. This causes constant friction between the American reformers and conservatives and Israel. Sometimes nationalism smooths out this friction, but as rabbi Rudin,

one of the members of the influential American Jewish committee, which mainly represents reformist Jews, said: "If peace were to break out in the Middle East ... we'd have a lot more trouble" *(U.S. News and World Report,* Feb. 17, 1975, p. 58).

Just as the Americanization of Catholicism and Orthodoxy is leading to tensions and conflicts between the American Churches and their centers abroad, on the one hand, and to pressure on these centers to adopt American bourgeois values, on the other, so the Americanization of Judaism will undoubtedly lead to tensions in relations between American Judaism and Israel and, at the same time, to pressure on Israel to Americanize, in particular, to refuse to be dominated by clerical orthodoxy.

The process of Americanization of the Church in every case comes up against some difficulties connected with the specific features of the given Church, and goes its own particular way. However, this process is going on everywhere and, despite occasional reverse movements, it is generally irreversible, penetrating ever deeper levels of religious ideology, organization and consciousness and transforming them.

It can be said that the process of Americanization of the Church is similar to that of the bourgeois integration of the sect in that it is possible, relatively easy and practically inevitable because of the special features of the American bourgeois ideological system. Although Judaism, Orthodoxy and especially the Catholic Church met with active opposition in American society, and although the entire history of American Catholicism is linked with the struggle against the anti-Catholic movements, these movements themselves, for all their subjective Americanism, turned out to be in contradiction with the basic, constitutionalized principles of American society, such as freedom and equality of religion and its separation from the state, while the Catholics themselves appealed to these very American principles. Therefore, the struggle for equal rights has been accompanied by Americanization and any triumph of the immigrant Church seeking recognition is, at the same time, that of the American ideological system, integrating, Americanizing this Church.

This process of Americanization, at the same time, fulfills major functions, primarily in helping immigrants adjust. The American system of values does not presuppose the immigrant's rejection of such an important element of national culture as religion just as it does not presup-

pose the sectarian's rejection of the sect. The process of adaptation and the assimilation of the American system of values is, therefore, made easier, for religion remains a bridge linking the immigrant with his past. The preservation of the old Church, its gradual Americanization, parallel to the Americanization of the immigrants themselves, make this process smoother, more gradual.

4. Characteristic Features of American Religious Life

We have seen that the American bourgeois ideological system and American society represent a melting pot for religious teachings and organizations which endlessly arise in it and penetrate it, originally hostile and alien, and constantly reproduce the features of religious life which are immanent to this system and society, fitting them into one common type. What then is this type and what are these features of religious life?

1. Religious pluralism was the primordial characteristic of American society. This pluralism has been gaining an increasingly strong hold through the formation of the sects, the importation of immigrant denominations and schisms all along the history of America. It is now further bolstered by the missionary activities of Eastern religions. Ecumenism acts as a counter-weight to this growing pluralism: denominations which are close to each other unite, (we shall talk of this later in part IV. Today, these factors are more or less equally balanced. The *Yearbooks of American and Canadian Churches* usually give data on some 250-270 Churches, but many small Churches and sects do not figure there.

But the mass of small Churches are not the crux of the matter—they do not comprise a significant proportion of the population. In 1956, 176 out of the 258 denominations mentioned in the Yearbook had only 1.6 per cent of the total number of believers *(129;* 75). The point is that no Church or denomination is numerically or morally superior to others in the sphere of the nation's life and culture.

Such a situation might prove explosive in different conditions (as in Lebanon or Northern Ireland). Meanwhile, in the U.S.A., on the contrary, religious pluralism is the guarantee of a stable society. It is of a fundamental nature, it is affirmed by the state system and bears the official stamp. This is connected both with the specific immanent features of the American bourgeois ideological system—a high value placed on religion, religious tolerance

and the principle of the separation of the Church from the state, and by the specific features of the American Churches themselves, of their organizational structure and ideology.

In the 1960s, the Blake Plan was actively discussed and almost adopted in the U.S.A. It envisaged the setting up of an eclectic Church uniting all the main Protestant denominational organizations. Such a Church, while not destroying pluralism (for neither sects, nor Catholics, nor Judaists, nor the Orthodox would have joined it), would, in many ways, actually have weakened it, for such a super-Church would have united Churches which are the bearers of the main cultural traditions of the most educated and well-to-do section of the population. Endless consultations were held, but yielded no results. Typically, one of the most common objections to the plan was that "Protestantism is strong because of pluralism".

2. American religious pluralism has, right from the very beginning, served the denominations which are relatively close to each other, primarily by their organizational form.

Congregationalism, the basic, dominant and the most striking organizational form, half-way between a sect and a Church; it is non-charismatic, has an established constitution and its hierarchy is under the democratic control of the laymen. We have seen that the stability of this form is connected with the very nature of Protestantism which contains the greatest internal obstacles to a denomination becoming a Church. It is this form which is functionally linked with other special features of American religious life, the way they arose before the revolution and are still present today. Thus, organizations of the sect and of the Church type are intolerant, for charisma and ardent enthusiasm reign in the first, while, in the second, the hierarchy, strictly preserving its monopoly domination, holds away. Only an organization dominated by the rank-and-file layman, not by the enthusiastic sectarian burning with the fire of newly acquired faith, not by the professional, can be tolerant. Such a type of organization has principles of social mobility different from those of the Church, as are the social interests of its clergy, whose career depends not so much on the appointment of non-elected and permanent leadership which place the greatest value on ideological correctness, as on the opinion of the laymen and the colleagues taking part in the electoral bodies. In this organization, the theologian knows that if he proposes some new concept which contradicts the already existing dogma, it does not necessarily spell the end of his career. Quite the contrary, it might well mean professional and social success, if his concept is in keep-

ing with the sentiments of the laymen and his colleagues. Therefore, in this case, the clergy is not the custodian of dogma. The opposite is rather true, for it is the educated clergy that, more often than not, acts as the initiator of various new theological concepts destroying dogma, while the less educated laity is a relatively conservative force. In the U.S.A., the denominational organizations with the most democratic structure (Baptists, Lutherans of the Missouri Synod) are by no means the most theologically liberal. However, the very possibility of the clergy taking an undogmatic stance totally depends on the control of the laity and on democratic organization. A stable religious pluralism, free of explosive situations, can only exist if this type of religious organization is dominant. And this type is not merely preserved in its basic features in the majority of American Protestant religious denominations, it is also widening its sphere of domination. Sects assuming a bourgeois nature are ever being attracted to it and so are immigrant Churches in the process of being Americanized.

In Joachim Wach's and David Martin's sociology of religion *(142;* 79-80) the concept of denomination as a particular third type of organization is substantiated (vis-a-vis the types of sect and Church denoted by Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber). This term is gaining recognition with difficulty, and sociologists still call organization of this type the way they call themselves—Churches. In our opinion, however, this use of the word is confusing, while the concept of "denomination" helps to avoid this confusion. As we see it, the typology of religious organizations should be as follows. Organizations of the type of the sect and Church are points at the opposite ends of the scale of evolution and, at the same time, extreme points of the continuum. Every sect strives to become a Church. In the majority of cases, however, they do not succeed. Cases of quasi-ethnic, partial territorial and any other types of isolation of the sect are surrogates, fake Churches which arise when, either through the presence of a powerful Church in society or through a high level of secularization, it is impossible for them to become a Church. Terms such as "an established sect", proposed by Yinger, or an "institutionalized sect", proposed by Roland Robertson *(176;* 120-24) are suitable designations for such cases. Meanwhile, the term "denomination" implies a completely different dimension, a completely different evolutionary plane. While the first dimension, "sect-Church", is that of religious organizations corresponding to one and the same level of secularization, the proximity

to or remoteness from a "denomination" implies various levels of secularization. Both the sect and the Church, which in this dimension are regarded as one and the same type, will be diametrically opposite the denomination.

3. It is difficult to establish a rigid ideological discipline in the democratic organization of denominations and, consequently, to work out or maintain a rigid system of dogma. If this is the case, if ideology is not established with dogmatic rigidity, the process of inner secularization can be relatively free of obstacles. This entails dogma becoming less significant and, finally, dying away.

We shall speak of the processes of inner secularization in the last section. These processes have already gone far now and are, ultimately and obviously, fraught with the profound crisis hitting the whole American ideological system. Let it be noted here that, in our opinion, these processes are taking place at a slower pace in the U.S.A. than might have been expected.

This is evidently explained by the fact that religion in the U.S.A. is an element of American bourgeois ideology, an ideology which postulates the importance and equality of all religions. It is also a distinctive form of secularization, when religion turns out to be an element of a wider system and draws strength not only from itself, but also from this system. It, therefore, holds up secularization in other forms. Religion is a part of a wider system, and people have faith in this system which is by no means archaic. The belief generally prevails (supported by the contemporary works of philosophers, psychologists, etc.) that religion is important, necessary and ultimately does not contradict scientific proofs. Gerhard Lenski cites data to the effect that in our time 54 per cent of Catholics and 51 per cent of Protestants see no conflict between religion and science *(130;* 254). All of this helps preserve religion. It is, obviously, because of this that Unitarianism in America, which has remained within the confines of a narrow intellectual circle, stopped growing after its initial successes, and that such completely secularized forms of religious ideology, as the Ethical Culture Society, are not widespread. Obviously, the lag of American theology behind European theology could, therefore, only be overcome in the period between the World Wars and after the Second World War (and, in many ways, it is overcome under the influence of European theologians and by the activities of Americanized immigrants, such as Paul Tillich). There was too much of a hothouse atmosphere for the development of theology in the U.S.A., while in 18th and 19th century Europe religion, developing

in quite a different atmosphere, had to rely on its own efforts to a much greater extent than in America to keep up with the times. If religion is attacked, intellectual efforts are called upon to defend it. If it is protected from attacks, it goes into intellectual hibernation.

Friedrich Schleiermacher as a young man (he turned more dogmatic in old age and changed his ideas) can, in many ways, be regarded as the forerunner of modern theology and as a man who, in many ways, foresaw the course of religious development—the collapse of dogma and organization; he was delighted at religious life in America, which he had a second-hand knowledge of, and the American example seems to have influenced his thinking *(180).* Schleiermacher was delighted with the fact that dogma was of so little significance in the U.S.A., that the U.S.A. was so tolerant of religions, that it was so easy for various religious trends to arise there, become widespread and die away. However, in the U.S.A. itself there were no religious thinkers who interpreted these processes. It was a German who became the ideologist and interpreter of the American religious processes in which theology was disregarded (though not reinterpreted, which meant that archaic features were often preserved). And the reason for this is clear. Schleiermacher's book, *Uber die Religion,* was addressed to educated people who held religion in contempt. There were no such people in the U.S.A.

4. Religious tolerance was established on the basis of the diminishing significance of dogma. The tolerance which arose spontaneously from internal causes was further consolidated—also under the influence of the American political system. This system could arise and can function only in conditions of a certain minimum of religious tolerance. However, once functioning, it is conducive to maintaining and intensifying this tolerance.

Since the main political parties in the U.S.A. share the American bourgeois system of values and are not founded on denominational differences, the electoral system is a powerful means which consolidates religious tolerance, for the candidates steer clear of anything that might offend the feelings of one denomination or another. Paul Blanshard, an expert on the religious aspect of American politics, writes of the tacit rules of conduct for Congressmen in religious matters: "If possible, never allow yourself to be manoeuvred into a record vote on any controversial religious issue. Never show any unfriendliness to any religious sect on the floor of Congress. Eulogize the principles and performances of religious organizations at every possible opportunity. Join a church or synagogue,

but do not be too partisan or conspicuous in promoting its interests" *(56;* 94).

Naturally, tolerance first spread to Protestant denominations which were close to each other, but then also to Catholic, Judaist and Orthodox denominations. Thus, while in 1952, 41 per cent of Protestants believed that Catholics in the U.S.A. had too much power, and 35 per cent believed this of Jews, the corresponding figures in 1965 were 30 per cent and 14 per cent, and in 1979 they were 11 per cent and 12 per cent. In 1952, 8 per cent of Catholics believed that Protestants had too much power and 33 per cent believed that of Jews. The corresponding figures for 1965 were 5 per cent and 12 per cent, and for 1979, 6 per cent and 13 per cent *(The Washington Post,* Sept. 1, 1979, p. C-6). A European may view this tolerance as something turned into totally flippant attitude to religious denominations, which Americans are capable of swapping with amazing ease.

Here are examples of the religious history of two ordinary American bourgeois families, who only became famous because one gave the country a President and the other a Presidential candidate.

Lyndon Johnson's grandfather was a Baptist at first, then became a Disciple of Christ, and later, a Cristadelphian. Johnson's parents, however, were Baptists. Johnson himself was a Disciple of Christ, although he worshipped in various churches. He married an Episcopalian and had two daughters who were also Episcopalians, until one of them married a Catholic and adopted her husband's religion *(Time,* Apr. 3, 1964, p. 30).

Barry Goldwater's father was a Jew, a Judaist, but having moved to Arizona where there were few Jews, he did not go to synagogue and later married an Episcopalian who then became a Presbyterian. Their wedding ceremony was held in a Presbyterian church. However, he did not adopt the Christian faith and the shops he owned continued to shut on Saturdays. His children were brought up as Episcopalians and Barry Goldwater himself married an Episcopalian *(Time,* Aug. 28, 1964, p. 44).

Change in religion can be brought about by the most chance happenings: marriage, moving to a town where there is no congregation of the given denomination, a change in social status and, correspondingly, switch to a more respectable congregation, etc. Changes of religion are also very common among the clergy. Here are figures, somewhat dated, but the situation should basically be the same today. Between 1951 and 1955, 972 pastors from other religions joined the Presbyterian denomination, while 209 left it. In 1930, the Congregationalists ordained

96 new pastors and welcomed 92 pastors from other religions into their faith *(129;* 89-90). Gerald Kennedy, Bishop of Los Angeles and one of the Methodist leaders, speaking of religious tolerance quoted himself as an example: "I married a Presbyterian. I received my theological education in Congregational seminaries. My closest ministerial friends have been from other denominations as often as from my own" *(Time,* Feb. 17, 1961, p. 34).

Such lengths of religious tolerance are a product of the 20th century. However, European travellers in the 19th century were struck by American religious tolerance in those days, too. After visiting the U.S.A., Charles Lyell, an English scholar, wrote that America had a sect of "Nothingarians". "A Nothingarian was indifferent whether he attended a Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian or Congregationalist church, and was often equally inclined to contribute money liberally to any one or all of them" *(61*; 154).

5. The presence of a universal system of values is functionally linked with this tolerance. We have already seen that denominations and this system of values form, as it were, a single ideological system. It is not religious tenets but this system that generally determines the behavior of an individual and is an object of faith. Religion is primarily a powerful symbol of this system in the consciousness of the masses and piety is a symbol of fidelity to the given system, of loyalty and respectability. Billy Graham, in his book *World Aflame* calling on people to repent and be converted, refers to Dag Hammarskjold, Hubert Humphrey, "a senator", "one of the world's leading mathematicians", "one of the world's great historians", Walter Reuther, a governor of one of the states, President of the U.S.A. as his personal acquaintances and true Christians; he quotes George Meany, Omar Bradley, etc. *(100;* 17, 22, 31, 212, 33, 209, 142, 172, 23, 28). The main point of these references, apart from individual boasting, is to affirm the respectability of Christianity and the Christian character of respectability.

In which circumstances is the average American tolerant and in which intolerant? The growing tolerance towards various religions does not mean that intolerance is generally disappearing, for it may be transferred to other spheres. A sociological survey splendidly illustrates what a true object of faith is and where intolerance lies. The question was asked whether they thought they really obeyed the law of love under the following circumstances: 1) if your neighbor was of a different religion: 90 per cent answered "yes", 5 per cent—"no" (probably mostly members of sects and un-Americanized members of immigrant Churches); 2) of

another race: 80 per cent said "yes", 12 per cent—"no"; 3) a business rival: 78 per cent said "yes", 10 per cent—"no"; 4) a member of a dangerous political party: 27 per cent—"yes", 57 per cent—"no"; 5) an enemy of the nation: 25 per cent said "yes", 63 per cent—"no" *(107;* 80-90). It is precisely this intolerance towards those who reject the system as a whole which allows religious tolerance, and it is on the basis of religious tolerance that this intolerance arises. We shall speak of the social functions of intolerance later.

6. In the activities of religious organizations whose dogmatic structure is collapsing and which are growing increasingly tolerant towards each other, the tendency is naturally arising to replace specifically religious activities with temporal, political and cultural activities, etc. This has recently been firmly established in the sociology of religion. It is, however, a permanent and essential feature of American religious life.

The very fact that the authority of religion consecrated the American revolution bears witness to this tendency. In the 1830s, de Tocqueville wrote: "The American preachers all the time turn to earth and have a great trouble taking their eyes off it... When listening to them it is often difficult to get whether the principal objective of religion is providing the eternal bliss in the other world or well-being in this world" *(199;* Vol. III, 207). The following statement made by James Watson, a leading Presbyterian (then Moderator of the New York Presbytery), shows to what extent his temporal activities may supplant his own specific religious tasks: "I see the ministry in terms of social action, not in terms of preaching or the rest of the nonsense we went through years ago. In our day, we are more concerned about man than God. God can take care of himself" *(U.S. News and World Report,* March 2, 1970, p. 44).

7. As the Church is separate from the state religious association is a voluntary matter. The extremely great importance of religion and the weakness and practical absence of integral ideological systems alternative to religious ones means revivalism is a principle of religious life. We said that there always have been features of intellectual hibernation in American religious life that have, in many ways, been preserved up to this day. However, this intellectual hibernation is sometimes replaced by feverish activity and seething emotions.

These periodic departures from religion by certain strata of the U.S. population are followed by noisy returns to it. The break away from religion in these cases is not accompanied by the elaboration of a basically non-religious

world outlook. It merely spells an end to institutionalized piety, while preserving its deeply psychological basis. The preachers who organize a revival can, easily replace intellectual argument with emotionalism and even showmanship. Charles Moody, a famous American revivalist of the late 19th century, said: "It makes no difference how you get a man to God, provided you get him there" *(108;* 85).

We constantly witness such revivals. In the last century, a series of revivals reached a vast scale, primarily in the western lands of America, where the volatile social organization of life was conducive to weakening and severing links with denominations *(165).* However, revivalism has been preserved in our time as well. The growing religiousness among the American middle class in post-Second World War years is also a revival. The famous Billy Graham is on revivalist crusades all the time. Sectarian movements of the type of the Black Muslims and the Children of Christ movement widespread among the hippies and elements close to them are also revivals, taking place in the strata which have broken their links with official religious attitudes but found no alternative to religion.

8. All this is linked with the practically universal character of religiousness. This universal character is maintained by religion being integrated in the American bourgeois ideological system and by the durability of this system. *Religion consolidates the American system which, in turn, consolidates religion.* It is not only a matter of the state employing chaplains in the army, and Congress giving money to charitable organizations and not taxing money donated to the Church. As a matter of fact, all this contravenes the principle of the separation of the Church from the state declared in the first amendment to the Constitution. The principle of the separation of the Church from the state cannot but be constantly infringed in conditions of total religiousness. However, since this separation is laid down in the Constitution, since it itself is sanctified, it must constantly be upheld. The Supreme Court investigates endless matters on the unconstitutional nature of various measures by the government and the states aimed at supporting religion, and adopts various wily decisions, ever trying to lay down the boundaries to state patronage of religion. Here is an example of such a decision. In U.S. schools, all pupils have to give the following oath: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all". In 1957, the Supreme Court pronounced this oath constitutional, provided no

measures were taken against a child who refused to say the words "before God" *(56;* 28).

The point is that religious affiliation is an integral part of the concept of the "American way of life". Just as the religious foundations of the American bourgeois system attach additional significance to American ideological symbols, to the flag, the Constitution, the national anthem, etc., so incorporation of religion into the American bourgeois society's system of values gives additional symbolic significance to religious acts. Whereas, in old times, being a Russian in Russia was identified with Orthodox faith, in the U.S.A. today, being American means belonging to any old faith, Orthodox, Catholic, Baptist, Quaker, Judaist, but to some faith—by all means, just the same. This is an aspect of self-identification, of answering the question: who are you? Will Herberg tells of Judaist workers at a car plant. They worked on Judaist holidays and were pressurized not to work by Catholic and Protestant workers who demanded: "You are Jewish, aren't you?" *(U.S. News and World Report,* June 4, 1973, p. 57).

Hence the vast religious statistics:

95 per cent of Americans identify themselves with one kind of religion or another *(107;* 36-37).

95 per cent—"believe in God", the greatest percentage among countries with a Christian culture. Here is the data of two international surveys.

A 1948 Survey:

Asked: "Do you believe in God?", 94 per cent answered "yes" in the U.S.A., and 3 per cent—"no". The percentage of believers in European countries with a tradition of state, church-run Protestantism is less: in Norway—84 per cent said "yes", 7 per cent—"no", Holland—80 per cent and 14 per cent respectively, Sweden—80 per cent and 8 per cent, Denmark—80 per cent and 9 per cent, while France presents quite a different picture with 66 per cent and 20 per cent *(143;* 101).

A 1976 Survey *(Public Opinion,* 1979, Nos. III-V, pp.38-39).

Those who answered "yes" to the questions: 1) Do you believe in God? 2) Is your religion very important to you? 3) Do you believe in life after death?

India	— 99, 86, 76%	Great Britain	— 76, 23, 43%
U.S.A.	— 94, 58, 71%	France	— 72, 22, 39%
Canada	— 89, 36, 54%	FRG	— 72, 17, 33%
Italy	— 88, 36, 46%	Scandinavian countries	— 65, 17, 35%
Australia	— 80, 25, 48%	Japan	— 44, 14, 18%
Benelux countries	— 78, 26, 48%		

A mere 0.1 per cent of Americans call themselves agnostics or atheists (these categories are combined in American surveys) *(182;* 231).

A little less than half of Americans attend church on Sundays. In 1976, 42 per cent of Americans attended church or synagogue once a week. This represents a certain drop in the attendance rate in comparison with the 1958 peak figures, when 49 per cent of Americans attended church once a week *(U.S. News and World Report,* May 11, 1977, p. 54). By way of comparison: in Italy, the weekly figures are 30 to 40 per cent *(64;* 96), in England 10 to 15 per cent, in Norway 5 per cent, in Marseilles and Toulouse 11 per cent *(215;* 88).

Hence also the permanent character of religious statistics: throughout the history of America the figures have not fallen, only fluctuated or even grew.

Thus, Seymour Lipset shows that the percentage of those belonging to one faith or another has practically remained the same since 1831: 90-92 per cent *(133;* 162).

Other data speak of the periodic tides of religious enthusiasm. Thus, the percentage of those weekly attending church service fluctuates the following way *(U.S. News and World Report,* May 11, 1977, p. 54):

1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976
46	49	47	46	45	44	43	42	40	40	42

There has been a certain fall in the percentage of those attending the Catholic church. In the U.S.A., the general crisis hitting Catholicism manifests itself in a fall in church attendance figures. Yet, the fluctuations of figures will be still more evident if Protestant attendance is taken separately. Here are the percentages of Protestants attending church every week *(Public Opinion,* 1979, Nos. III-V, p. 34):

1954	1958	1966	1970	1974	1977	1978
40	44	38	38	37	39	40

The question "is religion losing its influence?" was answered "yes" by: 49,9 per cent in 1937, 34 per cent in 1939, 14 per cent in 1957, 31 per cent in 1962, and 57 per cent in 1967 *(76;* 129), while according to other data, the following believed that its influence was growing: 69 per cent in 1957, 45 per cent in 1962, 33 per cent in 1965, 23 per cent in 1967, 14 per cent in 1970, 31 per cent in 1974, and 44 per cent in 1976 *(U.S. News and World*

Report, May 11, 1977, p. 54). Asked, "Do you believe in life after death?" answered "yes" 64 per cent in 1936, 76 per cent in 1944, and 74 per cent in 1961 *(76;* 127).

One of the figures of American religion statistics, the percentage of Church members in the population, is rising steadily: in 1850—16 per cent, 1860—23 per cent, 1870—18 per cent, 1880—20 per cent, 1890—22 per cent, 1900—36 per cent, 1910—43 per cent, 1920—43 per cent, 1930—47 per cent, 1940—49 per cent, 1950—57 per cent, 1955—60.9 per cent *(110;* 107), and in 1962—62 per cent. This, however, is explained by the growing percentage of Catholics, which all those who have been christened are considered to be, and, secondly, by easier admission of new members into the bosom of Protestant denominations.

These fluctuations are very important and one must constantly bear in mind that temporary tendencies should not be taken for profound and permanent ones. Thus, approximately since 1957, all the figures of religious statistics and surveys show a fall in institutionalized religion and in the interest in religion. It would be very easy and tempting to draw the conclusion that American have begun to drift away from the Church. However, these figures rose again in the 1970s.

A great deal of data indicate that there will be no radical changes in the attitude towards religion and institutionalized religion among the coming generation. According to a student survey carried out in 1978, 49 per cent of those polled considered that over the past 3 years religion had become more important for them, only 13 per believed it had grown less important, while 4 per cent said it was no importance whatsoever for them *(The Washington Post,* Dec. 15, 1978, p. E-14).

All these features of religious life are indissolubly interconnected. Had there been no religious pluralism, there would have been tolerance, no universal abstract religiousness, etc. Had there been no democratic organization in denominations, dogmatic systems would not have disintegrated and, once again, there would have been no tolerance.

These features are stable and constant features of American religious life. The tendency is for them to be increasingly consolidated, which, as we shall try to show later, ultimately brings about a crisis in the entire ideological system. However, the germ of these traits sprang up even before the revolution and made the American revolution possible in the form it took. In the society created by this revolution, the given features are the essence, the parameters within which the structure of this

society can exist. Indeed, this structure may, as we have already said, exist only as long as ideas which have a greater value than that of the social system are not sufficiently widespread. This system, therefore, cannot exist without a minimum of religious tolerance, when too great a value is attached to religion. Nor can it exist if, on the contrary, no significance is attached to religion at all and it is replaced by temporal forms of ideology. However, such a situation also implies other features of religious life which are inseparably linked with religion—the prevalence of denominational organizations, the collapse of dogmatic systems, etc.

We have seen how American society helps express a whole number of its conflicts in the form of religious contention and how it settles them, constantly maintaining the parameters which are essential to it. There are, however, conflicts which cannot be expressed in a religious form. These conflicts have to be channelled in such a way, such a form of ideological expression, which will not shake the foundations of the system. Religion also plays a major role in transforming conflicts which are not expressed in denominations.

5. The Social Role of the Clergy in Politics

Characteristic of the U.S.A. is a high degree and a very complex structure of the political activities of its denominational organizations and the clergy.

Not all Churches in the U.S.A. are active to the same extent or along the same lines. The very nature of their involvement is varied. Sects are generally not active politically and the purer the sect the less the role it plays in political life: sectarians do not vote and abstain from labor unions, political organizations and demonstrations. Immigrant Churches are active, as a rule, only when they are roused to action by their dogma, by the immediate interests of the Church as an organization or by the interests of their coreligionists and fellow countrymen abroad (as they understand these interests to be).

This activity may apply to the sphere of both foreign and home policy. Thus, at home, the activities of the Catholic hierarchy concentrate heavily on the struggle against legislation allowing abortion and divorce and in support of state financing of Catholic schools. In foreign policy, inasmuch as almost all Churches of the world can be found

inasmuch as almost all Churches of the world can be found in the U.S.A., the most diverse international conflicts are transferred to U.S. soil and take the form of conflicts between various immigrant Churches which exercise pressure on society and the government. The support for Israel, for example, plays a major role in the activities of the Judaist rabbinate, while the clergy of the Arab Christian Church and the Muslim clergy support the Palestinians in every way. The clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S.A. vigorously supports Greece, Greek Cypriots and the Patriarch of Constantinople in their conflicts with the Turks.

This type of activity is fundamentally different from, let us say, the participation of the white Churches in the struggle for the blacks' rights, which is not dogmatically prescribed and holds no promise of direct benefits for the denominational organizations and their members. It is also principally different from the actions by the Protestant Churches with respect to the political terror of the dictatorial regimes of Latin America (terror which is in no way aimed against Protestants). It is this second type of activity, that is typical of the main, the oldest American Protestant denominations. They are constantly active over various non-religious political questions, labor legislation, blacks' rights or the most diverse foreign policy issues, which do not concern them directly neither in material nor dogmatic terms.

It can even be said that the place such issues occupy in the activities of the Church is a good indicator as to how far it has been Americanized. Thus, in the last century Catholicism practically ignored the issue of slavery, and during the Civil War the Catholic hierarchy limited itself to expressing its loyalty—in the South to the Confederation, and in the North to the U.S.A. This in no way resembles the activity of the Catholic Church today on issues concerning the rights of racial minorities. The participation of Archbishop Jacobos, head of the Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S.A., in the Selma march organized by Dr. Martin Luther King *(192;* 157) signalled turning point in the Americanization of Orthodoxy.

What is the aim of this type of political activity of the Churches?

It stands to reason that the activities of different Churches take different lines. The Churches more or less repeat the range of views existing in society as a whole. There are liberal and ultra-right Churches. The specific features of theological traditions, their composition, organizational features—all this influences the position

of the Churches, so that each of them has its own political complexion.

However, for all the diversity of Church views we can note one important rule. The oldest Churches in the U.S.A., the main Protestant Churches, constantly and noticeably lean to the left of the range of views of the population as a whole. It is these Churches, the Episcopal, the United Presbyterian, the United Church of Christ, the United Methodist, the Lutheran and others which are influential members of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., that constantly voice their support of the movement of the oppressed in American society and protest against the U.S.A.'s aggressive foreign policy actions.

These liberal, or leftist political leanings are rooted in the distant past, when the struggle of the Churches for moral reform (strict Sunday observance, the fight against alcoholism, etc.) and their philanthropic endeavors gradually became a struggle for social reform.

The moral reformism of the Quakers, Unitarians and Congregationalists naturally gave rise to their fight against slavery. The movement of the "social Gospel" and the Churches' support for the labor movement arose from their concern over the working class's drift from Christianity and from their philanthropic concern over the plight of the working people. In the last century, condemnations of the imperialist tendencies in the U.S.A.'s foreign policy and appeals for pacifism came from the Churches more than once.

Members of the clergy came out against the war with Mexico, against the seizure of the Philippines and Cuba. A war psychosis replaced pacifism in 1917. But although, in many ways, this spelled the clergy's surrender of its position,

there was a great deal of idealism in the 1917 bellicosity of the Protestant cle

war to end all wars", etc.). A mighty pacifist reaction followed the war. In a survey carried out in 1931, 10,000 pastors out of the 19,000 polled, and in 1934, 13,000 out of the 21,000 polled, said that in no circumstances would they condone war *(145;* 351). The survey carried out by J. M. Yinger in May 1941 produced very interesting results: 24 per cent of the pastors asked unconditionally opposed war, 56 per cent agreed with the following formula: "The Christian may find it necessary to recognize that the nation is faced with a crisis it must meet, but his task still remains to preach forgiveness and love"; 19 per cent said that although they were generally pacifists, resistance was essential, in order to halt "the march of evil" and a mere 1 per cent said that the Christian could not be a

pacifist in the face of Hitlerism *(218;* 202). Roosevelt had to spend a good deal of time convincing the clergy, and although the majority of the clergy approved of the war, this majority was not so significant as during the First World War.

In the 1950s, the National Council of the Churches of Christ and the leaders of the main Churches were savagely attacked by McCarthyites who accused them of being "soft towards communism" or even "infected by it" *(201;* 151).

However, it was in the 1960s that the liberal political activity of the Churches really took off. It concerned mainly two spheres—the civil rights struggle and peace in Vietnam.

The role of the clergy (the clergy of the white Churches, not only black Churches) in the struggle for black rights cannot be overestimated.

We shall quote a number of facts. In June 1961, buses set off for Alabama with whites and blacks on board to protest against segregation on interstate highways. They were headed by three blacks (one of them a pastor) and a white man, William Coffin, a Protestant pastor and a chaplain at Yale University *(Time,* June 2, 1961, p. 15). In 1963, the police arrested 283 demonstrators, white and black, protesting against segregation in a park near Baltimore. There were 26 white churchmen (slightly less than one-tenth) among the arrested, including Eugene Blake, a major Presbyterian figure famous in the U.S.A. for his plan for the integration of Protestant Churches, William Coffin, James Corrigan, an Episcopalian bishop, and rabbi Maurice Liberman. Two hundred churchmen were arrested from January to October 1963 *(Time,* Oct. 4, 1963, p. 43). These short-term arrests should not be taken too seriously. The inconvenience they caused and the fines imposed were generally more than compensated by the publicity they brought. However, the civil rights movement was also marked by martyrdom of pastors, who gave their life for black freedom. One of them, in 1964, was Bruce Klunder, a white Presbyterian pastor who organized the opposition to the building of schools in Cleveland which would have strengthened the objectively existing segregation; he lay on the ground in the path of a bulldozer which ran over him *(Time,* May 1, 1964, p. 14). After the march from Selma to Montgomery, racists brutally beat up a young Unitarian pastor, D. Reeb, who died in hospital.

In the famous March on Washington in August 1963, along with the blacks, hundreds of white churchmen took part. On March 7, 1965, the Alabama police broke up a black march from Selma to Montgomery. Martin Luther King scheduled

a new march for March 9. White pastors and priests hurried to Selma from all over the country. They dropped everything and came to join the march—400 in all *(Time,* March 19, 1965, pp. 16-20). A great many more examples could be given showing the active personal participation of members of the clergy in the civil rights movement.

In the 1960s, besides the participation by individuals, the Churches took joint action on a large scale, too, organizing various committees, boycotting companies which discriminated against blacks, issuing appeals, initiating petitions, abolishing segregation and discrimination in their own organizations, demonstratively electing blacks to responsible church posts and raising funds to distribute millions of dollars among black organizations. The United Presbyterian Church contributed ten thousand dollars to the Free Angela Davis Fund *(The Washington Post,* June 19, 1971, p. B-6).

The same picture was with regard to the war in Vietnam. The Berrigan brothers are by no means a unique phenomenon, even though, perhaps, the form of anti-war protest in this case was the most active and striking. In 1968, the Unitarian Universalist Church decreed it would grant draft dodgers the right of "symbolic sanctuary" in their prayer houses *(Time,* June 28, 1968, p. 48). The National Council of the Churches of Christ in 1965 and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in 1971 called for an immediate end to the war. Among the anti-war organizations were the Clergymen's Emergence Committee for Vietnam formed in 1965 *(Time,* June 30, 1969, p. 49) and the Clergymen and Laymen Concerned, an influential organization active today, too *(The Washington Post,* Apr. 6, 1977, p. 8). The clergy of the United Methodist and the United Church of Christ took part in anti-war demonstrations and organized various petitions on a truly mass basis.

Here are some very indicative figures.

In California in 1968, 2 per cent of the Protestant clergy (including 10 per cent of the United Church of Christ) took part in civil disobedience campaigns against the Vietnam war, running the risk of arrest, 7 per cent took part in anti-war protest marches (14 per cent of the Methodist clergy, 16 per cent of the United Church of Christ), 16 per cent in anti-war organizations (27 per cent and 34 per cent respectively), 25 per cent attended protest meetings, 25 per cent signed anti-war petitions, 29 per cent wrote protest letters to officials, 52 per cent publicly spoke out against the war and 65 per cent against war propaganda *(169;* 118).

Churches usually take no part in election campaigns, nor do they officially support some candidate. However,

the Churches did once decisively and unanimously oppose a Presidential candidate and throw all the weight of their authority into the election campaign. That candidate was Barry Goldwater *(Time,* Oct. 9, 1964, p. 37).

In the 1970s, following the end of the war in Vietnam and a certain recession in the black movement, with the conservative reaction sweeping the main Churches, their degree of activity fell somewhat. However, the basic stance and views of the Churches remained the same. Thus, the Ecumenical Consultation on Domestic Hunger held by the National Council of the Churches of Christ officially declared that the capitalist system, in exploiting "the many for the sake of the few and the Third World for the sake of the first world" was "basically unjust" and profoundly contradicted the teachings of Christ. In 1978, prior to a meeting between Church leaders and President Carter, the N.C.C.C. published a memorandum which read: "It is with great disappointment that we do not see your commitment to lead the effort to reduce the international conventional arms race honored" *(The Washington Post,* Sept. 26, 1975, p. A-16; March 3, 1978, p. C-6).

Such facts are numerous. The liberal leanings in the clergy's social position and its criticism of the social orders and governmental policy are a permanent phenomenon. They may be said to be a natural feature of religious, social and political life in the U.S.A.

The churchmen themselves, naturally, recognize this specific feature of their position. This recognition is clearly embodied in the theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, which has had a great influence on American thought. He advanced the idea that the original sin was reflected in the fundamental imperfection and sinfulness of any human institution, which, therefore, required constant criticism. The idea of constant social criticism is reflected in a number of Church documents. Thus, the Letter to Christian America, the program document of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, reads: "The Council considers it as its duty to sensitize the conscience of the nation ... that no group of citizens shall arrogate to itself perpetual rights and privileges which it denies others" *(144;* 495).

The social and political liberalism of the clergy and the Churches has one specific feature. For all their passionate political activity, the clergy and the Churches are, to a certain extent, apolitical. This distinctive combination of the apolitical and the political is mani-

fested in the following way.

In the first place, no matter how close the position of the clergy may come to creating its own political program and platform, this never leads to these being created, nor even to the attempt to create some kind of specifically religious party, such as the European and Latin American Christian Democratic Parties. Donald Meyer showed that the logic of "social Evangelism" urged the clergy on in this direction but no decisive step was taken (*145)*.

Secondly, the clergy never identifies its cause with the program of one of the two parties nor does it ever unreservedly support one candidate against the other. It more often than not refrains from taking part in electoral campaigns altogether. However, if, as was the case with Goldwater, it censured one candidate, it, at the same time, refrained from praising the other. And like the liberal leanings this distinctive non-partisanship in politics has its roots deep within American history. De Tocqueville wrote: "I saw that they /the clergy—*Auth.l* carefully separated themselves from all parties and were so much at pains to keep out of contact with them as if that was in their personal interests" *(199;* Vol. II, 224).

What is then the explanation of this liberal and active, yet, at the same time, non-partisan position of the Churches?

First of all, let it be noted that this position is not taken by all Churches. The liberal Churches are relatively elite, have a very high percentage of intellectuals and, in general, those having some form of higher education among the believers.

However, although the social composition of the main Churches seems to create relatively favorable conditions for Church liberalism, the official position of these Churches does not directly reflect the opinion of the majority of their members. It is not the laity who decide this position, but the clergy. The clergy often meets with the active opposition of the laity, and yet it imposes its opinion on decision-making bodies in the Church, since even in the most democratically organized Churches, it plays the leading role, grossly out of proportion with its numerical strength. The left leanings in the stances taken by the Churches (as compared with the general attitudes of the U.S. public at large) reflect primarily the left leanings of the clergy as compared to the laymen's attitudes in a given Church. This fact was noted by J. Yinger way back in the 1940s. He wrote: "The sharpest

contrasts in economic attitudes were not found among the various denominations but between clergy and laity" *(218;* 157).

Time magazine noted that desegregation in the Churches always came from above, from the Church leaders urging congregations who were either opposed or, at the very least, indifferent *(Time,* Dec. 4, 1964, p. 59). According to a 1970 survey, *72* per cent of Protestant pastors believed that their congregations were more hawkish with regard to Vietnam than they themselves were, and 69 per cent considered that their congregation did not share their opinions. In the Catholic population, 48 per cent of Catholic priests and 38 per cent of Catholic laity were in favor of withdrawal from Vietnam *(U.S. News and World Report,* March 23, 1970, pp. 44-45). According to the Quinley research carried out in California in 1968, 57 per cent of the Protestant clergy and 21 per cent of the population as a whole were in favor of ending the bombing of Vietnam *(169;* 111).

The increased liberal policies of the Churches in the 1960s spelled the exacerbation of conflicts between the clergy and the laity. When in 1964, as a result of opposition by the laity, a conference of Episcopal Churches did not adopt a resolution on the non-observance of laws contradictory to the will of God, the organ which reflected the opinion of the majority of the clergy wrote that it was "an outrageous usurpation by the laity of the teaching function of the church" and a slap in the face for the "hundreds of courageous priests who have joined in the most significant social revolution of our time" *(Time,* Oct. 30, 1964, p. 51). When unable to fundamentally change the position of the Church leadership, the laity sometimes even cut off donations (see *Time,* Nov. 19, 1965, p. 66) and simply left the Church. There was a drop in the membership of all the main liberal Churches in the 1960s and early 1970s, and they all experienced subsequent financial difficulties.

However, it is not only the clergy of the main Protestant Churches which takes a more liberal foreign policy stance than its laity: the leaders of the clergy of these Churches are more liberal than its lower orders. Here is data of the Quinley report: taking part in anti-war demonstrations were 14 per cent of Methodist pastors, 16 per cent of the pastors of the United Church of Christ, 8 per cent of Episcopal pastors, 7 per cent of Presbyterian pastors, and 6 per cent of the pastors of the Lutheran Church in the U.S.A. However, 63 per cent, 71 per cent, 39 per cent, 54 per cent and 45 per cent respectively said their Church

leaders would have approved of their participation in these marches. 1 per cent, 10 per cent, 2 per cent, 2 per cent and 1 per cent respectively took part in acts of civil disobedience connected with the war in Vietnam, while 30 per cent, 47 per cent, 21 per cent, 27 per cent and 20 per cent said their Church leaders would have approved of their being arrested for such acts. 70 per cent, 76 per cent, 57 per cent, 69 per cent and 54 per cent said their Church leaders would nave approved of their participation in black rights marches (*169*, 260-66).

Thus, a clear and, on the face of it, unexpected picture arises—the Church support of the rights of the oppressed poor and the struggle against aggressive foreign policies are primarily initiated by the top clergy of the elite Churches (i.e., those which have no oppressed poor). The rank-and-file pastor is under two kinds of pressure—liberal pressure from above, from the Church leadership demanding greater activity, and conservative pressure from below, from the laity. How can this be explained?

The liberal political stance of the clergy is not an isolated aspect of its world outlook. It is tied up with its theological liberalism.

The politically liberal group of the main Churches is, at the same time, a group of theologically liberal ones. It is those Churches whose dogma is the most eroded dogma, which are ecumenically oriented and extremely liberal in the field of sexual morals.

The detailed research on the position of the clergy, carried out by Harold E. Quinley, points to the same relationship *(169,* 148). These coinciding positions on different types of issues existing at Church level are also found among individual members of the clergy. The conflict between the position of the clergy and that of the laity, which we spoke of earlier, does not only concern political issues. It concerns a whole range of issues, around which, in the 1960s and 1970s, a struggle was being waged between the Church leadership and the conservative opposition from below.

This link between political and theological liberalism, and also education (it has already been said that the liberal Churches have the most educated membership, the clergy, on average, naturally, being more educated than the laity), shows that the liberalism of the clergy is a part of the wider phenomenon of the liberalism of the American intelligentsia, noted by the data of numerous surveys (see *132;* 298-307). It stems from a critical and sceptical attitude towards the prevailing ideological myths (both religious and temporal) which, in turn, stems from a high

degree of culture. The more highly educated a person is, the less he is capable of believing not only in the "Virgin birth" but also in the whites' superiority over the blacks and in a "communist conspiracy", and the sooner he will become more tolerant towards the ideology of others, will listen to them, seeking elements of truth in their ideologies. His rejection of certain dogma and myths of bourgeois ideology may lead him into a direct alliance with the oppressed. The latter's rejection of the institutions of bourgeois society, arising from their protest against their social status, may coincide with the rejection of these institutions by a certain section of the intelligentsia, arising from the fact that it sees the limitations of these institutions or even their fallaciousness. Hence, alliances between the highest and lowest members of society are a rather frequent phenomenon in the history of America, beginning with the alliance between Jefferson and Madison, and the ignorant sectarians in the struggle to abolish the state Church, and up to the alliance between the Church, the university elite and the blacks in the civil rights struggle. However, the intellectual liberalism of the ruling circles is generally inconsistent and indefinite. This is the liberalism of people who, for all their ideological discontent, are, nevertheless, rich and respected. Only a few individuals (and the young) may develop this discontent into action.

Meanwhile, the liberalism of the clergy is something more than simply the liberal tendencies of the cultural elite. In the consistency of its liberal position and degree of its political involvement the clergy, no doubt, cannot be compared with any group of the American intelligentsia (see 769; 120, 139).

This particular consistency of the liberalism of the clergy is explained by the influence of another factor connected with the nature of the clergy's profession, with the nature of their activities. The pastor is a moralist and ideologist. It is his duty to consider concrete problems from a general moral and ideological stance. He is, therefore, often more idealistic and consistent than the average American (incidentally, typical of the clergy is its closely connected stance on various issues, at a time when the liberal stand of the laity on certain questions is combined with their conservative stand on other—see 769; 191). The pastor's task is to evaluate all issues from a religious point of view. However, what does this mean for contemporary American religion, for liberal Protestantism in particular?

Protestantism, having rejected the mass of archaic

magical elements of religion, concentrated the functions of the clergy on preaching morality. Religion increasingly comes down to morality, and morality is being interpreted on an ever wider and informal plane. Not only does the contemporary American pastor of the main Churches often not see himself as the bearer of a particular magical force and the performer of magical actions, but he does not see himself as the guardian and bearer of rigid dogmatic and universal moral truths (all such dogmatic truths have long been suspect). He rather sees himself as a champion of a moral and ethical intellectual quest into the problems of the contemporary world. He sees himself as a specialist in social conscience.

This conception of its professional tasks in many ways explains the specific position of the clergy in the U.S.A.

This position arises from the general ideological situation. However, active defense and championing of this position is not only a consequence of this situation. It is, in a way, regarded by the clergy as its job and duty and in the course of fulfilling this duty its members are prepared to go against the opinion of their flock and even, to a certain extent, to complicate their life.

That the clergy itself sees its duty and work in its liberal political activity may still not sufficiently explain it. Work is only work when it is remunerated and society thus recognizes its social importance. Does American society recognize the social significance of the liberal political activities of the clergy?

This is a very difficult question to answer. The conservative laity of the main Churches constantly oppose the liberal activities of the clergy. The examples of this are endless (see *169;* 210-13). In our opinion, however, it is not the presence of this opposition that is surprising, rather how weak it is. The protests of the laity are timid. The difference in the positions of the clergy and laity is, as a whole, taken as the norm.

It is, therefore, obvious that although the liberally active clergy often condemns itself to various troubles, as a whole, despite the laity's major role in Church organizations and in the career of the clergyman, liberalism is not an obstacle in the way of his career.

One even gets the impression that, sometimes, acts such as being arrested for taking part in black marches are a kind of step up in the clergyman's career, acts which are on a par with having articles published in a famous journal. Thus, Eugene Blake, who in 1961 first came into the limelight with his plan of the unification of Churches, was

later arrested, and then became head of the World Council of Churches.

This is explained not only by the fact that the clergyman's career does not depend on the laity alone, nor that the laity, while electing the most educated clergymen as leaders of the Church, willy-nilly elect liberals. There are cases when in a very democratically organized Church conservatively inclined laymen in full awareness elected very liberally inclined clergymen as their Church leaders (see *70;* 177). But it is also a matter of the extremely complex, contradictory attitude of the laity, of society as a whole, to the liberal activities of the clergy.

First of all, let us take a look at the ideological aspect of this attitude. As we have already said, the liberal activities of the clergy are, in many ways, connected with its notion of duty, rooted in Protestant and, particularly, in Calvinist tradition. These notions, however, are not peculiar to the clergy alone. They are also a particular feature of the laity. Just as the pastor knows that it is his duty to expose sins, so the layman goes to church precisely to hear these sins exposed.

Listening to them, they feel that, for all the hustle and bustle and sinfulness of their life, they, nevertheless, have not become completely soiled, they have not lost their moral ideal completely. In any case, they can be reborn and correct their lifestyle. Recognition of their sins is the path to salvation or even (in many theological traditions) the main indicator of salvation.

Likewise, the pastor should expose collective sins, the sins of the nation. The conservative layman may protest that pastors are concentrating too much on political problems, which, in his opinion, they are not great experts on, to the detriment of problems of individual morality. He may say that, for instance, Vietnam should be discussed less, while the problems of drunkenness be discussed more. However, he cannot demand that the pastor generally not touch upon politics. The clergy's exposure of collective, social sins, in the eyes of many Americans, is a sign of America being a "Christian state", "one nation under God", just as the exposure of believers' sins is a sign of the believer being a Christian, and above all, of his having been saved.

Therefore, surveys show that although 77 per cent of the laity are against the clergy participating in demonstrations and picket lines, 84 per cent consider it bound to act as the "bearer of the moral conscience of the nation". The majority of the laymen do not agree that the Church should not involve itself in politics *(169;* 190-93).

However, Church liberalism fulfills not only a purely ideological function, but also very important social functions. The fact that American society accepts this liberalism (with inevitable reservations) implies that it is recognized as essential to this society, that it consolidates the bourgeois structure of the U.S.A. Then how does Church liberalism help the stability of the American bourgeois social system?

Let us first examine the influence of this situation on the oppressed strata rising in struggle. If workers propose that a leading churchman help resolve a labor conflict, while the employers refuse, aware that the decision will be in favor of the workers, if blacks learn that Blake, the head of the Presbyterian Church, has been jailed for a breach of the peace during an anti-racist demonstration, then in neither case is the Church identified with capitalism and racism any longer. If this is the case, they have no stimuli for taking the tortuous and difficult road to an anti-clerical world outlook. They preserve religious symbolics (this is particularly typical of black movements). But the clergy as a group enjoys great social prestige in society, and religious, biblical symbolics is all-American, which means that the oppressed are not acting against society as a whole but against a certain group in society, certain particular shortcomings of this society. Moreover, they may refer to all-American values and to the source of these values, the Bible. In this way, their movement inevitably turns out to be not a revolutionary, but a reformist one within the framework of the social system, of the Constitution, within the framework of all-American (bourgeois) values. Thus, abstract religious symbolics preserved by the movement of the oppressed is inseparably linked with the opportunist, reformist character of the movement. At the same time, their appeal to the Bible, to general Christian values, gives these reformist, opportunist demands and movements the character of a "crusade". It is a feature of American political life, which first appeared at the time of the revolution and has been preserved throughout the entire history of the U.S.A., that typical of all American popular movements is the disparity (from the point of view of the European observer) between the very practical, real character of the movement's demands ana their exceptional emotional intensity.

While encouraging the channelling of the social movements in a harmless, opportunist direction, Church liberalism, at the same time, pushes the bourgeoisie and ruling circles towards reformism. It encourages the rejection of that

short-sighted self-interest which, if ideologically consolidated, might lead to the moral and social collapse of society.

The same can be said of the foreign policy aspect of Church liberalism. The moralistic position of the major Churches is one in a sum of internal factors determining their foreign policy course. Let us try to mentally analyze this factor. For instance, let us try to imagine how things would have been had Churches not opposed the war in Vietnam, had they supported a crusade in Indochina. It is obvious that the situation would have been very different. The foreign policy moralistic position of the Churches to a certain extent preserves U.S. society from the destructive consequences of its own aggressiveness and self-interest. Thus, just as liberal moralism in domestic issues is conducive to the movements of the oppressed acquiring an opportunist character, remaining within the bounds of the system, so the position of the Churches on the issue of the war in Vietnam was a factor preventing the anti-war movement as a whole from growing into a movement against the bourgeois social system. This movement died away when the war came to an end.

It can now be understood why the liberalism of the clergy does not lead to their political parties being created, nor to them identifying their position with that of a particular party or a political figure. Such identification would mean that the social and political structure of the U.S.A. as a whole was deprived of the sanction of religion, that it was an un-Christian society. Meanwhile, even the most biting criticism, but from within the framework of the structure, merely consolidates the idea that the U.S.A., ultimately, is a truly Christian land which may sin and err, but is, nevertheless, God's chosen, just as Israel, which sinned and erred but was God's chosen, nevertheless. Thus, we see that the specific and non-partisan liberalism of the U.S. clergy is an integral element of American bourgeois society, upholding the system and related to all its other elements. It is a means of consolidating universal abstract religiousness and is unthinkable without this abstract religiousness. It is a means of upholding the specifically opportunist nature of political life and, again, it is inconceivable without this political life. It is a means of upholding the idea of the U.S.A. as a special chosen land, and is inconceivable without this idea, etc.

Just as it is functionally connected with all these elements, so genetically it is connected with the Puritan doctrines of subordinating the entire life of society

to the "glory of God" and that of the "chosen people", doctrines which imply the activity of the clergy and its constant moral criticism of an ever imperfect society, which, nonetheless, is a "chosen" society, doctrines which have preserved their importance and, in a secular form, become elements of American bourgeois ideology.

Liberal Churches are the major Churches, the most elite in their social composition, the most influential. But they are far from being all the Churches.

There are Churches which are conservative in terms of religion and passive in terms of politics. These Churches are more democratic in social composition. The leading one of this type are the Southern Baptist Convention and the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod.

There are also Churches and religious organizations which are extremely right-wing as far as politics is concerned and ultra-conservative in religion. In the 1950s and 1960s, the leading organization of the ultra-fundamentalist and right-wing Churches was the American Council of Christian Churches, headed by Carl Mclntyre, which comprised Churches with a total membership of 300,000.

Besides the American Council there are also extreme right-wing organizations with a specifically fundamentalist Protestant flavoring—the Christian Crusade of Billy Joe Hargis and the White Citizens' Councils among them. These undertones are also typical of the Ku Klux Klan to a considerable extent.

These groups are distinguished by their paranoid fear of communism, which they feel is infiltrating everywhere and whose agents are the National Council, the Washington government and Old Uncle Tom Cobbley and all. They consider that liberal churchmen, in showing an interest in reform, have abandoned the true task of the Church, that of saving souls. This they see as the result of communist influence. They view progressivism as a loss of Christian faith, of the belief in the Last Judgement.

In foreign policy they adopt a position of frantic war-mongering. In 1975, Mclntyre, leader of the A.C.C.C. proposed bombing Hanoi to "save" South Vietnam *(The Washington Post,* Apr. 4, 1975, p. C5).

Since the late 1970s, a new generation of Protestant right-wingers has replaced these organizations. They are grouped around TV preachers, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, James Robison, people who hold no key position in the hierarchy of one Church or the other, but who are known

to the mass of Americans and who have created rather powerful and effective organizations (Moral Majority, Religious Roundtable, Christian Voice, National Coalition for Christian Action). Unlike the Protestant ultra-right organizations of the 1950s and 1960s, these have successfully managed to break their way into politics in the 1980 elections. It should be noted, however, that the success of these organizations is, in many ways, connected with a relaxation in their position, compared with the position of the old Protestant right wing—a rejection of outright racism, anti-Catholicism, etc.

While Church liberals encourage society's progress within the framework of the system, and in conditions of rapid scientific and economic growth and social changes their predominance is functional, these conservative groups pull society back. But in so doing they, too, fulfill an important functional role.

In the first place, without such a conservative ideological ballast Church liberalism might go too far beyond the limits permitted within the framework of the American bourgeois ideological system. The presence of fundamentalist and conservative denominations is a constant refuge for conservative elements. Thus, the main denominations paid for their excessive liberal activity in the 1960s by the fact that their rank-and-file members were going over to conservative denominations. From 1964 to 1974, the membership of four conservative denominations grew: of the Assemblies of God by 26 per cent, of the Seventh Day Adventists by 21 per cent, of the Southern Baptists by 12 per cent, the Missouri Lutherans by 9 per cent. Over the same period, the membership of the main liberal denominations fell: of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. by 8 per cent, of the United Church of Christ by 8 per cent, of the American Lutheran Church by 4 per cent, of the Episcopalian Church by 1 per cent. The only denomination which saw an increase in its membership was that of the Methodists—0.3 per Cent *(U.S. News and World Report,* Feb. 25, 1974, p. 54).

In the second place, just as Church liberalism encourages abstract religious complexion of the movements of the oppressed and, consequently, their opportunist character, so Church reaction furthers the fundamentalist or abstract religious tone of the movements of the reactionary strata, and again, to a certain extent, their opportunist nature. While American labor union officials are the leaders of the working class and Pastor Martin Luther King was the leader of the blacks, the reactionary forces as a whole are headed not by fascists, not by a party proposing a

model ideal society as an alternative to the American structure, but by people like Wallace or Goldwater, whose banner is loyalty to that same American Constitution. Just as the political activities of the clergy, both the left-wing and the right-wing, cannot, by definition, lead beyond the frontiers of religion, those movements which churchmen provide with ideological formulae, likewise, cannot reject religious symbolics, which means, as we have already seen, that they remain within the limits of American bourgeois ideology.

Thus, both to the right and to the left, the conflict is fit into the framework of general Christian values and laws. This conflict ideologically arises not as one of ideals but rather as a conflict over the ways in which the goals can be realized, a conflict within bourgeois system of ideas.

6. The Social Functions of the Intolerance of Atheism

One of the specific features of the mass consciousness of Americans which directly arises from the nature of the American bourgeois ideological system is the widespread intolerance towards atheism. However amorphous and vague religions of the mass of Americans are, for all the tolerance of all religious differences, of all the most exotic and strange forms of religion, Americans are considerably more tolerant of the Church of Satan than of atheists. There are no reports of harassment of the worshippers of Satan, who first appeared in the 1960s, the press treats them ironically rather than maliciously. However, in the case of a group of atheists who instituted court cases concerning a number of forms of the state patronage of religion being unconstitutional, the tone is spiteful and even such a respectable magazine as *Time* described their being badgered with an undisguised malign joy.

The leader of this small, but active group of atheists (the Free Thought Society) fighting against the infringements of the first amendment to the Constitution, against government patronage of religion, was Magdalene Murray. Her children were beaten up over a hundred times, her windows smashed, her flowers trampled over, she was sent various threatening letters and indecent photographs. *Time* called her the "most hated woman in America" *(Time*, May 15, 1964, pp. 33-34). Various law suits were initiated against her and things got so bad that she once even had to flee to Hawaii *(Time*, July 3, 1964, p. 66). American

magazines employ excellent photographers capable of making any monster seem a beauty and vice versa. In photographs in these magazines Mrs Murray appeared as some kind of monster from a horror film. The photos seemed to say: "These are the monsters that won't let us worship God in peace".

More than 80 per cent of Americans, .according to the data of a public opinion poll, said that they would never vote for an atheist running for President, no matter what kind of a man he was or whatever his program *(56;* 20).

The research on the intolerance of Americans, which was carried out by Samuel A. Stouffer, revealed the following information. Asked "If a person wanted to make a speech in your community against churches and religion should he be allowed to speak, or not?"—60 per cent answered "no" and 37 per cent "yes"; asked "If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing the book or not?"—60 per cent answered "yes" and 35 per cent "no"; asked "Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university or not?" (not teach scientific atheism, simply teach)—84 per cent answered "no" and 12 per cent "yes" *(186;* 32-33). Stouffer's research was carried out in the 1950s. The situation has changed somewhat since then. In 1977, 62 per cent of those asked were against the prohibition of anti-religious propaganda. However, the level of intolerance towards atheism is still colossal for so highly developed a country. On the face of it, this high level of intolerance strikingly contradicts the principles of democracy and freedom which American bourgeois ideology postulates. As a matter of fact, although there may logically be a contradiction here, there is no contradiction in psychological or social terms, and, moreover, one presupposes the other.

What are the reasons for this intolerance and what functions does it fulfill?

First of all, let us note that intolerance towards atheism is combined with a broad religious tolerance. This is what fundamentally distinguishes it, ideologically and psychologically, from, say, the intolerance of an Irish Protestant extremist, who fears "papists" as much as communists, or the aggressive Iranian Shiite who detests atheism, but, at the same time, smashes the prayer-houses of the Baha'is.

As we have already said, the average American is not so tolerant as he might seem to be on the basis of his religious tolerance. As far as religious differences are concerned, he behaves as an educated European with secu-

larized consciousness which discards primitive religious and ideological myth might behave. However, the average American by no means has such a high level of consciousness. He simply conforms with the particular organization of American bourgeois ideology, integral elements of which are recognition of equality and high value of any religion. The universal religious consecration of that ideology, its considerable amorphousness, the permissibility of internal ideological differences and the religious tolerance of the average American—all this spells tolerance towards *internal ideological* differences. The average American's intolerance of atheism is intolerance of an *alien* ideology. His capacity for intolerance is possibly no less than that of the Iranian Shiite, but is distributed differently. Since the abstract religious sanctification of the American bourgeois system of values, combined with the demand for tolerance towards religious differences, is an aspect of the American bourgeois ideological system, and atheism is a sign, symbol, aspect of the negation of this system, tolerance towards religious differences does not exclude, but rather presupposes intolerance towards atheism and is functionally linked to it.

It is obvious that the genuine, principled atheist cannot share the American bourgeois system of values. The atheistic world outlook rejects any idea of atonement for one's sins after death and, consequently, includes the idea of the construction of an ideal, happy and just society here on Earth (these are naturally connected, both logically and psychologically). Just as there can be no genuine belief in a social ideal while there is belief in God, which presupposes that all social values and every social ideal are relative, so atheism cannot exist without such an ideal (in any case, atheism as a phenomenon of mass consciousness).

Intolerance towards atheism fulfills major defensive functions for American society. It is because this society permits a considerable degree of freedom, that it permits any opportunist movement which sets partial goals attainable within the framework of the American bourgeois-democratic system, any movement which remains in the stream of the American bourgeois system of values (and, consequently, as a symbol of this system of values, to some degree at least, preserves religious symbolics, in however abstract form), because this society greatly respects all religious convictions, that the average American sharing the values of this society cannot understand people who *fundamentally* disagree with this society, people who "do not believe in God either". The average American sees

them not as ordinary normal people, but as some kind of "fiends from Hell", most likely foreign spies. Towards these people, people with a positive social ideal, American society turns a completely different face, not the tolerant and kind, shown to all Churches, sects and all those who, in one way or another, appeal to "Christian values" and "ideals of democracy", but intolerant and fanatic. It pits all its strength against them, all the strength of ideology which is backed up with the authority of 200 denominations merged with the national history and national awareness. Just as leucocytes attack a foreign body which has penetrated the organism and surround it, so hatred surrounds the "foreign body" of the ideology which has penetrated American society. Sometimes, the bearers of this ideology are worse off psychologically than those who live in conditions of open ideological terror. De Tocqueville wrote: "The Inquisition could never prevent the circulation in Spain of books contradicting the religion of the majority. Domination of the majority has achieved more in the United States: it has removed the very thought of them being published" *(199;* Vol. II, 208-09).

However, in these conditions the state cannot maintain a formally legal position. When religiousness is universally widespread the principle of the separation of the Church from the state cannot be strictly observed, although, as we have seen, universal religiousness is functionally linked with this principle. Likewise, when intolerance is universally widespread, the legal standards of bourgeois democracy cannot be strictly observed, although again, this intolerance is functionally linked with these standards. These same standards and principles in defense of which persecution of dissenters is organized are constantly infringed in the course of this persecution.

American society is, naturally, not in the state of a permanent witch hunt. However, a high potential of intolerance is ever present and might at any moment explode into hysteria. Louis Hartz wrote: "Any one who watches it /an explosion of hysteria—*Auth.* ***I*** then can hardly fail to have a healthy respect for the dynamite which normally lies concealed beneath the free and easy atmosphere of the American liberal community" *(106;* 56). Stouffer's book reveals the appalling picture of the communist witch hunts during the McCarthy period, which is beyond human understanding. It was precisely hysteria, an explosion of hatred, a peak (in the following chapter we shall show to what extent this hysteria can go). It had not happened before and it receded afterwards. However, the figures quoted above on the Americans' intolerance of atheism

(less than of communism but more than of the ideas of nationalization) are not linked with hysteria. Religion was under no particular attack at that time. These figures, which are enormous, splendidly illustrate the general level of intolerance towards dissenters, which leads to individual outbursts of hysteria towards certain groups which are the most conspicuous and dangerous at the given moment.

Intolerance is unevenly distributed among different social strata. The degree of tolerance towards differently minded people directly reflects the erosion or collapse of dogma and myth in people's consciousness. Therefore, it is only natural that this tolerance increases as the main factor hitting the myth, education, becomes more widespread ***(186;*** 90). And, conversely, the lower the level of education, the greater the level of intolerance. However, education is rather closely linked with wealth and high social standing. Therefore, it is those strata, that are safe from fundamental and mass dissidence due to their social interests, which turn out to be the most tolerant towards this difference of opinion. On the contrary, those who by their social status might be disposed towards dissidence but whose thinking is more dominated by dogma and myth and affected by the enormous pressure of American bourgeois ideology, adopt this ideology more dogmatically and are more intolerant towards dissidence. Thus, intolerance is more pronounced precisely in those strata where tolerance would be the most dangerous.

Nowadays, 71 per cent of those with higher education and only 53 per cent of those with lower education disapprove of the activities of extreme right Protestant organizations (such as the Moral Majority, etc.), which are the embodiment of American intolerance, and which, besides, sometimes overstep the framework of the American bourgeois system of values (Gallup Poll Release, Dec. 14, 1980).

American bourgeois society's capacity for intolerance, which it might at any moment bring down upon the heads of "subversive elements", is a weapon which the majority of European bourgeois societies do not possess. This, of course, is one of the sources of strength, of the stability of the American bourgeois society. However, it is also a mark of its relative weakness. L. Hartz writes that American society has considerably fewer radicals than any other Western society, but more hysteria is aroused over them than anywhere else. Why so? Not only because it has a splendid weapon of mass intolerance always ready to swing into battle.

Obviously, it is also because the danger emanating from those whom Hartz calls radicals is, in the U.S.A., in

a different proportion to their numbers than in European bourgeois countries.

In our opinion, intolerance always shows there is a real danger for an ideological system and a social structure this ideology sanctifies, that danger emanating from an ideology which becomes the object of intolerance. This danger is not always obvious to the outside observer and intolerance seems simply a consequence of prejudices, of an incorrect understanding of the obtaining alignment of forces. However, as a rule, the internal logic of the system which responds by intolerance is more accurate than the logic of the outside observer who is ignorant of the system's mechanisms and hidden weaknesses.

What are the weaknesses which lie behind the hysteria over small groups which seem to pose no real danger? American society rests on the combination of national, religious and bourgeois-democratic aspects of ideology, on their identification in the mass consciousness. This is the guarantee of its stability. However, it also spells the weakness of American society, its vulnerability. Any American who does not see the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. social structure as the pinnacles of human wisdom and progress, if he is an ordinary citizen, not an agent of a foreign power or some kind of odd-ball, he, by his very being, tears this combination apart, explodes the myth of the American way of life. A tradition of various types of radicalism exists in other societies. The French have seen most sundry philosophies and extremist parties during their history. This makes ideological contradictions somewhat relative, for a spontaneous national feeling has arisen: "After all, we are all French". This feeling may unite a nation in difficult times, force it to bury its ideological differences for a while. However, things are different in the U.S.A. "We Americans" means first of all "we adherents of the American way of life". Therefore, dissidence for U.S. bourgeois society is more dangerous than for other bourgeois societies. It subjects dissidence to such persecution because it has no other weapons to use against it.

7. **Religion and Some Characteristic Features of American Political Life**

There are very close and diverse links between the character of American religious and political life and the specific features of political parties and organizations. Let us try to trace these links.

The most important distinction between American and European political parties lies in their organization, in how the parties arose. In the U.S.A., bourgeois-democratic institutions arose before the party was formed. At the first stage, when these institutions already existed, there were still no parties. They arose as opinions within already elected bodies were being polarized, then the opinion of the electorate was polarized and crystallized around this polarization (between Jefferson and Hamilton). As Richard Hofstadter showed ***(109)*** the appearance of the party was first conceived of as something unnatural, abnormal, unhealthy, which, in many ways, kindled partisan passions. Opponents struggled against each other wishing to put an end to this abnormal phenomenon of a party schism in the country. However, these party passions were, nonetheless, not great enough to prevent Jefferson coming peacefully to power in 1800 on being elected President of the United States. This was the first time in history that power was peacefully transferred from one party to another as a result of elections. (England was the second country where such a transfer of power occurred. In 1830, following a parliamentary vote, Wellington's cabinet fell; in 1868 Disraeli's government resigned immediately after its defeat at the polls, without waiting for a parliamentary vote.) The Federalist Party disintegrated rather quickly and for a long time Jefferson's Republican Party was practically the dominant one. However, internally, this party was suffering from a factional struggle, slowly and gradually the idea arose, most vividly expressed by Martin Van Buren, a founder of the second two-party system (Democrats and Whigs), the idea that the party was a natural and legitimate phenomenon, that since there were elections there must be political parties, that it was better to have parties clearly opposing one another than an endless, disorganized and amorphous struggle waged, with seemingly no parties existing. The second two-party system collapsed following the split between the North and the South, which did not coincide with party polarization. The old parties disintegrated. A third and final party system was established following the Civil War—that of the Democrats and Republicans.

Hence, the parties arose after the institution of elective bodies, as a result of the electoral system. In Europe, it was only the old English parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, which arose this way and acquired a mass following. The majority of European parties arose *before* parliamentary institutions did and when Parliament arose, they entered it from without. Spain is probably

the most striking example of this. It had no parliament, no elections as yet when all the parties already existed.

And so, just as the Constitution in the U.S.A. historically arose before the party, so in the mass consciousness there the Constitution is something indubitable and absolute, while the party is still something dubious. Naturally, no one doubts its legitimacy, but a measure of ambivalence towards it is preserved. Thus, according to a 1966 survey, although 67 per cent of Americans did not agree that it would be better if party names did not figure in the elections, at the same time, 64 per cent believed that parties often artificially created conflicts, while 53 per cent believed that the system would be better without party conflicts *(120;* 7).

The emergence of parties being different from Europe, which was connected with the differences in religion and in the process of secularization, determined many other party features.

The fact that elective institutions in the U.S.A. arose before parties and that no one thought of parties as a normal and constant phenomenon when they arose, was linked with a high extent of unanimity in the American revolutionary camp. And although a subsequent struggle arose between the Jeffersonians and the Federalists, the fiercest in the history of the party struggle in the U.S.A., there was, nevertheless, a peaceful takeover of power. Even then, the polarization of opinion between the parties was not so great. "We are all republicans. We are all federalists", the victorious Jefferson said.

This weak political polarization between parties has been preserved as a typical feature throughout the entire history of America. It is clearly linked with the specific features of American religion and the type of secularization.

Thus, in the political life of Europe and Latin America the presence of polarity plays a major role: clericalism and religion—anti-clericalism and secularization. In the U.S.A., however, such polarization is practically nonexistent. In the U.S.A. religion is secularized and the secular sphere is sanctified by religion. A kind of weak analogy with the struggle between clericalism and anticlericalism may probably be found only in the defense of state patronage of Congregationalism in New England and, subsequently, in the Protestant traditions emphasized by the Federalists, then by the Whigs and Republicans, and, on the contrary, in the principle of the separation of the Church from the state and the equality of all religions emphasized by the Jeffersonian Republicans and then by

the Democrats. Nowadays, a tiny trace of this polarization is preserved in the fact that Protestants vote rather for the Republicans, while the Catholics and the Judaists tend to give their vote to the Democrats (this polarization was of significance in the early history of America, when the separation of the Church from the state was a relatively recent event and Congregationalism still had an official significance in Massachusetts). The Democrats, however, may be pictured as an anti-Protestant party and the Republicans as anti-Catholic only by some unscrupulous demagogue from the opposing party. Both of them support the separation of the Church from the state and the equality of all religions. Both use the same general religious symbolics. The orthodox Protestant Southerners, as well as the Catholics and Judaists, support the Democratic Party.

Therefore, there is no substantiation in the United States for the parties typical of the European and Latin American countries, such as, for instance, the various Christian or Catholic parties (these can only arise when part of the people has rejected religion, when religion recognizes that it does not embrace the whole of society, and when there is no such religious pluralism as there is in the United States). However, neither is there any substantiation for parties which are bearers of the traditions of anti-clerical ideology of bourgeois Enlightenment (the Italian Republicans, French Radicals).

The European bourgeois revolutions, which brought down the powerful deep-rooted old regimes, were unable to completely destroy the traces of these regimes in the peoples' consciousness and memory, or to wipe out all the followers of these regimes. This gave rise to a dichotomy: conservatism, aristocratism and monarchism, on the one hand, and modernism and bourgeois democracy, on the other. The U.S.A. has not real national feudal past and, correspondingly, there is no foundation for such dichotomy or for the parties of the monarchistic type. The same as a very weakened form of the polarization, clericalism vs. anticlericalism, can be found in a certain difference in the approach of American parties to religion, a weakened form can be found in the polarization of conservatism and aristocratism vs. modernism and democratism. This form was particularly distinct in the early period, when the degree of political polarization was greater, in the Federalists' struggle against Jeffersonians. It was preserved in the subsequent struggle of the Whigs, and then of the Republicans, against the Democrats of the North. The Democrats are now rather the adherents of the welfare state, that

is, government interference in economic life (to a very limited extent) aimed at helping the poor and somewhat redistributing the incomes, and supporters of trade unions. The mass support of the Democrats in the North comes rather from workers and generally people not very well off, reckoning on government aid. The Republicans are in favor of unlimited private enterprise. They are supported mainly by the bourgeois, generally by people with a vested interest in not giving the government money to help the poor. According to a 1965 survey, 56 per cent of businessmen and specialists and only 15 per cent of skilled and 8 per cent of unskilled workers recognized the Republicans as "their party". On the contrary, 22 per cent of specialists and businessmen and, respectively, 59 per cent and 62 per cent of workers recognized the Democratic party as "their party" *(27;* 187). Polarization runs along the same line as in Europe, but the end points are immeasurably closer together.

Likewise, the U.S.A. lacks the polarity of cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism typical of the majority of European countries (occidentophilism in 19th century Russia, in Spain—orientation on France). In the U.S.A., cosmopolitanism is nationalistic, and nationalism is cosmopolitan (the role religion plays in this can be seen from the above). Therefore, in the U.S.A. there is not, nor can there be, a party of a nationalistic type. Although, of course, here again, the difference between the Democrats, on the one hand, with their slightly more active foreign policy, slightly more liberal attitude towards immigration and their orientation on groups of immigrants not yet completely Americanized, and the Republicans, on the other, relying on the "old American" strata, is a faint analogy of the European polarization of cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism.

Pragmatism and absence of ideology in political life in the U.S.A. are linked with the weakness of political polarization, and, again, with the specific features of the American version of secularization and American religious life.

We can say that American bourgeois society, in not permitting social protest to be ideologically expressed in the form of an integral non-religious world outlook, in bringing down all its ideological and psychological resources on the bearers of this world outlook, carries out a kind of surgical operation on various ideologies. It cuts specific socio-political values, that happen to contradict those of American society, off from their religious ideologies (in the process of the Americanization of the Church and the bourgeois integration of the sect), turning them into ideologies which are identical to each other by their practical socio-political impact. It undercuts the ideo-

logical foundations of socio-political movements, or, rather, does not permit ideologies capable of providing such a foundation to spread, and encourages the opportunist forms of such movements which have no such substantiation. Truncated forms of religion result, indistinguishable from one another in their impact on the socio-political sphere, and truncated organizations, indistinguishable in their general ideological foundations. In this respect, one should not be deceived by the emotional atmosphere of American social movements. The abstract religious sanctification of often narrowly practical demands, typical of the American revolution and a permanent feature of American political and cultural life, leads to the uniquely American appearance of movements that look like real crusades. It always seems to the European observer who reads about mass demonstrations in support of some particular demands, that there is something more behind these demands. He constantly awaits this something more, but is always disappointed.

It is the partial, truncated nature of American religious denominations, that make no attempt to completely subjugate man, their dogma disintegrated and they themselves tolerant of one another, which makes the partial, opportunist character of political life possible, for, inevitably, a powerful Church religion would have given rise to anti-religious forms of ideologies with their own positive social ideals. If such ideals are to be realized there must be a break with religion and the solution to existential problems which religion provided is to be sought in the earthly social ideal. However, if this break with religion is to be made, religion must be powerful and dogmatic, must impede development and dictate its own laws.

Just as the weakness of polarization implies the absence of clear social ideals and is conducive to preserving the abstract religious nature of the ideology of political parties, so the preservation of abstract religiousness implies the absence of social ideals and, thereby, the weakness of polarization. A bilateral connection exists here.

The weakness of polarization and the non-ideological nature of party differences are inseparably linked with the special features of the internal structure of American parties.

The word "party", like the word "church", sometimes obscures the profound differences between organizations calling themselves by these names. Pentecostals, Presbyterians and Catholics call themselves Churches. Tiny

extremist groups call themselves parties, as do the Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S.A. An analogy can evidently be drawn between different types of religious and party bourgeois organizations. Where Churches completely dominate the beginnings of spiritual development of the Modern Age, bourgeois parties tend to move from organizations of the sect type (various minute extremist groups) to a church type of organization (for instance, fascist parties are the same extremist groups, but who have gained total domination). In this respect one often comes across statements by journalists or individuals, comparing young Black Muslims, the Children of God, or Moonists with Hitler's Storm Troopers (see for instance, *Time,* Jan. 24, 1972, p. 34). These statements, never as yet, as far as we know, discussed in sociology, are something more than a mere metaphor. Meanwhile, American parties which arise when denomination prevails by their very nature are reminiscent of a denomination.

Indeed, neither charismatic leadership nor hierarchical domination are typical of the organizational structure of these parties. They are organized in accordance with the same principles of bourgeois democracy, which underlie the organization of society and which themselves, in many ways, arise from the organizational structure of Protestant denominations. Party bodies are very weak and the tendency is for them to grow even weaker. There is very little party discipline.

The absence of a definite ideology is typical both of denominations and parties, therefore, they unite people with very different views. As Engels wrote, "different strata and interests are represented in each of the two big parties, depending on the locality" *(12;* 416). The Republican Party favors government non-interference in social and economic life. It is a party of businessmen, white Protestants, "old" Americans, who are content with their status in life. The Democrats, more inclined towards active government interference, are, to a certain extent, a party of the dissatisfied, a party of Progressives, supported by labor unions, blacks, new immigrants, Catholics and Jews. However, these are merely nuances in the approaches to problems, and only objectively created ties with groups of the electorate, which are tenuous and not consolidated ideologically. It is because of this that white Southerners, orthodox Protestants with a racist disposition (not only the poor, but the Southern oligarchy as well) may support the Democrats. This phenomenon took shape historically as a result of the Southerners leaving Lincoln's Republican Party in their masses. However, without the extreme ideo-

logical amorphousness there could not have been the unnatural combination of orthodox Protestants with Catholics and Judaists, white racists with blacks, Wallace with McGovern and Kennedy within the framework of one party.

Like denominations, parties tolerate each other. Like denominations, parties are similar to each other, the difference between them being one of nuances which sometimes almost disappear, sometimes are clearly emphasized. Such parties cannot induce genuine devotion, cannot make the party's cause the meaning and aim of one's life.

And just as belief in a denominational doctrine does not play a great role in influencing a person's choice of denomination, so the role of the party is not great in shaping the reasons for voting this or that way.

In Presidential and Congressional elections, a huge number of electors vote in one instance for the representative of one party and in the other for the representative of the other (in 1968, 54 per cent of the total electorate voted thus—*120;* 147). A survey carried out in 1966 showed that the overwhelming majority of those asked, 82 per cent, were of the opinion that one must vote in elections regardless of the party *(120;* 7) and in the 1980 elections, 11 per cent of the electorate considering themselves Republicans voted for Carter while 26 per cent of those considering themselves to be Democrats voted for Reagan *(The New York Times,* Nov. 9, 1980, p. 28).

To a great extent, the two-party system is functionally linked with the ideological amorphousness of party "denominations". The two-party system is an extremely stable feature of American political life and is preserved despite frequent attempts at forming a third party, despite various party regroupings and long periods when one party dominates. To a certain extent, it is even possible to speak of the widening sphere of the two-party system in the U.S.A., now that the Republicans have penetrated what used to be the one-party Democratic South. How can this be explained? It can, in many ways, be explained by the organizational structure of elections. Unlike countries where seats in legislative organs are distributed according to the overall percentage of votes a party receives, so that a party which might not win in any district, but merely receives 1-2 per cent of the total number of votes, is given seats in parliament and may even make its way into government if it enters into a coalition with other parties, in the U.S.A. constituencies elect one deputy by a simple majority vote. Such a system does not allow small groups to make their way into Congress or to power, and the elector who really wants to achieve certain definite aims with his vote is

at a disadvantage if he votes for them. While encouraging the collapse of weak parties, such a system, at the same time, forges all political forces into two major coalitions which have a real chance of success. Speaking of the special features of the U.S. Constitution in a letter to Friedrich A. Sorge, Engels pointed out that "every vote that is not cast for one of the nominated candidates ... is considered to be *lost.* Meanwhile, the American, just like the Englishman, wants to influence his state and does not toss his vote to the wind" *(22;* 173). The same idea was later elaborated by Lipset and Sartori (*124;* 166).

It is only possible to accommodate the whole range of opinion in such a huge and intricately organized country as the U.S.A. in two parties due to the ideological amorphousness of the parties. Therefore, in promoting the two-party system, the Constitution promotes ideological amorphousness. In general, the Constitution which is not meant for a party struggle is a powerful factor in undermining ideology. Another such feature of the Constitution which helps to destroy ideology is the fact that elections for the great many elective posts existing in this country are held at different times, with a considerable time gap in between. This leads to a situation where a party cannot win or lose all key posts at once. Had the parties been polar extremes and had clear ideological outlines such a system would have collapsed. However, since the two parties have to live side by side in harmony, this system, in fact, prevents the parties from acquiring sharp ideological outlines and from becoming polarized.

However, these special features of the Constitution are linked with the fact that the political parties were not in existence when it was drawn up. The idea of proportional representation, therefore, could not have arisen then. Moreover, had the parties which subsequently arose embodied integral ideological systems, the impracticality of voting for a candidate who would go no further would not have played a major role, for the stronger the ideological significance of the party, the more quickly the voting acquires an expressive character. In voting for a clearly minority party a person not so much strives to influence the passage of parliamentary bills as flies the flag, affirming his loyalty to an ideology. Therefore, the "2 determinant" (2 parties, 2 candidates) is not only linked with the incongruity of voting for candidates who have little likelihood of being elected. It is also linked with the absence of sufficiently powerful political ideologies, a feature observed throughout the history of America and, irrespective of the two-party system, deeply rooted in

the entire American ideological system, in the specific features of religion and the process of secularization.

Hence, the fierceness of the struggle in American elections, where each candidate, as a rule, has a real chance of success, is linked with the ideological void of this struggle. With there being no real political difference, differences are sometimes convulsively sought and contrived, and rather than the contest of ideologies, it is the contest of the canditates' images that moves to the foreground. It is rare in American history for the victorious Presidential candidate to win with 10-20 per cent more votes than his closest rival. Sometimes, less than a 1 per cent majority of votes decide the choice of the President (in 1960, Kennedy received 49.7 per cent of the votes, Nixon—49.5 per cent, and in 1968, Nixon—43.4 per cent, Humphrey—42.7 per cent ***(120;*** 31).

The ideological amorphousness, pragmatism and weak polarization of political parties lead to power being transferred painlessly from one party to the other. American history has a rhythm, the alternation between the more conservative elements being in power, the Federalists, Whigs, Republicans, and the more progressive, the Jeffersonian Republicans, and the Democrats. This rhythm is similar to that of various European bourgeois societies. In both cases political parties acquire a pendulum movement, sometimes swinging far forward, sometimes far back. The difference is, of course, in the amplitude of the swings. The movement from the domination of the Federalists to Jefferson was the first swing of the pendulum. It was followed by the federalization of Jefferson's victorious party and its shift to the right. This reached its peak under John Quincy Adams, was subsequently followed by a shift to the left under Jackson, then by a shift to the right—the defeat of Van Buren and the Whig victory. The pendulum had been set in motion. The Roosevelt era was a swing to the left, the Eisenhower era—a swing to the right, etc. Did French history, for instance, witness similar pendulum movements? Yes, it did. The shift to Robespierre was an upward swing, a shift to the left, to Charles X—a shift to the right, then from 1830 to 1848, again a shift to the left. However, the amplitude of the pendulum swings varied, for the degree of the polarization varied also. In France, the difference between political forces and parties was so great that power could not be transferred peacefully and that once one side came to power it did everything it could to destroy the other. The pendulum swung from revolution to

counterrevolution and back again to revolution. Each time, in dealing with its opponents and uncompromisingly asserting its ideology, the party went too far and paid for it in blood and a mighty swing in the opposite direction. Although the swings are smoothing down in France, there is still no rhythm of the constant and peaceful transfer of power from one party to the next to this day. The U.S.A. has never known such a situation. The victory of one party or the other never entails radical changes there.

In the U.S.A., there is no basis for that motley party system which is typical of European countries and which is linked with the presence of internal political ideological systems in the past and in the present, replacing one another in the struggle for power. However, in the U.S.A. there is every basis for a ramified network of organizations, following some particular aims and acting as pressure groups in the political arena. There is no such system in any European country. This network is of a truly amazing scale. D. Boorstin quotes staggering figures: in the mid-20th century, 18,000 conventions of various public organizations were held annually, with 10 million people taking part in them *(60;* 143). 65-75 per cent of Americans belonged to various public organizations (more than those always taking part in the elections, 25-30 per cent) *(120;* 91). It is normal for the middle-class American to belong to 5 or 6 public organizations. It is only natural that such a system arise, for social activity which is not integrated into a whole by an ideology is fragmented into the pursuit of individual aims and individual endeavors.

As a result, socio-political and spiritual activities are, as it were, distributed among a range of organizations. A person, let's say, on the one hand, is a Presbyterian, and, on the other, (this is not directly linked with which denomination he belongs to) he votes for the Republicans, furthermore, he is a member of an environmental protection group and a member of a Masonic Lodge. How he divides his time up between these organizations depends on their order of importance for him. However, his allegiance to any one of these organizations cannot outweigh that towards the state and the American social structure.

This type of bourgeois ideological and political system, this mode of society's cultural and political life is, naturally, very stable, considerably more so than other bourgeois systems.

Part III

THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND RELIGION

The purpose of this chapter is to reveal several characteristic links between the labor movement and religious life in the U.S.A.

Engels wrote: "It is remarkable but wholly natural how firmly rooted bourgeois prejudices are even in the working class in such a young country, which has never known feudalism and has grown up on a bourgeois basis from the beginning... The American worker ... imagines that the traditional bourgeois regime he inherited is something progressive and superior by nature and for all time, a *nec-plus ultra" (13;* 426). Although these words were said in 1892, numerous facts of life in the U.S.A. today show that they are still relevant to a large extent. Engels not only noted the specific features of the workers' mass consciousness in the U.S.A. He also pointed to some of its causes: the absence of a feudal tradition and the connection between bourgeois values and national self-awareness. However, we have seen that both the one and the other are, in many ways, connected with the specific features of religion. They are an essential element in the system of factors influencing the characteristic features of the labor movement. The types of interrelations are virtually endless: religion—the specific features of the state structure—the characteristics of the labor movement; religion—the characteristic features of the political parties—the specific features of the labor movement; religion—the specific features of national self-awareness—the characteristic features of the labor movement. We shall limit ourselves to a much narrower task—to show the parallel and the functional interrelationship between the specific features of the labor movement and those of the workers' attitude towards religion, and also, with respect to the working class, the operation of those defensive

mechanisms of the American bourgeois ideological system which make use of religion and which we already spoke of in the Part II. First of all, however, we must point out the basic characteristics of the labor movement in the U.S.A.

1. Characteristics of the Labor Movement in the U.S.A.

The history of the labor movement in the U.S.A. goes back to the time the American nation and statehood took shape. There were local mutual aid societies of craftsmen and working men before the revolution, and during the revolution workers joined anti-English organizations, even holding what today are called political strikes, refusing, for instance, to unload English ships. The seeds of labor unions sprang up in the late 18th and early 19th century. Thus, the labor movement in the U.S.A. has a longer history than that of many European nations.

Moreover, it was in the U.S.A. that political parties, deliberately working-class-oriented and known as workingmen's parties, first appeared. They were represented by a group of local parties which arose in 1828 during the wave of Jacksonianism. However, the fate and character of these parties, to a certain extent, might herald the fact that the labor movement in the U.S.A. would have a very distinctive history and would develop a very distinctive ideology and organizational forms. The workingmen's parties of the Jackson era were typically American parties with weak discipline and amorphous ideology, created exclusively for elections (at the level of local government and state legislatures). These parties had a very moderate program—inexpensive state-run schools, the abolition of the prison sentence for the non-payment of debts, a cheaper legal system and the like. It is important to note that these parties did not put forward the demand for universal suffrage which was so typical of many early European workers' organizations. The granting of this right meant a radical change in the political system, and demanding it placed these organizations outside the system to one extent or another and led them to function outside the system of elections and the legislative bodies. In the early 19th century, universal male suffrage was gradually introduced in all American states.

On the whole, these parties represented the left wing of Jacksonianism. It remains a mystery for the contemporary American historians whether they were the fruit of the

policies of the Democrats who strove to attract workers, or. on the contrary, the fruit of a Whig plot to split the Jacksonian bloc, or, indeed, genuine parties which arose spontaneously *(125;* 45-55). They did not last long and disintegrated everywhere by the early 1830s. This was evidently connected with the fact that the bigger parties adopted some of their demands. Two features of this first tvpe of party attract our attention—the moderate character of their demands (and, correspondingly, the amorphous ideology and weak discipline) and the difficulty of appearing with these demands on the American political scene as a third force *(125;* ch. II).

We, of course, do not intend to describe the entire history of the American labor movement. The aim is simply to discuss some of its specific features.

Moderate demands were typical not only of the workingmen's parties, but of other, large labor organizations, as well—the National Labor Union (1866-early 1870s) and the Knights of Labor (1869-late 1880s), the forerunners of the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.). To be sure, the Knights did entertain some vague ideal of a cooperative commonwealth. Yet on the whole, these organizations did not have a clear ideology, nor did they establish any kind of stable ties with left-wing intellectuals (on the face of it, the moderate demands of the mass workers' organizations strangely contrasted with the often very violent, forcible methods of striking. We shall discuss the reasons for this later).

The National Labor Union and the Knights were unsuccessful in their bid to enter politics as a third force *(125;* ch. III).

These organizations were not lasting, evidently due to their indefinite, indecisive character: on the one hand, they aimed at more than exclusively narrow, immediate material gains, but, on the other, they did not have a sufficiently powerful ideology they could continue to adhere to irrespective of practical advantages and in defiance of any advantage.

Only one type of organization was relatively stable—the trade unions of skilled workers, pursuing exclusively economic aims and relying on the rare and high value of their commodity, the skilled workforce. The A.F.L., made of these organizations, set up by Samuel Gompers in 1886 and existing to this day, declared as its principle the refusal to create a party or actively participate in politics, the emphasis on collective bargaining, narrow economic aims of its struggle and hostility to "ideology of intellectuals" *(125;* ch. IV). When Gompers said that

these principles were the conclusion of the lessons of all the earlier history of American labor organizations and that they were labor's only means of survival, he, in his own opportunistic way, was correct. It is difficult for a third party to survive in the U.S.A. when its political goals are narrow—for narrow goals may be included in the programs of the two larger parties. It is better to have no particular ideology at all and to completely concentrate on a goal which no political party can steal—the goal of achieving the material prosperity of a given narrow group of workers, instead of having an indefinite ideology which easily dissolves in the melting pot of U.S. political life.

The creation of the American Federation of Labor on Gompers' principles and its becoming relatively stable was a turning point, for any organization, if it manages to last long enough, begins to draw the strength and stability from this very fact—from its members traditional adherence to it, from the psychological ease with which they are able to follow the path which this organization has already trod and from the psychological difficulty of searching for new paths. As' long as an organization exists, it occupies a place which might be filled by other organizations.

This situation, undoubtedly, offers alternatives. Possibly, had there been no person such as Gompers, to whose energy and efforts the A.F.L. owes its stability in the early, difficult years of its existence, and who, between 1886 and 1924, headed the A.F.L. (except for one year) and left the imprint of his personality and his ideas on it, and had there been no hostility with Daniel De Leon, the labor movement in the U.S.A. might have assumed other forms. One thing, however, is clear—that very powerful forces were active along the lines taken by the A.F.L., that the chances of things turning out as they did were very great.

The A.F.L. embraced only the cream of the working class, skilled workers whose rare and complex trades were a powerful factor in the struggle for collective bargaining. The Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.), set up in 1905 and very much not a part of the American system, declaring its adherence to revolutionary means of struggle, addressed itself to the lower strata of the working class. However, this organization, on the one hand, had a strong non-ideological (a simplified version of anarchy) and anti-intellectual tendency, and, on the other, was widespread on the fringes of the working class, the most unskilled workers in the West and immigrant textile workers in the East. The I.W.W. collapsed partly under the blows of mon-

strous repression during the years of First World War and in the 1920s, partly through reasons which brought about the downfall of other organizations—ideological vagueness which did not allow a clearcut organization to be created capable of surviving in any conditions, and the insignificance of its concrete achievements.

A crucial stage, turning point came in the history of the A.F.L. and in the history of the entire American labor movement when semi-skilled and unskilled workers started joining labor unions in their masses during the New Deal years. The craft principle of their unification, on which the A.F.L. was founded, was out of place here. A new organization arose—the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.), involving the broader strata of workers and more left-wing. Communists and socialists played a major role in organizing it. However, it was run by people like John Lewis, pragmatic and, in many ways, cynical union barons. After a while, Communists were driven out of the C.I.O. and, in 1955, it merged with the A.F.L. For they had no ideological differences. They arrived at a common denominator.

The A.F.L.-C.I.O. is a huge, mass-based, rich organization. American workers, in many ways, link their relatively high material status with it to this day. It has a mighty tradition and is solidly integrated in the American social system. It occupies a very safe place in society and it decreases the chances of the American labor movement taking any fundamentally different forms.

The present-day organized American labor movement is the most integrated in bourgeois society and the least adhering to a coherent ideology. We shall list its most typical features.

First of all, the parties ideologically addressing themselves to the working class are weak and operate in very difficult conditions.

The highest point of these parties' influence was in 1912 when Eugene Debs scored 5.9 per cent of the votes at the Presidential elections. Consequently, the working class has no mass-based party offering an alternative to American bourgeois ideology. The working class expresses its interests and social protest in the sphere of electoral behavior only in a moderate form within the system by voting for the "party of the poor"—the Democrats. Another way of expression is that American workers are considerably less active at the polls than the American middle class or European workers who have their own political parties (an indication of greater alienation from political life)

(132; 189, 195, 201).

The Democratic Party is traditionally not only based on the support of the labor electorate, but also has political links with the unions *(125;* 421-30), which especially strengthened in the Roosevelt era. However, these links are much weaker than, for instance, those the British Labour Party has with the working class and the trade unions. They have not been consolidated ideologically and organizationally, and non-partisanship and pressure on both parties and on individual political figures is a principle of union policies.

In the majority of capitalist countries trade unions are linked with various parties, while in the U.S.A., they are "independent" and represent the only form of organized, mass labor movement. This, naturally, leaves its imprint on the character of the unions. Non-partisan and having no close ties with the intelligentsia, the kind they have in other countries, the mass labor movement has no consistent class ideology of its own. Since some kind of ideological concept is necessarily there, the resulting ideology is partly an aspect of the all-American bourgeois system of values in the mass consciousness of the workers and partly an attempt to ideologically sanction the organizational practice of labor unions. Thus, the ideological systems of Gompers, Selig Perlman and their successors postulate the idea that all the misfortunes of the labor movement in other countries arise from the infiltration of intellectual ideologists who distract the workers from their vital task of raising their living standards. The American labor movement, "untainted" by the domination of the intelligentsia, they maintain, is the only authentic and the highest form of labor movement (just as, in general, the U.S.A. is the highest form of society), and the workers of other countries should learn from American workers *(125;* 103-27). The emphasis on practical demands for raising the workers' living standards is logically linked with the acception of the basic principles of the existing society, with the readiness to act within its framework, not with the aim of changing it, but with the aim of improving it. The fundamental refusal to create a workers' party is linked not only with practical considerations (the difficulty of success, the great convenience of operating through already existing parties, etc.). It is also linked with the notion that such a party would become a means of infiltration by ideologists seeking to gain control over labor. And it implies that collective bargaining is viewed as the main effort in labor struggle. The struggle for legislative reform to improve the situation

of the workers is of secondary importance. It is emphasized in every way that labor organizations are the workers' own business, that they should ask no one for help, that they can realize their demands only through their own struggle and organization. Surveys *(125;* 408) indicate that these views have profoundly penetrated the mass consciousness of the workers, the ground for them prepared by the American bourgeois system of values.

The organizational structure of labor unions is as distinct as their ideological background. S. Lipset compares the organization of the American unions with that of European ones: "Their tactics are more militant; they are more decentralized in their collective bargaining; and they have many more full-time salaried officials, who are on the whole much more highly paid and exhibit a somewhat greater penchant to engage in corrupt practices. American unions have also organized a smaller proportion of the labor force than have unions in these other nations" *(132;* 195-96). It is easy to trace the functional connection between these traits and the specific features of union ideology, and an indirect one between them and the American bourgeois system of values, of which this ideology is one aspect.

1) Aggressive tactics, which, on the face of it, contradicts the narrowly practical economic aims of the struggle, is linked with the value of individual social success. This value, in the first place, gives rise to the employers' tendency (and, to a certain extent, the workers') to regard their class conflicts as private, almost personal conflicts, which do not concern the state. Hence the specifically American tendency of the bourgeoisie to resort to its own means in the struggle against the workers, i.e., hiring strike breakers and private guards, setting up terrorist groups of gangsters, etc. This, naturally, has evoked an extremely violent response. Secondly, the value of social success is an unbearable psychological burden on people of "low status", for this is regarded as a sign of personal inferiority. According to a research carried out in 1966-1967 in an industrial town of Michigan, 37 per cent of whites classified as poor believed that in the U.S.A. the rich and the poor had equal chances, of getting on. Of these, 13 per cent believed that the poor were poor because "they do not work hard enough", and 19 per cent—because they "do not want to get on" *(27;* 112-13). Hence the general frantic attempts to achieve high status. For the worker, however, inasmuch as there is little likelihood of his becoming a member of the intelligentsia or bourgeoisie, status, primarily, means

money. The struggle for material prosperity, therefore, acquires great personal significance. Hence the aggressive tactics of this struggle.

2) Decentralization in the struggle for collective bargaining is expressed particularly in the fact that, in the U.S.A., the difference between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers is greater than in any European country *(133;* 207), and the decentralization of the movement in general, when the lobby of individual unions in Congress often oppose one another, is perhaps connected with the narrowness of the aims and inadequate class awareness.

3) The presence of a relatively large number of highly paid union officials (in the U.S.A., there is one per 300 union members, in Great Britain, Norway and Sweden, one per 1,700-2,200) *(133;* 220), and the small number of part-time, unpaid union activists is, likewise, easily explained by the narrowly egoistic, utilitarian character of their aims which make it difficult for a man to regard union work as his life's cause. It is for this reason that, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, C.I.O. leaders enlisted the services of Communists and other radicals, who they later ousted from the unions. The Communists were people devoted to their work, unequalled in their selflessness, honesty and enthusiasm among those who shared the views of the union leaders.

4) The tendency to corruption and, besides, the tendency of the unions to become undemocratic dictatorial organizations with practically unchanging leadership fiercely suppressing opposition (including crimes and murder with the help of gangsters) *(132; ch.* XII) are also functionally linked with the specific features of their ideology. The tendency to corruption is a direct consequence of the egoistic and utilitarian aims of the union movement and its leaders. The tendency to dictatorship within the labor unions results, in the first place, from the fact that the workers have little interest in the unions, other than collective bargaining. According to data gathered in the mid-1960s, 54 per cent of the workers regarded the union as purely instrumental, as a means of increasing their wages *(27;* 169), and a mere 16 per cent considered its main purpose to link the worker with his comrades, with his class *(27;* 172). Meanwhile, collective bargaining takes place once every year or two and does not require broad democracy within the organization. Secondly, this tendency arises from the specifically worker, non-intellectual character of union leadership. On becoming a union leader, a worker acquires power, high standing and wages. However, with all this standing, power and wages directly linked with his job as a leader, loss of this

post would spell disaster—he would be forced to return to the shop floor. Evidently, one more reason may be pointed out. The worker who is alienated from cultural and social life relatively rarely participates in any kind of public organizations widespread in the U.S.A. Thus, according to a 1955 survey, out of the 5 classes into which sociologists categorized all Americans, 82 per cent of those from the upper class and 8 per cent from the lower took part in public organizations *(132;* 195). This means that the latter are not accustomed to discussing issues, to the electoral procedure, etc.

5) Finally, the relatively small percentage of workers who are members of labor unions (now 42.1 per cent of male workers) *(27;* 161) is also connected with the dominating values, for it reflects that same individualism and weakly developed class awareness which is manifest in the decentralized system of labor unions, in their undemocratic character and other features.

And so, we see that the ideology and organizational characteristics of the American labor movement are an aspect of the American bourgeois system of values. Let us now take a look at how these characteristics of the movement are linked with the workers' attitude towards religion.

2. The Attitude of the Working Class in the U.S.A. to Religion

It should first of all be noted that at the turn of this century the leaders of the Social Gospel movement made much noise about the fact that Churches (primarily Protestant ones) were losing members of the rapidly growing working class. This, generally, was not confirmed by the data of surveys of that time (two local surveys were the exception) *(48;* 62) but, evidently, it was a well known fact which did not require proof.

However, the clamor over the working class drifting away from Christianity gradually died down. We have no data from surveys taken in the 1920s and 1930s (nor, indeed, do we know if they were carried out), but the claims made at the turn of the century were then no longer heard. In the 1940s, the theme of "the worker and the Church" clearly ceased to be a matter of concern for leaders of the Protestant Churches and for sociologists. There was hardly any scientific literature studying workers' attitudes to religion. Liston Pope's extensive study, entitled *Millhands and Preachers (168)* published in 1942, is a conscientious piece of local research dealing with the attitude

of various religious groups to strikes. However, this was only the first and, to all intents and purposes, the last sign. Since then, only one work has appeared which has been specially dedicated to workers' attitude to religion, the article by Glenn Vernon entitled "Religion and the Blue Collarite" *(58;* 318-21). In the 1940s, however, the number of concrete sociological researches dedicated to the social factors of religiousness increased (although they are few just the same), and they yielded interesting data on the working-class attitudes towards religion.

Concrete sociological studies in the U.S.A. usually single out three aspects of institutionalized religious attitudes. We shall discuss the data pertaining to each of these aspects.

a) *The presence of a preferred denomination.* This specifically American concept implies the first, most superficial level of identification with a religious organization. There are, naturally, more people who have a preferred denomination than there are members of denominational organizations. In 1945-1946, the Public Opinion Research Center of Princeton University, on the request of the Federal Council of Churches, carried out a study of the social factors of religiousness. American sociologists have constantly referred to the data of this research ever since, for no more comprehensive research has yet been carried out on a national scale. Below are some figures obtained from this research (per cent) *(182;* 231).

	Protestant, undesignated	No preference	No answer or "don't know"
National sample	3.8	3.9	2.6
Skilled and semi-skilled workers	4.65	4.05	3
Unskilled workers	4.7	6.12	4.5

b) *Membership in denominational organizations.* Surveys carried out in 1939 and 1940 showed that 30 per cent of those in the lower income bracket were not Church members. The corresponding figure for the middle class was 24.5 per cent and for the upper class—21 per cent. The non-worshippers constituted 31 per cent of those who had not complete elementary education, 29 per cent of those who had completed elementary education, 22 per cent of high school graduates and 20 per cent of college graduates *(69;* 577 and others). Although the lower class and those without college education, naturally, do not coincide with the

working class, these figures when correlated with data of other research acquire a certain value as an indication that fewer of the working class were Church members.

Thus, research carried out by Lee Burchinal between 1954 and 1955 in urban and rural areas in Iowa, Ohio, Kansas and Wisconsin revealed the following data (per cent) *(63;* 53-64).

Church membership	Business, professional	Clerical, skilled and semi-skilled workers	Unskilled workers
Male	90	79	62
Female	94	87	64

Finally, a 1976 Gallup poll showed that 66 per cent of workers called themselves Church members *(173;* 33). This, again, is lower than the nationwide figure of 68 per cent.

It should be noted that in accordance with their various dogmatic and theological principles, different Churches have different definition of a Church member. For the majority of Protestant Churches these are adults who consciously join a Church organization, while for the Catholic and Orthodox Churches they are all those who have been christened. As the last criterion is immeasurably more formal, and as the percentage of Catholics among those without college education is rather high, the true Church members in this category are fewer than would seem on the basis of these statistics.

c) *Church attendance.* Research carried out by B. Lazerwitz provides the fullest and the most representative data on church attendance by members of different classes. The survey was conducted in 1957-1958 and revealed the following relationship between church attendance and denomination and type of employment (per cent) *(127:* 3041:

	Catholics		Protestants		Baptists		Methodists	
	Regular	Never	Regular	Never	Regular	Never	Regular	Never
Professions	81	1	47	7	66	3	47	7
Owners, managers, officials	83	4	41	7	45	7	45	5
Clerical and sales workers	81	3	43	5	51	3	40	4
Skilled workers	68	4	35	8	33	8	30	8
Semi-skilled workers	66	5	34	7	38	7	26	7
Unskilled workers	62	6	35	7	42	5	30	8
Farmers	67	4	44	6	43	2	40	3

We see that with the vast differences in church attendance depending on the denomination, workers always attend church less often than members of the intelligentsia, bourgeoisie and farmers.

Lazerwitz's figures coincide with those of Burchinal's local research mentioned above, which shows the following differences in the pattern of church attendance among different groups of society (per cent) *(63;* 58):

	Business, professional	Clerical skilled and semi-skilled workers	Unskilled workers
Men	51	40	22
Women	67	54	36

The data of Gerhard Lenski's research paint a similar picture. In Detroit in 1958, the following attended church at least once a week (per cent) (*130;* 44):

	White Catholics	White Protestants
Middle class	82	32
Workers	74	23

Lenski shows that the Americanization of the immigrant is a factor which consolidates institutionalized religious affiliation (this confirms the place of religion in the American bourgeois system of values). However, in examining this factor, we again see that the worker attends church less regularly, regardless of which generation of Americans he belongs to. Here is data on different generations of Americans, not Southerners (institutionalized religion is stronger with Southerners), who attend church regularly every week (per cent) *(130;* 43):

	First and second generation Americans	Third or later generation Americans
White Catholics:		
Middle class	77	88
Workers	71	82
White Protestants:		
Middle class	30	38
Workers	19	27

Finally, the data of the Gallup poll, carried out in 1976, paint a similar picture.

The following percentage of the population attended church or synagogue during the average week *(173;* 27):

	Total	Protestants	Catholics	Jews
National	42	40	55	23
Professional and business	44	43	60	23
Clerical and sales workers	43	42	57	28
Manual workers	37	36	48	7
Non-labor force	45	42	63	30

This same picture of low church attendance by workers is preserved when the categories of men and women, Protestants and Catholics *(173;* 28) and various Protestant denominations are examined separately *(173;* 31).

The interaction of denominational and class factors can be clearly seen in all these data. The average church attendance in a denomination depends on its doctrine and historical tradition. However, the dependence of church attendance in various denominations on the social stratum one belongs to is practically the same (if these data were represented in a diagram, the curves would be very similar). The same may be said of the interrelation of the class and the Americanization factors.

The above research data gathered at different times (sometimes, in different towns) embracing various indices of institutionalized religion (the presence or absence of a preferred denomination, Church membership, church attendance) and singling out various non-class factors point to the same thing. They speak of the stable tendencies for less institutionalized religion among the workers as compared to the other strata of the population. However, there is no doubt that these data do not correspond to the statements made by the Social Evangelists at the turn of this century about the U.S. working class drifting away from Christianity. The institutionalized religiousness of workers has, evidently, either risen somewhat since then or, in any case, has stopped falling.

The data of religious statistics are ambiguous and open to interpretation. The fact that workers attend church less than other strata of U.S. society can be explained in several ways: not enough time, dissatisfaction with the existing denominations or little interest in religion. We believe it is rather a case of the latter but this should be verified by other data.

d) *Denominational affinity.* In defining denominational affinity, we shall begin with the data which we have already used, those of the research carried out in 1945-

1946 *(182;* 231), reinforcing it with data of other research.

The main question we are faced with is whether membership in a particular denomination can be explained as interest in religion in general or in some kind of religious teaching in particular. We proceed from the fact that the adoption of a new religious doctrine is almost always proof of interest in its content, while preservation of the old, the traditional, is rather proof of the strength of tradition and other factors not connected directly with the content of the doctrine.

In 1945-1946, Catholics made up 25.9 per cent of skilled and semi-skilled workers and 20 per cent of unskilled workers. The percentage of Catholics in the working class is greater than in the population as a whole. According to data obtained in 1976, Catholics accounted for 30 per cent of workers (and 28 per cent of the population as a whole) *(173;* 36). However, Catholics are concentrated mainly in highly industrialized areas and major cities, major working class centers, where they account for a greater percentage than in the working class as a whole.

Can this fact, the large percentage of Catholics among workers, be explained by their preference for Catholicism, by Catholicism being consonant with the workers' psychology? In our opinion, the spread of Catholicism among the working class can be explained primarily not by the specific features of a Catholic doctrine but by factors that have nothing to do with them.

First of all, this is the immigrant nature of Catholicism. From the 1860s and up to the beginning of this century, the industrialization period of the United States, immigrants came chiefly from Catholic countries, via the north-eastern ports. A vast number of Italians, Irish, Poles and Czechs, etc., who became workers, settled in the north-east of the United States. They, naturally, strove to stick together and were concentrated in the major industrial centers. Therefore, Catholicism should not be regarded as a religion which workers embraced, which they chose. It is their traditional religion, and their affiliation cannot be explained by religious interest. We do not exclude the possibility that some features of Catholicism may make it more attractive to the worker than Protestantism. We shall speak of this in greater detail in the next paragraph. One thing, however, is clear—the overwhelming majority of Catholics did not choose Catholicism, but simply retained it.

Protestants, in 1945-1946, made up 59.8 per cent of the skilled and semi-skilled workers and 64.5 per cent of un-

skilled workers, i.e., the proportion of Protestants in the working class was less than in the population as a whole (65.2 per cent). In 1976, the percentage of Protestants in the population was equal to that in the working class, 60 per cent (173; 36). The proportion of Protestants among small town workers was greater than among workers in large cities.

However, individual Protestant denominations differ considerably from each other in their spread among the working class.

Baptism is the only Protestant denomination which has more weight in the working class than in the population as a whole. In 1946, Baptists accounted for 12.7 per cent of skilled and semi-skilled workers, 16 per cent of unskilled workers and 11.5 per cent of the population; in 1976, 26 per cent of workers and 21 per cent of the population *(173;* 38). In 1946, Methodism was the most widespread denomination among the working class (15 per cent and 16.2 per cent correspondingly). However, the proportion of Methodists in the working class was less than in the population as a whole (17.6 per cent). In 1976, the Baptists ranked first and the Methodists second. The Methodists accounted for 9 per cent of the working class and 11 per cent of the population *(173;* 36).

In 1946, the proportion of two denominations among the working class was approximately equal to that in the population as a whole (Lutherans—6.1 per cent and 6.2 per cent, and Reformers—1.8 per cent and 1.1 per cent) but considerably higher than among unskilled workers (4.5 per cent and 0.6 per cent respectively). In 1976, Lutherans accounted for 7 per cent of the population and 6 per cent of the working class.

In 1946 and 1976, the proportion of Presbyterians, Congregationalists and Episcopalians in the working class was considerably lower than in the population as a whole.

What do these data tell us? The Protestant denominations prevalent among the workers may conditionally be divided into farmer and late immigrant denominations.

Lutheran and Reformed denominations are related rather to the latter. As we have seen, they hold a strong position among skilled and semi-skilled workers. The reasons for their spread among these strata are basically the same as for the spread of Catholicism.

Of the old immigrant denominations two, Baptism and Methodism, are typically farmers', and were dominant in the western lands of the United States. It is precisely these denominations which are most widespread among the workers. Just as the spread of Catholicism and of new im-

migrant Protestant denominations is linked with one of the sources of the formation of the U.S. working class, immigration, so the spread of Baptism and Methodism is linked with another source, the ruin of farmers. Ex-farmers tended to move to towns near where they used to farm. Therefore, while Catholics are concentrated in the north-east of the United States, in cities, Protestants are concentrated in the mid-West and West, mainly in small towns.

The following table shows the distribution of Catholics, Protestants as a whole, Baptists and Methodists about the territory of the U.S.A.(according to 1976 data. See *173;* 57, 60):

	Population as a whole	Catholics	Protestants	Baptists	Methodists
Towns with a population of more than 1 million	19%	28%	13%	13%	9%
Towns with less than 2,500 inhabitants	27%	14%	35%	37%	38%
East	27%	39%	20%	15%	20%
Mid-West	27%	29%	28%	20%	32%
South	28%	18%	35%	54%	35%
West	18%	14%	17%	11%	13%

Distribution of all the denominations listed above does not require an analysis of the interrelationship of the content of the doctrine and the psychology of the workers if it is to be explained. It is entirely explained by tradition which owes its tenacity and strength to the specific value attached both to religion and to membership in some denomination in the American bourgeois system of values. These data do not show a genuine interest in religion.

The principle of explanation must be completely different when it comes to the sect. The sect cannot attract people otherwise than by its own doctrine. It is difficult to be a sect member without genuine faith, simply by tradition or by a desire for respectability.

Is the sect widespread among the working class?

According to a research carried out in 1945-1946, members of small Protestant organizations accounted for 7.3 per cent of skilled and semi-skilled workers and 10.5 per cent of unskilled workers, while accounting for 7.2 per cent of the population as a whole. This category includes, among others, respectable bourgeois denominations—Quakers and Unitarians, which have very few workers among their members. However, in the main these are numerous organiza-

tions, sects which arose relatively recently: the Assemblies of God, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Salvation Army, etc. N. Demerath in his study *(75)* drew up an index of "sectarian orientation" in religion (not necessarily coinciding with sect membership, but apt to manifest itself in the sectarian attitude to religion within the framework of an organization of another type, too) and showed the considerable correlation between this orientation and status.

The sects are spread mainly among unskilled workers and are a considerable force (one in every ten workers is a sect member). There are fewer sect members among skilled and semi-skilled workers.

An examination of the statistics allows us to draw the following conclusions.

1) The institutionalized religiousness of workers is, by all indications, less than that of other social strata and classes.

2) The reasons for the spread of certain denominations are rather tradition and the origins of the working class, not an interest in the content of the doctrine of the given religious denomination (with the exception of the sects involving unskilled workers). This indicates the lack of interest in the content of religious teachings, at any rate, on the part of skilled and semi-skilled workers, and that religious symbolics is present here in a transmuted form. Negative data may also be informative. There is no information on mass revivals amongst workers similar to that of farmers in the West in last century. It is universally recognized that the religious boom of the 1950s concerned primarily the new middle strata. Oriental and exotic cults, again, spread among the new middle strata.

Let us try to verify the hypothetical conclusions with data of surveys carried out among workers and providing a better insight into the psychology of the worker, into his attitude towards religion.

e) *Data obtained from surveys.* First of all, it should be noted that neither atheism nor anti-clericalism lie behind the low level of institutionalized religiousness.

According to a 1945-1946 research, there was only a tiny handful of atheists and agnostics in the U.S.A.—0.1 per cent, concentrated mainly among the intelligentsia, while they accounted for 0.04 per cent of skilled and semi-skilled workers and 0.0 per cent of unskilled workers *(182;* 231).

Neither do we come across anti-religious or anti-clerical attitudes here, even of no atheistic nature.

Here is data obtained from one survey (per cent) *(58;* 48).

	Catholics *		Protestants *	
	I	II	I	II
Sales and clerical workers	86	73	59	68
Skilled workers	81	84	50	63
Semi-skilled workers	73	72	49	62

* I—those attending church at least once a month, II—those who consider religion to be "very important".

According to a 1976 survey, 56 per cent of workers said that religious belief was very important for them (the figure for professionals and businessmen was 54 per cent, and sales and clerical workers—57 per cent, while 3 per cent (6 per cent and 4 per cent respectively) said it was of no importance for them *(173;* 17).

36 per cent of workers and only 29 per cent of professionals and businessmen had great faith in religious organizations *(173;* 13). Workers less than the middle class are inclined to believe that the principles of U.S. democracy permit freedom of anti-religious propaganda. Here are the figures for those who agreed with this view (per cent) *(130;* 143).

	White Protestants	White Catholics
Middle class	65	52
Workers	40	40

Finally, workers are more inclined to religious orthodoxy. G. Lenski singles out two types of religious orientation—devotionalism and orthodoxy. The former presupposes attaching less significance to dogma and rites and to institutionalized religion in general, and more to the individual experience, while the latter—the strict observance of rites and belief in the main Christian dogma, in prayers being answered by God, in Hell and Paradise, etc. This is how these types are distributed among workers and the middle class (per cent) (130; 362).

	Middle Class	Working Class
White Catholics:		
Orthodoxy	62	61
Devotionalism	54	44
White Protestants:		
Orthodoxy	28	33
Devotionalism	33	26

The data of the 1976 survey *(173;* 44) correspond to those of Lenski's survey:

	The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word	The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word	The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history and moral precepts recorded by men
Professionals and businessmen	26%	53%	18%
Clerical and sales	28%	58%	14%
Manual workers	43%	42%	10%

Workers are no less orthodox than the intelligentsia or bourgeoisie. On the face of it, these data contradict those of institutionalized religiousness. This, however, is only on the face of it. They rather testify to the formal assimilation of the idea of the importance of religion, than genuine religious sentiments, to the fact that the majority of American workers are under the influence of American bourgeois ideology.

In our opinion, the recognition of religion as being very important indicates rather the absence of an anti-clerical ideological tradition and, indirectly, the effectiveness of the American system of ideological control instilling certain ideological stereotypes among the workers, rather than the real significance of religion. The very question: "Do you recognize the importance of religion?" is asked in such a way which will evoke the stereotype reply: "Of course, how could it be otherwise?"

In our opinion, orthodoxy here is the transfer of the formal assimilation of the value of religion into the sphere of specifically religious ideas. Religion is "very important", it is the foundation of society and, as such, must not be criticized. Hence the mechanical, formal recognition of dogma. The symbols of Christian dogma act here as symbols of the secular bourgeois system of values.

Other surveys, where questions were differently formulated, not evoking an ideological stereotype answer, reveal the relatively unimportant place religion occupies in the life of the worker, the fact that he has little interest in it.

For instance, when workers, fathers of families, were given a number of statements on various aspects of the father's role in the family and asked to place them in order of importance, the statement "I practice the family religion and philosophy" came in 11th, while the statement

"I earn the living and support the family" was put in first place *(58;* 108).

When workers were presented with a list of things they might do if they had a shorter working day, only 1.6 per cent of them chose going to church, and this was in 17th place in order of preference.

Finally, the data on "mystical experience" was very indicative. We are not concerned here with the psychological nature of feeling "of union with a Divine Being". It is sufficient for us that these are strong feelings, connected with religious symbolics. According to 1976 data, 10 per cent of Americans have felt themselves being in "union with a Divine Being" in their life, including 15 per cent of professionals and businessmen, 16 per cent or clerical and sales workers and 10 per cent of manual workers *(173;* 54).

Thus, the American worker, primarily the skilled and semi-skilled, while formally assimilating the value of religion to a very great extent, does not display a great interest in religion, in the content of religious doctrine. A larger percentage of unskilled workers than that of skilled and semi-skilled workers do not attend church at all, and there is a significant percentage of sectarians among them, which, all combined, constitutes a somewhat different type of attitude to religion than that of the nucleus of the industrial proletariat (more about it later on). The American skilled and semi-skilled worker differs in his religious attitudes from the mass of poor farmers and the urban poor (including a large number of unskilled workers), the strata which swarm with sects, and also from the intelligentsia undoubtedly interested in contemporary theology and in various exotic forms of religion. How can this be explained?

In our opinion, three basic features of the status of the worker explain his lack of interest in religion.

In the first place, the worker's high school and technical education. The worker (this, obviously, applies to the unskilled worker to a lesser degree) has outgrown that level of consciousness where utilitarian and magical elements, so important in the sect and, partly, Church ideology, may be considered really significant. The worker is above that level of consciousness where man can believe that magic manipulations may bring success in life or cure an illness. Likewise, it is difficult for him to believe in the reality of the sects' imaginary world, with its miracles, revelations, etc. At the same time, his average level of education does not presuppose the study of philosophy, theology, nor concentration on the existential problems or his world

outlook, which might strengthen his interest in religion, not in its utilitarian and magical aspects, but in its existential ideology. It should be added that although religious education in the U.S.A. is included in high school programs and many workers graduate from Catholic parish schools, the very essence of high school and technical education is utilitarian. This education is indispensable to modern industry. The teaching of religion in these conditions may really only suggest the value of religion and formal affiliation. On the one hand, the main themes of teaching do not permit the introduction of magical elements, while, on the other, it is extremely far-removed from existential problems.

Secondly, the nature of work. High school and technical education opens up an opportunity for a worker to find a job in industry where he deals with various machinery. The whole sphere of problems which he encounters in his work demands rationality and skill. This differs him from the farmer who is constantly subject to the forces of nature, which are outside his control. And it also differs him from the intellectual who deals with the unknown in science, art and philosophy. There is nothing unknown, no secrets to break for the industrial worker in his job. The only irrational aspect beyond his control is unemployment, not a production but, rather, a social problem, which, however, in the present day threatens more the unskilled than skilled and semi-skilled workers.

Thirdly, the situation where the worker receives an average wage and is denied the possibility of upward social mobility.

The skilled and semi-skilled workers in the U.S.A. today receive average wages which allow them to make ends meet. It is completely pointless, however, to compare the living standards of the worker in the U.S.A. with those of the worker in Turkey. Every society has its own consumer standards, its own demands and idea of what constitutes a decent life. Being unable to buy a house in one society is psychologically the same as being unable to buy a suit in another. The situation of making ends meet, of being able to guarantee one's family a decent existence through great efforts, rules out both the despair of the poor, for whom religion is "opium", and introversion and absorption in existential problems which may be the case with the person for whom economic problems have become of secondary importance. When a person is wrestling with his family's financial problems, this naturally presupposes that he is more concerned with the practical, the material, the down-to-earth. Problems of, say, communi-

cability, or the meaning of life are, naturally, of secondary importance to him, or may not even arise.

However, it is not only a matter of the level of income. A worker's job and education in themselves limit his opportunities for social mobility. The worker fundamentally differs in this from any intellectual, even if the latter earns the same or even less than the worker. This limitation of mobility increases the role of prestigious consumption for self-respect and status, which, again, consolidates the worker's concern for the practical, the down-to-earth.

Thus, we see that the specific features of the worker's social status do not presuppose an interest in religion. These features, however, are consolidated in certain values of the worker's environment, in a certain sub-culture. The works of American sociologists have recently in many ways revealed the specific features of the workers' culture, which differs from that of the intelligentsia, to which the sociologists themselves belong, not only in its level, but also in its content. When reading their works one gets the feeling that the authors are amazed at discovering a new world for themselves.

The working class finds it is inacceptable to show interest in impractical ideas, ones which yield no concrete results, and anyone who does show an interest in such things is not understood, becomes an object of derision. Interest in the humanities is not spread, while interest in technology is looked upon very favorably. The ability to do manual work is regarded very highly, as are physical strength and courage. Sport is also tremendously important among the working class, incommensurably so in comparison with the place it holds among the intelligentsia. Life is geared to youth, the years of physical fitness, which are considered to be the best time of one's life and are nostalgically recalled later. Incidentally, workers are least interested in religion in their young years. Typical of a working-class family is the clear division of the role of men and women. They do not have that dominant psychologism and moral uncertainty characteristic of families of the intelligentsia and presupposing an interest in existential problems, the speciality of contemporary theology *(193;* 35-44; *58;* 24-36).

In a word, the values spontaneously arising in the working class and consolidated in the specific features of the working-class culture, contradict a religious world outlook.

When we tried to explain workers' lack of interest in religion in comparison with other strata and classes of U.S. society, we never had recourse to "American factors" in

our explanation. Indeed, the data of religious statistics of other countries do show that it is not American, but universal class factors which are operating here. Everywhere, in all countries, the figures characterizing the institutionalized religion of the workers are lower than the corresponding figures relating to other classes and strata of society.

Thus, the Italian sociologist Silvano Burgalassi writes: "...it can be affirmed that ... farm laborers and industrial workers ... are the social categories which are the least predisposed to ... religious practice" *(64;* 55). British sociologists have come to the conclusion that the non-religiousness of the working class has its roots deep in the early 19th century *(142;* 47, 104). The French researcher Francois Isambert came to the same conclusions; together with an historical and sociological analysis of the religiousness, or rather non-religiousness, of the French workers, he gathered data on the workers' attitude towards religion in various European countries which showed, for all the various fluctuations, that the level of the workers' religious attitudes in various countries was everywhere lower than that of other social strata *(113;* 46-52).

However, when comparing the religious statistics of any European country with those of the United States something else immediately becomes obvious—the great extent to which the religion of the American worker is institutionalized. Data on the attendance of Sunday mass by blue-collar and white-collar workers of various French cities sufficiently clearly show both the trend towards the lesser degree of religiousness of workers in comparison with the middle class, which coincides with the American trend, and the significantly greater religiousness of American workers in comparison with French workers *(113;* 45). However, we consider the comparison of American and Spanish data to be the most interesting. Below is a table of figures on Sunday mass attendance in religious and non-religious districts of a modern industrial Spanish town (per cent) *(82;* 65).

	Religious District	Non-Religious District
Services sphere (Public Administration workers)	100	
Landlords	80	
Capitalists	90	
Professionals	90.2	80.8
Skilled workers	51.6	14
Unskilled workers	29.2	5

In the non-religious districts we see a huge gap between professionals and workers. The figures for church attendance in the suburbs of Barcelona are even lower (2.5 per cent) *(82;* 52), i.e., in that social stratum where in the U.S.A. there is a slight drop in institutionalized religion, there is a huge drop in Spain. These figures show not only a lack of interest in religion, but also the anti-clerical nature of the culture of the Spanish working class. Indeed, the data of surveys show that 89.6 per cent of workers call themselves anti-clericals, 41.3 per cent anti-religious, and 54.7 per cent of workers say that they are not interested in religious matters (this, incidentally, does not prevent 86.1 per cent of workers from having their children baptized) *(82;* 71). It is enough to compare these figures with the 0.04 per cent of American workers who call themselves atheists or agnostics to see the vast gulf that separates the American and the Spanish worker.

By comparing these data we get a picture which is partly similar to that of the frequency of church attendance in the U.S.A. which depends, on the one hand, on which class and, on the other, which denomination one belongs to. Thus, having analyzed these data, we see the interaction of two factors—denominational and social. Now, in comparing church attendance in France, Spain and the U.S.A., we see the interaction of the general class factor, which everywhere leads to a fall in workers' institutionalized religion, and the factor of national culture.

The general class factor comprises those special features of the workers' psychology and culture which arise from his status in the present-day capitalist social system. These specific features are everywhere such that religion does not meet the workers' psychological needs, that workers drift away from religion. This drift may be final, as in Spain and France, where a certain anti-clerical subculture of the working class has taken shape, or mute and indefinite, as in the U.S.A., where the overwhelming majority of workers recognize the importance of religion. We must turn to the specific historical and cultural feature of the various countries if we are to explain these differences, to the different variants of secularization. We have already spoken of the American version of secularization, of the place that religion occupies in U.S. life. The type of secularization in France and Spain is the direct opposite of that in the United States. While in the U.S.A. religious pluralism has existed from the very beginning of the country's history and a state Church was, and still is, practically non-existent, France and Spain had a united state Church from very early on in their history. While

in the U.S.A. the bourgeois revolution did not assume an anti-clerical character, in France and Spain it did, which resulted in a definite tradition of secular ideological systems. The working class movement arose in France and Spain in the heart of the bourgeois-democratic anti-feudal movement and was anti-clerical right from the very beginning. In France late in the last century, the Church, already in opposition and already separated from the state, attempted to defend the interests of the workers and revive its influence on the working class. However, it was a belated attempt. In Spain, the alliance between Francoism and the Church obviously drove workers even further from the latter.

The sum total of cultural and historical factors in Spain and France (and the situations in all countries with a tradition of dogmatic state Churches are, evidently, similar) was conducive to strengthening the seeds of anti-religiousness in the psychology and culture of any worker, which grew into anti-clericalism and atheism, while the American variant of secularization killed off these seeds, did not allow the specific features of the workers' culture to grow into an anti-clerical type of culture. Hence, the vast difference in statistics that we noted above.

3. The Link Between the Specific Features of the American Working-Class Attitude to Religion and the Characteristic Features of the Labor Movement

In our opinion, it is clear from all said above that the relatively high level of institutionalized religion of workers in the U.S.A., their firm belief in the value and importance of religion and the specifically non-ideological, opportunist nature of the organized labor movement are phenomena which are functionally interrelated. It is also clear that these phenomena are not isolated from the general characteristics of American bourgeois society, but are connected with them, reflecting them in the working class attitudes and movement. The strength of institutionalized religion among U.S. labor is connected with the great significance of religion in U.S. society as a whole and, consequently, with the specific features of U.S. religion, U.S. history and the American bourgeois system of values. The characteristics of the labor movement would have been different had religious life been different. Everything is interconnected. The corruption in labor unions is

ultimately connected with revivalism, and the absence of a mass-based worker party is connected with Puritan traditions. One more important feature should be noted. The characteristics of the American labor movement, described in the first section of this chapter, are functionally linked with other elements of American bourgeois society. At the same time, they emerged in the course of history, just as the domination of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. did. The American worker's attitude to religion is also historically and functionally connected with all the characteristics of American society. Late last century and early this century, the situation was very confused. No single organization had as yet established its domination in the labor movement and, evidently, the workers were leaving religion in their droves. The A.F.L.-C.I.O. gradually assuming domination and the workers' assimilation of the value of religion are thus parallel, interrelated processes, the same factors at work in both of them.

In the preceding chapter we spoke of the four ways of safely channelling social conflicts, which, at the same time, were conducive to consolidating the value of religion in U.S. society. We spoke of the role of sects, Churches, the political activity of the clergy and of the role of intolerance towards atheism. In this section we shall try to show the influence of these factors on the working class and the labor movement in the United States.

Sects. We spoke of the role of the sect in social conflicts in the U.S.A. in general. Let us now take a look at it with respect to the working class and the labor movement.

The above data are an indication of considerable differences in the attitudes towards religion between the nucleus of the working class, skilled and semi-skilled workers, on the one hand, and unskilled workers, on the other. These differences are as follows:

a) The percentage of those who have no preferred religion or religious denomination is greater among unskilled workers than among skilled and semi-skilled workers (according to a 1945-1946 research—15.32 per cent) and there are considerably fewer Church members among the former.

b) There are considerably more sect members among unskilled workers than among skilled and semi-skilled workers.

There is a great deal of data on the sects among the urban poor. Thus, the work of B. Goldschmidt shows the social composition of individual Protestant congregations in a small Californian town *(99;* 350). Here are results of this research (per cent):

	Congre-gational-ists	Method-ists	Bapt-ists	7th Day Advent-ists	Church of Na-zarene	Assem-bly of God	Church of God	Pente-costals
Workers—belonging to congrega-tions	19	43	42	43	63	60	77	99
Unskilled workers	1	2	19	21	22	22	39	81

Here, denominational organizations are distributed according to how close they are to the ideal type of denomination and sect. We see that the percentage of workers, especially unskilled workers, is the greater the closer the congregation to the ideal type. The community of Pentecostals is practically homogeneous in composition: 81 per cent of its members are unskilled workers.

Louis Butlena's study of 24 congregations in the town of Madison revealed that one of the congregations, the Assembly of God, was 100 per cent working-class. The Unitarians, Christian Scientists and Episcopalians had the lowest percentage of workers *(65).* Cowgill, in the course of ecological research in Kansas, discovered that Christian Scientists, Unitarians, Lutherans, and Methodists were concentrated in the rich districts of the town; Christian Scientists, Evangelists, Reformers, Quakers and Mormons—in middle-class districts; and members of the Church of Nazarene, Adventists, Baptists, members of the Assembly of God, the Church of Christ, the Church of God, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Salvation Army, the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, and Pentecostals were concentrated in poor white districts *(205;* 395). Research carried out in 1966 among the white population of Detroit showed the following hierarchy of denominations, according to the average social status: Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Orthodoxists, Judaists, Catholics, Methodists, Lutherans, Baptists, various fundamentalist sects, and the Church of Christ (also fundamentalist) *(126;* 187). Research into the class composition of individual sects also reveals that their members come mainly from among the poor. Thus, Howard Elinson, a student of the ideology of one Pentecostal trend, that of the revivalist Allen, noted that his followers included many workers in small Southern towns and workers from the South who migrated to major cities in the North *(84;* 405).

The spread of the sects and the considerable percentage of non-church people are interrelated phenomena. Sects

are religious organizations alienated from society and hostile to it. It is only natural that the stratum which has few church-goers yields the greatest percentage of sectarians (inasmuch as Churches are respectable, inasmuch as they are the symbol and fulcrum of society).

The attitude of unskilled workers to religion shows that their socio-psychological make-up is different from that of skilled and semi-skilled workers. What we have already said of the psychological features of workers' attitude to religion applies primarily to skilled and semi-skilled workers. It does not apply to the stratum of unskilled workers or that socio-psychological type. Their level of education is considerably lower. The crudely mythologized and magical features of sectarian ideology are completely accepted here, are not regarded as old wives' tales. There is considerably greater poverty here and magical means of salvation from this and miraculous recoveries, which are commonly found in sects, are very much at home here. The main thing, however, is the terrible psychological inferiority complex, the terrible alienation from society, the terrible hatred and envy a person from this stratum harbors towards society. The very essence of sectarian ideology is the reflection of this psychological complex in mythological form.

We have already spoken of the evolution of the sects and of their role in channelling social protest in a way which is safe for bourgeois society.

The working-class poor are perhaps not very capable of discipline and persistent struggle, but they are a very inflammable and seditious stratum of society. It is there that hatred accumulates. A considerable percentage of its members join sects which forbid union membership, voting and generally any kind of activities which may influence society. It is worth noting that the growth of the sect reached its peak in the years of the Great Depression. Thus, sects not only absorb the most seditious stratum of the working class, they also most actively absorb people in the most seditious situation. Sects provide an outlet for the hatred habored by the poor, give them self-respect and in the process of their evolution return them to bourgeois society already imbued with bourgeois values and with seditious potential spent.

The role of immigrant Churches. We have already spoken of the high percentage of Catholics among workers in the U.S.A. due to the role played by European immigration in the formation of the U.S. working class. Therefore, the role

of Catholicism and the process of its Americanization are colossal for the working class and the labor movement in the U.S.A. We shall now take a closer look at this role.

Catholicism's link with the feudal past, its dogmatism, conservatism and hierarchical character gave rise to anti-clerical ideological systems and to the working class drifting away from Christianity in all Catholic countries of Europe. However, Catholicism in the United States is different. It is not linked with the feudal past and the traditional social elite; it is a Catholicism of the immigrant minority in a country which, on the whole, is Protestant. This type of Catholicism does not provoke an anti-clerical reaction. Moreover, several features of its ideology may possibly attract workers, make it more attractive to them than Protestantism. First of all, the cult of personal success is not typical of the Catholicism. Therefore, the Catholic worker is, to a certain extent, not burdened by an inferiority complex, nor does he feel the psychological need to change his social status at any cost whatsoever. The data of social research testify to this type of psychological influence of Catholicism.

The Catholic worker, less than the Protestant, strives to send his children to college. In 1958, a mere 9 per cent of the children of Catholic workers went to college as against 16 per cent of the children of white Protestant workers *(130;* 100).

Catholics believe less in the equality of opportunity. Among the working class, 62 per cent of white Protestants and only 51 per cent of Catholics believe that children of a working-class family have good chances of making a career; 82 per cent of white Protestants and 70 per cent of Catholics believe that ability is more important than family connections for success in life in the U.S.A. *(130;* 94).

The Catholic is less discontented with his job if he is a manual worker, particularly unskilled, and more if he comes from the higher trades *(130;* 87). The Catholic worker does less to improve his social standing: for instance, he runs up more debt *(130;* 97), puts by less money for long-term plans *(130;* 100), is less inclined to regard such pastimes as moderate drinking and gambling as evils. 55 per cent of Protestant workers consider gambling to be an evil, 25 per cent—moderate drinking, while respectively 39 per cent and 12 per cent of Catholic workers consider these to be so *(130;* 150).

Thus, like sects, Catholicism relieves the colossal psychological tension which the poor in the United States are subject to.

There is yet another feature of Catholicism which might attract the worker. Since the majority of Catholics are workers and since Catholicism has no traditional elite from which to draw the members of the top Catholic hierarchy, the way this is done in European countries, a vast percentage of the Catholic clergy comes from the working class. Archbishop Richard Cushing once declared: "Every one of our Bishops and Archbishops is the son of a working man and a working man's wife" *(108;* 139). Data of sociological surveys show that if he did exaggerate, it was only slightly so. Here are data from G. Lenski's survey in Detroit (per cent) *(130;* 259-60).

	Catholic Priests	Protestant Pastors
Middle-class family	27	66
Working-class family	53	22
Farmer family	20	13

This is one reason why there is no psychological alienation between Catholic workers and the Catholic upper crust, the kind that is present in relations between Protestant workers and the Protestant upper crust, mainly of intellectual and bourgeois origins.

These specific features of American Catholicism determined the considerable role it has played in the American labor movement. In the first place, since Catholicism does not encourage the desire for personal success, the Catholic worker, to a certain extent, is more class-conscious than his Protestant counterpart. He is not ashamed of being a worker, does not consider the fact that he belongs to the working class as a mishap, as something to be avoided at all costs. He, therefore, easier identifies himself with a labor union.

Thus, according to G. Lenski's research, 26 per cent of white Catholics and only 17 per cent of white Protestants attend all or nearly all trade union meetings; 52 per cent of Catholics and 42 per cent of Protestants say that they are very interested in the union; 88 per cent of Catholics and 63 per cent of Protestants agree with the political line of their union *(130;* 89); 89 per cent of Catholic and 70 per cent of Protestant workers consider that their views coincide with those of the majority of union membership *(130;* 90).

The Catholic hierarchy's relative proximity to workers, together with the fact that its flock IS overwhelmingly composed of workers, encouraged it to take an active part in labor problems. Two features should be noted here.

Firstly, American Catholicism showed an interest in the labor movement earlier than American Protestantism did. The Catholic hierarchy established its ties with the Knights of Labor way back in the 1870s (at this time, the Protestants still had an utterly moralistic and individualistic approach to social problems). Cardinal Ray Gibbons managed to persuade the Vatican, prepared to pass a decree forbidding Catholic workers from participating in union activities, not to adopt this decision. Almost two-thirds of the Knights of Labor membership were Catholics (*71;* 855), and the condemnation of this organization might have led to Catholicism losing part of its flock. However, broadmindedness and courage was demanded of Gibbons to fight against the condemnation, for the Knights were a semisecret organization, whose knighting ritual was taken from the Masons, which the Vatican detested. The hierarchy of the Canadian Catholic Church censured the Knights immediately.

The hierarchy subsequently established close relations with the unions and set up a number of organizations designed to help them. The Militia of Christ for Social Service, the Catholic group in the A.F.L., particularly stands out. It was founded in 1910 by Father Peter Dietz* who with the hierarchy's permission permanently served in the A.F.L. (71; 858).

The pro-labor position of the Catholic hierarchy is still preserved today. In 1975, 26 Catholic bishops called for action to help the poor of the Appalachian Mountains, where the economic situation was particularly bad. Their appeal called for "a strong and broad labor movement" with the aim of stabilizing the workforce and "to prevent groups from playing off different sectors of working people against each other" *(The Washington Post,* Feb. 7, 1975, p. P-14). It is interesting to note that this activity of the U.S. Catholic hierarchy in labor matters sharply contrasts with its passive stance on the black question, the issues of war and foreign policy.

Secondly, unlike European Churches, the American Catholic Church does not set up its own Catholic labor unions. This is at odds not only with European practice, but also with Catholicism's activities in other spheres, where, as we said earlier, Catholicism is out to create all possible types of organizations embracing the most various spheres of life and fencing the Catholics off from the Protestant world as much as possible. The fact that the hierarchy did not create Catholic labor unions can be explained by several reasons. In the first place, Catholics do not make up the overwhelming majority of the working class

and unions which do not embrace the majority of workers within the industry or enterprise have little chance of success. Secondly, Catholic labor unions in a Protestant country would lead to a fusion of anti-Catholic and anti-union sentiments, which might have dire consequences both for Catholicism and the unions. Thirdly, in Europe, Catholic trade unions were indispensable to the Church in order to keep a section of the workers from drifting away from Christianity and to prevent secular and anti-religious forms of ideologies from spreading. In the U.S.A., these ideologies presented an infinitely smaller danger. Therefore, Catholicism in the United States has functioned along lines which most corresponded to the demands of American bourgeois society—along non-ideological lines which do not break with the abstract religious symbolics of the labor movement.

The role of the political activities of the Protestant clergy. The Protestant clergy's activities with respect to the working class and the labor movement are connected with the so-called Social Gospel movement whose history is dealt with in A.A. Kislova's book *(34).* We shall not reiterate what has already been said there. We merely want to point out two aspects of this movement.

Firstly, the clergy's specific sensitiveness to the labor movement. Just as abolitionism began in seminaries when public opinion was by no means disposed to it, the Social Evangelists supported labor unions and the idea of collective bargaining when public opinion regarded these as the complete rejection of all principles. The Protestant clergy strove to help workers when the labor movement in the U.S.A. was in its early stages, before it had acquired a clear organizational and ideological form. Pointing to the victory of "godless" socialism in Germany, Walter Rauschenbusch wrote: "In our country we are still at the parting of the ways. Our social movement is still in its earliest stages... The divorce between the new class movement and the old religion can still be averted" *(170;* 322).

Secondly, we want to stress the depth and radical tone of the Social Evangelists' criticism of capitalism. Rauschenbusch's statement may give an idea of this: "It is hardly likely that any social revolution, by which hereafter capitalism may be overthrown, will cause more injustice, more physical suffering and more heartache than the industrial revolution by which capitalism rose to power" *(170;* 218).

The following facts are also indicative. In the early 20th century Rauschenbusch wrote: "No other learned profes-

sion seems to be so open to socialist ideas as the ministry" *(170;* 124). A survey was carried out among the ministry in 1934 on which was better—capitalism or a cooperative commonwealth. A mere 5 per cent of those asked said capitalism was the best; 28 per cent said socialism was the best path to the ideal society, including 34 per cent of Methodists, 33 per cent of Congregationalists and Evangelists, 32 per cent of Reformers, 30 per cent of the Disciples of Christ, 24 per cent of Episcopalians, 22 per cent of Baptists, 19 per cent of Presbyterians, and 12 per cent of Lutherans. A 1932 survey revealed that 75.1 per cent of pastors voted for the socialist Norman Thomas and 1.6 per cent even for the communist William Z. Foster *(145;* 174-75).

In the post-Second World War period, the liberal sentiments and political activity of the Protestant clergy in general sharply abated. They gathered again momentum in the 1960s, when the Protestant clergy was concerned most with the black question and the war in Vietnam. The social criticism and activity of the clergy is generally directed against society's weak, sore spots, and the labor movement in the 1960s did not assume such an acute form as the black movement and the split in the country over Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the movement of the poorest, unorganized strata of the proletariat who were deprived of rights was actively supported by the ministry in the 1960s. Thus, the Church actively supported the strike of Mexican grape-pickers in California which was aimed at winning recognition for their union and the right of collective bargaining. A number of pastors were imprisoned for breach of the peace and for calling for struggle against strike-breakers *(Time,* Dec. 10, 1965, p. 57). A survey carried out among the Protestant clergy of California in 1968 showed that the pastors of the main Churches very actively supported the strike. 7 per cent of the Methodist clergy went to the strike area, as did 13 per cent of the clergy of the United Church of Christ, 10 per cent of the Episcopalian clergy, 4 per cent of Presbyterian and 5 per cent of the clergy of the Lutheran Church in America. Correspondingly, 28 per cent, 28 per cent, 21 per cent, 18 per cent and 26 per cent signed petitions supporting the strikers *(169;* 117). In all, 47 per cent of the clergy came out in favor of its own participation in the organization of the union (17 per cent were against), including 66 per cent of Methodists, 63 per cent of the United Church of Christ, and 62 per cent of the Lutheran Church in America *(169;* 107). The National Council of Churches sent members of the clergy to work among the poor of the Mississippi delta; they helped

organize a strike and set up a labor union of black agricultural workers on cotton plantations. Several of these pastors even delivered sermons of the following type: "The man in the big white house taking food out of your wife's and your children's mouths and the clothes off your back" *(Time,* July 2, 1966, p. 53). And all this, of course, in addition to the charity and educational work by the clergy in poor districts.

The clergy has never really been able to impress its ideas on the labor movement, to really penetrate it. Evidently, the clergy's social ideas, the theological systems of Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr, are too complex and the pastors' psychological alienation from the workers too great for them to have any influence on the labor movement. This movement is not what liberal pastors would like it to be. They would like it to be more idealistic, less self-interested. However, as a result of their activities, the workers did not treat the ministry as enemies (even if they regarded them as alien), did not drift away from Christianity, and did not begin to seek a secular world outlook. Objectively, the idealism of the ministry (which inspired their social activities) helped form an extremely non-idealistic labor movement.

The role of intolerance towards atheism. In the previous chapter we spoke of the functional significance of intolerance towards atheism as being one of the main and most stable elements of the general American intolerance towards people of a different mind. This easily turns into hysteria and maniacal persecution of the ideology which presents the greatest danger at the given moment. We shall now take a look at how far this hysteria can go. We have already mentioned S. Stouffer's research which painted the picture of the American consciousness in the McCarthy era. Asked: "Suppose an admitted Communist wants to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?"—60 per cent answered "no", 27 per cent—"yes"; asked: Suppose he wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing, or not?"—68 per cent said "yes", 27 per cent "no"; "Suppose he is a high school teacher. Should he be fired, or not?"—91 per cent said "yes" and 5 per cent "no"; "Suppose he is a clerk in a store. Should he be fired, or not?"—68 per cent said "yes", 26 per cent "no"; "Should an admitted Communist have his American citizenship taken away from him?"—77 per cent said "yes", 13 per cent "no"; "Suppose you discovered that one of your friends today had been a Communist ten years ago,

although you are sure he is not now. Would you break your friendship with him, or not?—14 per cent answered "yes", 78 per cent "no"; "On the whole, do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea for people to report to the F.B.I, any neighbors or acquaintances whom they suspect of being Communists?"—73 per cent said "good", 19 per cent "bad"; "Which of the two statements ... is more important: To find out all Communists even if some innocent people should be hurt. To protect the rights of innocent people even if some Communists are not found out"— 58 per cent answered that the former was more important, while 32 per cent considered the latter to be more important *(186;* 32-46). This was the nightmare that existed in 1953, the McCarthy era. Meanwhile, Stouffer's data show that, despite the McCarthy hysteria, the average American had a relatively realistic grasp of the situation and did not consider himself to be on the brink of disaster. Only 19 per cent considered that there was a very great danger emanating from the CP U.S.A. and only 17 per cent said that a war between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. was very likely in two years' time *(186;* 76-77).

Intolerance towards atheism is one of the permanent, stable aspects of intolerance, whereas intolerance towards Communists is an external, and, when on such a scale, a temporary phenomenon. However, intolerance towards atheism is one of the major aspects of intolerance towards communism. Thus, in answer to the question: "What do Communists believe in?", the first thing that comes into people's minds is that they are "against religion". The percentage of those who say this (24 per cent) is even higher than the percentage of those who say that Communists are in favor of nationalized property (18 per cent) *(186;* 166). Other data also indicate that atheism is one of the main components of the image people have of Communists. Thus, in reply to the question "What racial or religious groups are Communists most likely to belong to?" 25 per cent answered—foreigners, 5 per cent—Jews, 9 per cent—blacks (white Southerners said 15 per cent, while the blacks themselves—4 per cent), 12 per cent said—non-believers, 10 per cent said that they knew suspicious people who might be Communists. The following answers were given to the question "Why do you think a person is a Communist?": "He would not attend church and talked against God", "He didn't believe in the Bible and talked about war", "Just his slant on community life and church work. He was not like us", "He didn't believe in Christ, heaven, or hell" *(186;* 174, 177).

It is very important to note that this intolerance among

workers is not less, but rather greater than among other groups of the population *(186;* 90). Thus, according to Lenski's data, 46 per cent of white Protestants, 34 per cent of white Catholics, and 23 per cent of black Protestants from among the middle class believed that democracy gives Communists freedom of speech while the corresponding figures for the same categories in the working class are—33 per cent, 32 per cent, and 27 per cent. In the middle class, 53 per cent, 43 per cent and 23 per cent respectively believe that democracy gave fascists freedom of speech, while the corresponding figures for the working class were 35 per cent, 32 per cent and 30 per cent *(130;* 145). The worker in the U.S.A. is at the average level of secularization of consciousness. He accepts things more rigidly, more dogmatically, than intellectuals do. If he has assimilated the bourgeois system of values, he rigidly adheres to it and is intolerant of those who oppose it.

Part IV

THE AMERICAN BOURGEOIS SOCIETY AND THE PROCESS OF SECULARIZATION

In Parts II and III we discussed the special place religion occupies in the American bourgeois ideological system, the functions it fulfills and how it helps extinguish social conflicts. We abstracted ourselves from the fact that secularization is a continuing process and treated the level of secularization as a constant. It was possible to make this assumption, for the bourgeois ideological systems which arise in the process of secularization are relatively independent and can exist while preserving their basic characteristics through a certain, rather lengthy stretch of secularization. However, if we wish to understand not only the influence of religion as a constant factor of the social system, but also the trends in the changing role of religion, we must look at the course of secularization more closely.

l.The Collapse of Religious Ideology

The processes of the Americanization of the Churches and of the bourgeois integration of the sects are early stages of inner secularization (logically and chronologically with respect to the given religious ideologies). These processes lead to the ideology and organizational structure of these organizations drawing closer to the ideology and organizational structure of denominations. However, the process of secularization is continuing in the denominations, too, gradually transforming them from within. A Church of the Holy Spirit, or something of the kind, in becoming a "decent" denomination, takes the same path as Congregationalists and Presbyterians, which were originally such denominations. However, these different stretches (and different forms) of the one path lead to different results and, ultimately, to different social consequences. We have already examined the processes of

inner secularization in the form of the transformation of the Church and the sect as well as the social consequences of these processes. They do not concern us here.

Here, we shall try to trace the logic of the process of inner secularization of the ideology of the Protestant denomination, to find its end result, to find out where this process leads to. It should be borne in mind, too, that these processes are extremely slow and only a few of the most elite and oldest denominations are near the ultimate result.

Developed religion has a definite structure, composed of interrelated elements which presuppose each other: 1) the Scriptures, 2) exegetics, 3) dogmatic theology, 4) cult, 5) organization. Let us try to trace how the process of the disintegration of religious ideology is reflected in each of these elements.

a) *The text of the Scriptures.* For the majority of American denominations the Scriptures are the Bible whose composition and text was established long before U.S. history began. Since nothing can be added or taken away from the text, it would seem, on the face of it, that there can be no talk of it evolving. Nevertheless, the Scriptures are evolving in two interrelated directions, which can subsequently be perceived in the evolution of any element of the religious structure.

As is known, in ancient times, while the Catholic and Orthodox Churches were being established, the Scriptures were canonized and their text dogmatized. The logical conclusion of this process was that in the Catholicism of the Middle Ages it was forbidden to translate the Bible into a living spoken language and the laity were forbidden to read the Bible on their own, for the system of interpreting the Scriptures was already so far removed from the source of ideology that this source itself became a danger.

Humanists began work on the Greek and Jewish texts of the Bible, while the Reformation, rejecting the authority of tradition and the intermediary magical role of Church organization, was everywhere connected with the Bible being translated into living languages. This meant that an extremely dogmatized text was freed from dogma. Just as later Protestantism, to a certain extent, reproduced the processes which had taken place when Catholicism and Orthodoxy were being established, the new translations were, to a certain extent, subject to dogmatization: both in Lutheranism and Anglicanism there was strong resistance to replacing the Bibles of Luther and King James

by new translations. However, this resistance could not have been strong enough. Protestantism opened the way for scientific work to be carried out on the text of the Bible on a regular basis and for ever newer and more modern translations to be made of it.

Dedogmatizing the text was the first tendency in its evolution. The second and resulting tendency was the correlation of the texts adopted by various denominations. The fact was that ancient translations of the Bible naturally diverged from one another and from the original text and with these translations dogmatized the ancient Jewish texts, the Vulgate and the Lutheran Bible became, strictly speaking, different books. The dogmatization of these translations meant that the Bible forked into many texts. This also consolidated denominational differences, making them insuperable, and rendered it impossible for different denominations to appeal to the same source. On the contrary, freeing the text from dogma and scientific work done on it led to correlation of different texts. Little noted, but a highly significant fact was the Catholic publication, in the 1960s, of an English translation of the Bible, prepared by Protestants or with their participation. Catholic ideology is now witnessing processes to a certain extent similar to those witnessed by Protestantism, although on a relatively small scale.

Both of these processes, just like all similar processes which other elements of the religious structure have gone through, directly contradict the processes connected with the establishment of Catholicism and Orthodoxy. It can be said that these processes have already reached their ultimate end—the Scriptures are now treated like any other text. Just as the text of the Scriptures itself is the cornerstone of the religious structure, freeing it from dogma is the basis of all processes logically following on from it.

b) *Exegetics.* If the text loses its magically dogmatic character, if it can be translated, worked upon, if a scientific approach, reason not fettered by dogma, has infiltrated at least one sphere of the religious structure, this approach penetrates every sphere of the structure, and, first of all, that of the interpretation of the Scriptures, exegetics. Protestantism proceeded from the idea that the meaning of the Bible was direct and clear and that the Bible was an indispensable and sufficient source of doctrine.

The breaking down of the barriers between reason and the text of the Bible led, on the one hand, to the desire of the New England Puritans to be guided by the entire Law of

Moses, inasmuch as it was still to be found in the New Testament, and to the literal interpretation of the later Fundamentalists. In this they went further than the Catholics who had both the authority of the Church and of its precepts. On the other hand, Protestantism imperceptibly began to recognize that not everything in the Scriptures might be the truth, a fact that was of fundamental significance. Protestantism's negation of all human authority spread, very logically and naturally, to its negation of the absolute authority of the Scriptures themselves, which, along with divine origins and revelations, had human origins, revelation being inadequately conveyed. The dogmatic attitude to Church resolutions, to precepts, to the fathers of the Church, to the letter of the text disappeared. However, without all of this, without the fence around the Scriptures, the dogmatic attitude to the meaning of their text could not have lasted much longer. A new attitude to the Scriptures arose: they came to be regarded as texts which, for all their religious significance, were ordinary, normal, historically conditioned texts to which, therefore, the usual methods of exegetics of any ancient text were to be applied. This new attitude to the Scriptures gave rise to fierce opposition and struggle within the denominations. However, the weakness of ideological discipline in democratically organized denominations and the basic principles of Protestant ideology did not allow these tendencies to be suppressed.

However, it was precisely this which permitted the man who saw the errors in the Bible to remain a Christian. Moreover, it allowed the main body of the critical analysis of the Bible to be carried out by the Protestant clergy, primarily by the German clergy, and until quite recently the U.S.A. simply borrowed the achievements of the German exegetes. Although such exegetics is subjectively religious, objectively it is scientific work, carried out within religion and eating away the religious structure from within.

Contemporary Protestant exegetics, particularly the work of Bultmann and his school, not only discovered a great many historically incorrect passages in the Bible, but also revealed the mythological nature of all biblical thought, the profound connection between the basic concepts of Christianity, for instance, the concept and the word "God", and the biblical map of the world which contemporary knowledge has rendered invalid. In other words, the limit of the dedogmatization of the Bible possible within the framework of Christianity has already been reached and the path to such forms of theology as that of "the

death of God" laid. Like any scientific work it implies universal methods of research and universal criteria of verifying the results. Therefore, a unifying tendency arises both in the sphere of exegetics and in textology. The more scientific exegetics is, the less it is connected with static differences and the less able to give rise to new ones. Thus, the more scientific methods penetrate Catholic exegetics the nearer it comes to Protestant exegetics, and, now, in the U.S.A., cooperation between Protestant and Catholic biblicists is growing. Scientific exegetics does not only lead to the distinctions between Christian denominations being eroded. It ultimately leads to the erosion of distinctions between Christianity and other religions, and between religion and non-religion. The assumption of elements of truth existing outside the Bible—in the Koran, Veda and other books—is a parallel process of the admission of errors and historical limitations in the Bible. The fact that the pastor of a present-day educated congregation may make reference to Eastern religious texts and even simply quote passages from Camus and comment upon them is logically connected with the scientific criticism of the text of the Bible. Religious distinctions are being eroded.

c) *Theology.* In the ancient Church and Catholicism, the development of theology led to theological tenets being dogmatically consolidated. In the sphere of theology, as in all spheres, early Protestantism at first developed along the lines characteristic of ancient times, but later took a different path. At first, there was the process of dogmatization—ever more rigid formulae were adopted. However, the lines of development subsequently changed. Ideological discipline increasingly slackened, while tolerance towards theological differences grew.

The theologian no longer spoke on behalf of a certain denominational organization, which, as it were, put its mark on his work; he began to speak more and more on his own behalf. Just as there is no force which might control the theologian's work, there is no force which might control his influence. No one can prevent a theologian of one denomination from reading works by a theologian of another denomination and falling under their influence. Thus, various schools may simultaneously exist in one Church, and, at the same time, theological schools increasingly assume an extra- and inter-denominational character. Niebuhr and Tillich are not Calvinists, nor are they Lutherans, they are Protestants in general. The same cannot be said of Altizer or Hamilton who are linked to Protestantism rather genetically. However, with this trend

in theological development which leads to each and every denominational difference being eroded, no new denominational differences can arise. If Luther's theology gave rise to Lutheranism and that of Calvin—to Calvinism, the theology of Bonhoffer, for instance, did not give rise to Bonhofferism as a particular religious trend or a particular religious organization. While the founders of Protestantism could not, by logic of their doctrine, force their followers to dogmatically regard their Scriptures, the contemporary theologian is even less capable of doing this. The entire tradition of Protestantism which he has joined does not permit him to assert the absolute, decisive character of his theological systems. This non-dogmatic line of development is reflected in the very content of the theological systems whose founders strive to stress the imperfect, incomplete character of any human systems—of any organization (Niebuhr), of any symbol of the absolute (Tillich).

So far we have been speaking of the development of theology with regard to whether it is dogmatic or not. However, if we leave this and take a look at its content we can see that the process of demythologization runs parallel to that of dedogmatization. This is a very indirect and complicated process. Last century, it took the form of theology gradually drifting towards various European philosophical systems. The ideas of the original sin and the Last Judgement, which did not correspond to the activism and progressivism of last century, were, to all intents and purposes, rejected. The theology of Walter Rauschenbusch, popular in the U.S.A. at the turn of this century, was the culmination of this process. In his theology Christianity became something similar to the philosophy of the Enlightenment: gradually and through man's efforts on earth, a just and splendid society will be created under the influence of Christianity and this society may be called the Kingdom of God. This liberal-theological concept overstepped the limits beyond which common sense does not allow to call it a Christian system.

Reaction set in against liberal theology and gave rise to the neo-orthodox movement. In the U.S.A., this was most strikingly represented by Reinhold Niebuhr. Outwardly, neo-orthodoxy seems to be a return to the past, but this is far from being the case. His criticism of liberal theology amounts to a debunking of the liberal-progressive myth, to showing that the ideas of the original sin and the Last Judgement are an immanent part of Christianity, to pointing out the existentialist significance of these ideas. However,this does not spell a return to the myth. It is, on

the contrary, the debunking of one myth (liberal-progres - sive) and pointing out that another myth, however valuable psychologically, but no longer acceptable to the modern consciousness, was immanent to Christianity.

The thought of another major American theologian, Paul Tillich, took similar lines. He is of German extraction, emigrated from Germany and created his major works in the U.S.A. Tillich defines God as "the depth and ground of all being", "the profound measure of reality" which directly makes itself felt in existentialist uneasiness, in a feeling of utmost concern and importance. This utmost concern corresponds to the utmost "depth and ground of all being"—that is both religion and immediate intuition of God. This allows Tillich to sidestep Kant by reviving ontological proof. However, here, as with Niebuhr, the question of reality is replaced by one of psychological importance. The symbol, which earlier referred to something real, now comes to signify its own psychological function. This, on the one hand, is a game with symbols, a substitution (in saying: "The name of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of all being is God"), and, on the other, it is the utmost demythologization of the symbol (the next sentence reads "The depth is what the word God means") *(197;* 64).

This opens the way for theological concepts which are linked with attempts to express the psychological and existential content of Christian mythology in non-mythological forms. Bonhoffer's irreligious Christianity and Bultmann's Christianity stripped of myth, both borrowed from Germany, may be added to this. In our opinion, these attempts also come down to substituting belief in the myth with an analysis and description of it, by affirming its existential significance. The vast significance of the idea of the Last Judgement may be pointed out, as may be the fact that belief in a personified God has completely different consequences from belief in indefinite forces ruling the world; it can be proved that there has been no continuous line of progress, that there is no Christianity without the idea of the original sin. However, modern man cannot be forced to accept a myth which contradicts today's knowledge.

The mythological symbol survives as long as it is regarded not as a symbol but as objective reality, as something which can be seen and heard, and as empirical proofs of its existence are tangible. When the symbol is stripped of mythology to such an extent that the last remaining traces of its tangibility disappear, it dies away.

The 1960s saw the rise of a new theological movement in

the United States, linked with the recognition of the impossibility of further theologizing, i.e., the impossibility to use concepts which have lost their meaning, the theology of the "death of God". The "death of God", proclaimed in the last century by Friedrich Nietzsche, an ardent anti-Christian, is now proclaimed by theologians, by people subjectively devoted to Christianity and proclaiming the death of God not joyously, but with alarm and fear. This proclamation of the death of God is the result of the theological development of the main Protestant denominations in the U.S.A., denominations whose theology gave rise to American bourgeois ideology. When we say that the theology of the "death of God" is the result of development, we do not mean that this system is destined to become dominant in the U.S.A. The theology of the "death of God" is already becoming unfashionable. But the idea of the "death of God", perhaps expressed in some other forms, in our opinion, cannot disappear, for, in a way, this idea states an empirical fact which cannot be destroyed by hysterically rejecting it.

These new theological systems might not be reflected at all in official Church documents (or be only indirectly reflected, as in the Presbyterian confession of 1967, where the Bible is not called the "word of God" but "evidence of revelation" (see *Time,* June 2, 1967, p.61), and the Church, in which theological seminaries teach "the death of God", may preserve the official symbols of faith adopted in the 17th and 18th centuries. However, the process of the demythologization of theology has clearly penetrated the sphere of official documents and formulae in one point. The 1960s and 1970s saw the growth of the feminist movement in the Church. One of the ideas of Church feminism is that the use of the masculine gender with reference to God and, generally, the representation of God in specifically male symbolics is a mythological reflection of the patriarchy, which ruled at the time the Bible was created and has no sufficient theological substantiation. It is difficult to contend against this reasoning. One after the other the liberal Protestant Churches (and the Judaist reformers) have been adopting resolutions demanding that the masculine gender be replaced by the neuter in the cult texts (see *The Washington Post,* Oct. 1, 1976, p. B-18). We can see here how theological arguments concerning the mythological basis of Christian symbolics directly penetrate the official sacramental formulae and destroy their concrete mythological content.

d) *Cult.* The process of the destruction of cult runs parallel with the process of the destruction of dogma. By

stripping religious worship of its magical elements, Protestantism paved the way for freeing it from dogma, for free and easy changes within the sphere of religious worship. The Protestant cult is presently developing along the lines of free improvisation. The seemingly reverse trend in Protestantism, connected with so-called liturgical revivals when Catholic elements of divine service seem to be reestablished (see *Time,* May 1, 1964, p. 51), is actually a step forward, for these elements are introduced freely and rather as aesthetic elements, without their magical and dogmatic significance.

The contemporary American Protestantism of the elite denominations is characterized by highly improvised ritual: scenes and pantomimes may be played out, extracts read out not only from the Bible, but also, for instance, from Camus or Salinger, rock orchestras might play and dances arranged *(Time,* Feb. 27, 1964, p. 45). The style of liturgy quickly changes. While revising the liturgy was once an intricate and difficult process, nowadays, jazz, folk and rock liturgies follow one another with the same ease as bell bottoms replaced the mini skirt and as easily harmonize with one another *(175;* 36-38). This occurs not only within the framework of denomination, but even within one congregation, as it happens in one of the communities of the United Church of Christ, where the congregation changes the style of divine worship or breaks up into various groups with different styles *(The Washington Post,* July 7, 1971, p. D-21; for similar phenomena of the Judaist reformers see *Newsweek,* Jan. 7, 1974, p. 48). Catholicism is, naturally, very far from this as yet, but the reform of divine worship adopted by the Second Vatican Council is along these lines.

And so, the process in all spheres follows in two interrelated directions: 1) dedogmatization **and** the **growth** of freedom within the denominations; and 2) on the basis of this, denominations draw closer together and denominational differences lose their significance. As far as the main denominations are concerned, this process is already well underway. Scientific textology and exegetics, the theology of the "death of God" and freely improvised divine worship are forms beyond which, in our opinion, further development within the framework of religious symbolics and religious organization is hardly possible. If not the end of the process of the evolution of Protestantism, these forms are something very close to it.

Let us now take a look at the parallel processes in the sphere of religious organization.

2. The Disintegration of the Religious Organization

A particular form of organization which outwardly resembles something between a sect and a Church is the starting point in the disintegration of the religious organization. Charismatic leadership and the bureaucracy of professionals in religion are less important here and the laity, acting through democratic institutions, plays a dominant role. It is typical of Protestantism and particularly so of those Protestant denominations which are the nucleus of the American religious system. This form of organization, which, on the face of it, is transitional between the sect and the Church and termed "denomination" by present-day religious sociologists, has proved to be not a temporary phenomenon, but rather a lasting one. In the U.S.A., sects which are experiencing a revival and Churches which are on the decline are attracted to this form of organization.

The democratic denominational organization is structurally linked with the above-mentioned processes. Such an organization cannot be as intolerant as the sect and the Church are. It is open to every influence and doubt, just as the layman is, who, in actual fact, wields the power in such an organization.

Just as nowadays exegetic and theological development does not lead to the creation of new dogma, i.e., develops on a different plane than dogma and exegetics did in ancient times, organizational development also takes place in a different dimension. It does not lead to the creation of new Churches, but to specific, unusual forms of organization unparalleled in the history of Christianity.

As denominational systems disintegrate, denominational organizations lose grounds for existence. This, to a certain extent, may be hidden by the organization switching over from its direct religious tasks to non-religious activities in the strict sense of the word. Denominational leaders take an active part in politics, charitable work, sociological research, organization of sports competitions and anything at all. Sociological research reveals the following distribution of the present-day pastor's working time: 40 per cent is spent on administrative matters, 40 per cent on giving advice to members of their congregation, 20 per cent on the church service and preaching *(76;* 189-90). One gets the impression that all this activity, often truly vast, is called upon to suppress the questions "Is there a God?" and "Why am I a Methodist". An enumeration of the activities of Methodists and Congregationalists, as it were, rules out

the question of whether the Methodist or Congregationalist doctrine is authentic and even, generally, of what it consists in. These great many temporal activities break down the isolation and specific character of the denominations. Firstly, non-denominational organizations may also carry out these activities. Secondly, although this type of activity may be used in the struggle, in the competition between individual denominations, it cannot provide the basis of this struggle. Only one thing may constitute the basis of interdenominational struggle—difference in dogma. However, since these dogma depreciate and die away, this kind of activity is a factor which unites denominations. Denominations, tolerant of each other, with dogmatic basis largely eroded, actively engaged in common activities which unite them, cease to compete and begin to draw closer together. This is the primary trend of organizational development, a specific feature of the new age, the so-called ecumenism.

This organizational confluence began quite a while ago. However, today, cooperation and various forms of unification assume a general, very marked character. The facts of such unification are numerous, and we shall try to establish several general features of these organizational processes. A number of forms and levels of unification can be identified. The forms of unification represent a continuum beginning with temporary cooperation with some specific aim in mind (social, missionary), or with the aim of achieving better mutual understanding (various types of dialogues), and taking such forms as general organizations created for some specific aim, as, for instance, setting up a joint missionary community or general multifunctional organizations of the Council of Churches type, and ending with the merging of two or several denominations.

The levels of unification also form a hierarchy, beginning with cooperation (or merging) between individual parishes or congregations. Then follow the city and state councils of churches and, finally, the National Council of the Churches of Christ (beyond the U.S. frontiers—the World Council of Churches). Various forms and types of unification are described in R. Lee's book *(129).* However, this book is already out of date. The ecumenical processes have progressed further since the time it was written. An important event of religious life in the U.S.A. in the 1960s was the discussion of the Blake Plan for merging all the main Protestant denominations into one super-Church.

The process of unification is such that the organizations that have more in common (dogmatically and historically speaking) travel along this path more quickly and farther,

while those which are dissimilar and have traditions of hostility start out later than the former and travel more slowly. Thus, dogmatically close organizations of Methodists and the Gospel Brethren merged in the United Methodist Church (U.M.C.), Christian and Congregationalist organizations merged in the United Church of Christ (U.C.C.), while the merging of the U.M.C. and the U.C.C. is only being planned (yet both of them participate in church councils at the nation-wide, city and state levels). On the other hand, various talks have been held of merging the three branches of American Judaism. Plans to unite Judaists and Protestants are as yet not even being dreamed of, although they already take an active part in various loose forms of unification—in dialogues and meetings, in ad hoc organizations, etc., and, in 1979, the N.C.C.C. even published the "Guidelines for Common Worship" for the N.C.C.C. Churches and for the reformed Judaists *(The Washington Post,* Dec. 29, 1979, p. B-5).

It was, naturally, the Protestants who began the process of organizational unification. They were the first to embark upon this road (the first germs of unification of Protestant organizations can be traced back to the end of the 17th century) and have made the most progress in the forms and level of unification (various Protestant denominations have merged several times in the U.S.A., and it was Protestants who founded the World Council of Churches). However, non-Protestant Churches are gradually being drawn into this process—Orthodoxists, cooperating with Protestants in the National Council of the Churches of Christ (and in the World Council), reformed Judaists, and Catholics. A great many ecumenical links may arise in which Protestantism even has no part (between Orthodoxists and Catholics, between individual Judaist Churches, etc.).

The process of organizational unification is forging ahead, growing in scope (from the nearest denominational organizations to those further away) and in depth (from the weakest and most amorphous forms of cooperation to more cohesive ones and further to merging). Despite some deviations, the process of unification accelerates—not only the further, the greater and closer the unification, but the further the process is underway the more frequently the mergers take place.

This process should not be regarded as unification to combat the common enemy. This is not so for two reasons. In the first place, although those taking part in the ecumenical process often regard this as unification against a common enemy, it has always turned out that the enemv has retreated and that he is not an enemy, but a friend,

with whom one must unite. At first, American Protestants regarded their unification as a means of fighting the growing influence of Catholicism, then later they began to actively cooperate with Catholics. Secondly, even Churches which did have a common enemy were unable to unite, despite the fact that those doctrinal points which divided them then seem completely trivial and immaterial nowadays. Ecumenism is a direct organizational reflection and consequence of the process of dogma and myth waning, and, conversely, it consolidates this process, for the closer denominations which were at first dogmatically far apart, the more amorphous and indefinite becomes their ideological basis.

Therefore, the growth of independent, separate groups of believers, the growth of anarchy at the lower level of the organization is a concomitant of the process of creating ecumenical superstructures. This is expressed in three forms.

Firstly, as ideological control within the denomination slackens individual congregations become more and more independent. In one and the same denomination, in one congregation there may be religious services accompanied by rock orchestras and dances, in another, solemn religious services in the style of the last century, in yet another, a religious ceremony in the spirit of a liturgical revival, with elements borrowed from Anglicans and Catholics. One congregation might have a conservative pastor, while that of another might publicly decry the Virgin Birth and the Trinity, as did James Pike, the Episcopalian Bishop of San Francisco.

Secondly, the number of congregations which are not subject to denominations but are directly under the control of the Council of Churches is growing. There is even a joint congregation (though consisting of two sub-congregations) of Methodists and reformed Judaists (see *The Washington Post*, Dec. 10, 1976, p. D-18). This control is, of course, pimarily in the sphere of organization and finances, not ideology.

Thirdly, various types of circles and groups arise among people who are interested in religion. These are often ecumenical in their composition, uniting both Protestants, Catholics and Judaists, "underground Churches", which are not under any control and in which anything at all can be done: liturgies can be something between an ordinary party and mass, various types of mystic experiences may take place with drugs, etc. (see *Time*, May 24, 1963, p. 39; Sept. 29, 1967, pp. 36-37).

3. The Struggle Within Denominations and the Objective Nature of Their Disintegration

The above described processes are natural and objective. However, this does not mean that they take place without people's knowledge, without a struggle. It simply means that those who try to halt them are unable to do so, nor even to slow down these processes. They can only modify the external form of these phenomena.

However, religious organizations in the U.S.A. were, and still are, the battlefield for various forces around the process of disintegration, with regard to various manifestations of this process. The following observations can be made concerning the forms and course of this struggle.

a) This struggle is closely linked with that of liberal and conservative social forces in the U.S.A. Progressive, liberally-minded elements, in the social sphere, have practically always supported liberal, progressive forms of religious life (since "progress" in religion these days means disintegration and decay, the most progressive, therefore, also means the most decadent). On the face of it, there is no logical connection between fundamentalism, on the one hand, and racism and rabid anti-communism, on the other.

However, the psychological connection is very clear and precise here. The stances taken in religion to a great extent correspond to those taken in the socio-political sphere.

In the struggle within denominations in the 1960s, issues such as ecumenism, the rejection of out-of-date dogma always went hand in hand with issues such as civil rights and peace in Vietnam. Thus, in 1965 the United Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A. adopted a new "article of faith" in which nothing was said of predestined salvation, of the incarnation and the Virgin Birth, and the Bible was not called the "Word of God" but a "normative witness of revelation". At the same time, demands for racial integration, the struggle for peace and an end to poverty were included in this article *(Time,* Feb. 26, 1965, p. 61; June 4, 1965, p. 36).

The spectrum of political positions from pathological anti-communism and racism through moderate conservatism to distinct liberalism precisely corresponds to the spectrum of theological positions from the fundamentalism of the American Council of Christian Churches, which regards the National Council as the weapon of world Communism, through Evangelism like that of Billy Graham, a

friend of Eisenhower and Nixon, to liberal theology and ecumenism. In the Presidential campaigns of the 1960s this gamut of positions was very clearly expressed. We have already said that the main denominations became involved in the fight only once—against Goldwater. The fundamentalists also got involved only once—supporting Goldwater *(Time,* Oct. 9, 1964, p. 37). Billy Graham did not speak out in Goldwater's favor, but did censure the anti-Goldwater campaign and expressed his support for a candidate only once—and this candidate was his friend, Richard Nixon *(Time,* Oct. 4, 1968, p. 39).

b) Just as political and theological positions correspond, so do fluctuations in the political and religious moods of the mass of Americans. The transition from the 1960s to the 1970 was one from prevalence of liberal political sentiments to that of conservative sentiments. It was, at the same time, the transition from the religious liberalism of the main denominations prevailing to a period where they, to a certain extent, turned to conservatism. Against this background, let us note the considerable growth of such conservative denominations as Southern Baptism and of sects which are still sufficiently conservative, although in the process of becoming denominations, such as the Adventists, Assembly of God and the Mormons.

It was against the background of a general conservative tide that the Baptist Jimmy Carter with his traditional moralism and vivid conservative religious tendency was elected President. He was supported by a broad mass of conservative Protestants and a number of popular preachers. Carter's religious and moral conservatism turned out to be comparatively mild. The conservatives accused him of not having justified their hopes—he did not speak out against an amendment to the Constitution on equality for women, against the legalization of abortions, for compulsory prayer in school, and he did not surround himself with Protestant conservatives. The general liberal erosion continued. Yet in 1976, conservatives became aware of their strength. The 1980 campaign was characterized by an active involvement in politics of the forces of conservative Protestantism, who set up such actually political organizations as the Moral Majority, Religious Roundtable and Christian Voice, out to actively influence elections and supporting Ronald Reagan who coaxed them (right up to publicly expressing doubts that man originated from animals) (see *U.S. News and World Report,* Sept. 15, 1980, pp. 24-27; Nov. 17, 1980, p. 42; *Time,* Oct. 13, 1980, p. 42; *New Republic,* Aug. 2, 1980, pp. 16-19; *Christian Century,* Aug. 13-20, 1980, pp. Y81-Y82; *Congressional Quarterly,* Sept. 6,

1980, 2627-2634).

These coincidences, this parallelism can, in our opinion, only be explained if one proceeds from the concept of the integral American bourgeois ideological system, the transformation and decay of which is the one process, so that temporal mythology disintegrates along with religious systems.

c) We have already said that in the main Protestant Churches the pastor generally takes a more liberal social stand than the laity. And, as a rule, they have a more liberal stance on specifically religious questions. The laity, on the contrary, are, on average, more conservative. In these organizations, the process of secularization takes place from the top downwards, from Church leaders, pastors, professors of theological seminaries down to the lower orders, the laity, congregations. Seminary professors are usually the most liberal public. In the fundamentalist quarrels of the 1920s, liberal teaching in the seminaries was a source of conflict. In the 1960s and 1970s, the source of conflict in similar struggles within the conservative Churches of the Southern Baptists and the Lutherans of the Missouri Synod, was the same *(Time,* June 8, 1962, p. 45).

This can be explained, first of all, by the high cultural level and, consequently, the secularization of the consciousness of the clergy, the representatives of a certain intellectual profession; and, secondly, by ideological discipline in the denominations ever slackening and, consequently, by orthodoxy becoming less important for the pastor's career prospects, increasingly subject to the standard principles of mobility in any intellectual profession. It should be added, though, that there is quite a different picture in Catholicism, where the organizational structure is different and so are principles of mobility. In U.S. Catholicism, the ruling hierarchy is more conservative than the middle hierarchy. In the 1960s, the struggle was waged mainly between the conservative ruling clique and the liberal rank-and-file priests.

d) The liberals usually come out the winners in this struggle. It was most often the case that the conservatives were too late to move—for instance, in the fundamentalist quarrels of the 1920s and early 1930s (when conservative groups were cast out of the main Protestant denominations, and later set up the A.C.C.C.) or in the 1960s during the vain attempt of conservatives in the Episcopalian Church to censure James Pike, a liberal bishop, for heresy *(Time,* Sept. 17, 1965, p. 60; June 4, 1966, p. 62) and in the Presbyterian Church when they were against the adoption

of the new creed. Liberals have long held the leading posts. The conservatives themselves gave these posts to them as more educated, younger and more talented people, and the stance of the conservatives is in itself too illogical to provide an adequate platform. They have conceded too much before and it is very difficult to explain why they do not want to concede at this particular instance.

However, sometimes the fundamentalists win, or the outcome of the battle is indefinite. Thus, in the 1960s, following a fierce battle between conservative leaders and groupings of liberal professors in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, the latter were cast out of the Church. *(Time,* Feb. 4, 1974, p. 48; March 4, 1974, p. 39). Following this, the liberal minority broke away from the Church and founded a new denomination, the Association of Evangelical and Lutheran Churches, but the Missouri Synod itself retained an extreme orthodox stance. The struggle within the major Protestant denomination in the U.S.A., the Southern Baptist Convention, also ended in a victory of the conservatives although, evidently, not such a complete one.

Do these facts contradict our idea of the irreversibility of the secularization processes? No. They rather indicate the unevenness of these secularization processes in different social strata (and, to a certain extent, the fear of these processes, the desire to halt them).

In the 1960s, liberalization from above went too far. The new religious forms were too liberal for the vast majority of ordinary American believers, the main denominations broke away from the masses in their advance along the path of inner secularization, and the denominational leaders broke away from their mass base, to a certain extent. The conservative religious reaction of the 1970s, which was most vividly manifested in the growth of conservative denominations and in the decline of liberal denominations, merely translated the process of secularization into different forms. Firstly, the orthodoxists' victory must, nevertheless, lead to the more educated strata leaving the denomination, to the lowering of the denomination's general social status, even if it does not entail the narrowing of the denomination's mass base. Thus, Southern Baptism, a denomination which blossomed and acquired special significance as a result of Jimmy Carter, a Southern Baptist, being elected President, is experiencing a serious crisis—its pastors are leaving the Church. 3 per cent of the pastors leave this Church annually; a survey revealed that three-quarters of the pastors were under severe stress and that about 33 per cent of them

thought of leaving the Church(C/.S. *News and World Report,* Nov. 25, 1974, p. 102).

Secondly, the orthodox victory does not solve the problem. Denominations which preserve their conservatism at the cost of their most cultured strata do not avert inner secularization. After a while, the struggle must start up again and they will again be faced with the same dilemma—to continue along the path of disintegration or to preserve their conservatism and lose their social status.

Both are the expression of the process of secularization. In conservative denominations, it is expressed by the most educated (and the most expanding) strata of believers leaving the most unyielding groups which have resisted inner secularization. In the main denominations, this is expressed in the processes described above.

e) However, the orthodoxy itself of those Churches which have refused to yield to the spirit of the times, upholding orthodoxy as a kind of banner, is often in doubt. One of the most interesting manifestations of how the process of the disintegration of dogma tells upon orthodox Churches is the very distinctive phenomenon of anti-ecumenism. When dogma was still strong and dogmatic differences were very significant, American Presbyterians (Calvinists), even religiously tolerant, were, nevertheless, convinced that the Methodists' path led directly to hell. In the course of inner secularization, dogmatic differences became less significant and Presbyterians and Methodists joined the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ (later, the National Council) and even planned to merge into a super-Church. Small orthodox Churches broke away from the Presbyterians and Methodists and combined religious orthodoxy with political reaction. At the same time, very significant phenomena arose. Whereas the Methodists and Presbyterians fought against each other in the "good old days", the Methodists and Presbyterians striving for a return to these good old days no longer fought. They were drawn together by a nostalgia for the past, and, in the 1940s, joined the American Council of the Churches of Christ which was engaged in a fierce struggle against the ecumenical World Council of the Churches of Christ, while, in fact, pursuing the same ecumenism, only of a different type. What did this phenomenon mean?

It could mean only one thing—the orthodoxists' dogma is also disintegrating and depreciating, but along different lines. Dogma dissolved in their general cultural and political reaction. It is this reaction, not dogma, which turns out to be a true object of faith and acquires the utmost significance.

The second stage of this process has been underway since the late 1970s. The ideology of the A.C.C.C. and other right-wing Protestant organizations of the post-Second World War period contained very strong anti-Catholic elements. Moreover, in the 1960s, even the Southern Baptist Convention, a conservative Church, but not so ultra reactionary as the A.C.C.C, expressed doubts whether John Kennedy, a Catholic, could be President of the United States *(Time,* Oct. 17, 1960, p. 54). The late 1970s saw the rise of a new generation of political and religious orthodox Protestant organizations (the Moral Majority and others). And while the organizations of the 1940s to 1960s were strongly anti-Catholic, nowadays, in the name of cultural and political reaction, orthodox Catholics, orthodox Orthodoxists and orthodox Judaists join (in minority) these main Protestant organizations and partly cooperate with them. The depreciation of dogmatic differences within Protestantism is followed by the depreciation of religious differences in general. All this is in the name of that same orthodoxy.

The process of the disintegration of dogma sidesteps the orthodox dogmatists, it finds loopholes which they do not notice and they themselves are subject to this process.

4. The Process of Secularization and the American Bourgeois System of Values

The above described process of the disintegration of religious ideology inevitably touched upon the sphere of ethical values drawn from this ideology. If Goa "dies", his precepts inevitably die along with him. They are not denied, just as God himself is not, they are dying away, petering out.

The development of Protestant thought results in the extreme iconoclast potential of Protestantism, destroying all absolute values, any established, unconditional guidelines of human behavior.

The extreme dedogmatization and growth of the religious tolerance also destroy the guidelines in the sphere of religion. While generally weak dogma and religious tolerance are inherent in the bourgeois-democratic principles of the U.S.A. and meet the demands of this society, then, when dedogmatization leads to the "death of God", this implies the transition to complete religious and generally ideological vagueness.

The same may be said of the socio-political results of the development of Protestant thought. Social criticism

is an inherent part of Protestantism and of the American bourgeois ideological system. However, the degree of its radicalism in the 1960s exceeded the bounds of American standards.

The Churches' struggle for the equality of blacks may also be regarded as a manifestation of the general process of the fall of dogma—the collapse of the dogma about superiority of the white race and the rejection of the significance of any permanent appraisals of individuals, unchanged throughout their life.

Evidently, the same considerations underlie the struggle of the main Churches for the abolition of the death penalty—that embodiment of a definitive, absolute evaluation.

The refusal to recognize permanent immutable opinions of individuals also spread to the rejection of fixed notions of the role of men and women. In practice, this meant unconditional support of the Constitutional amendment on equal rights for women, support of the legalization of abortion and the admission of women into the clergy. This process began in the 1950s, developed rapidly in the 1960s, and in the 1970s, after a long struggle, the last of the major Protestant Churches—the Episcopalian Church—admitted women into the clergy. It was particularly difficult for it to do this because of the specific features of its tradition. The reformed Judaists also admitted women into the clergy.

It is obvious that on all these issues the main liberal Churches struggled resolutely and selflessly against social prejudice and the forces of reaction upholding these prejudices. Yet, it is also obvious that this was not the replacement of one ideology by another with new, clear and precise values and guidelines. Rather, it was the maximum development and erosion of the old system of values, leading to the loss of clear guidelines in general.

In our opinion, this was most clearly seen in the revision of ethical principles controlling personal relationships, primarily, the relationship between the sexes.

Situation ethics, an idea put forward in the 1930s by E. Brunner, arose in the sphere of Protestant ethical doctrine and ran parallel to new forms of theology (like that of "the death of God"). It was subsequently developed by Tillich, Fletcher, and taken up by Robinson. The basic idea of this new ethics was "Nothing prescribed—Except Love". Robinson's account of this principle is as follows: "This means accepting as the basis of moral judgements the actual concrete relationship in all its particularity... but yet, in the depth of that unique relationship, meeting and responding to the claims of the sacred, the holy,

and the absolutely unconditional" *(177;* 114). In simpler and clearer terms this means the rejection of the absolute value of any evaluation. No action can be described as always good or always bad. It all depends on the situation. It is bad to be unfaithful to one's wife, although there may be situations when this is a good thing. It is bad to tell lies, but there may be times when this is alright, etc. "One cannot, for instance, start from the position 'sex relations before marriage' or 'divorce' are wrong in themselves. They may be in 99 cases or even 100 cases out of 100, but they are not intrinsically so, for the only intrinsic sin is lack of love" *(177;* 118). Ethics becomes extremely undogmatic. It is recognized that man should be guided only by an extremely profound and indefinite principle, which cannot be translated into a series of more concrete demands, the principle of love for people and by what the situation dictates. "Nothing Prescribed—Except Love" *(177;* 116). What are the practical conclusions to be drawn from these general ethical principles?

The official position of the Churches in the sphere of sexual morals changed in complete accordance with the above quotation from the works of Robinson—decisions were adopted on the impossibility of condemning unconditionally sex before marriage or illicit love affairs *(Time,* Dec. 13, 1971, p. 36; *The Washington Post,* March 7, 1970, p. C-9).

Finally, what ought to make the forefathers of today's Congregationalists, Presbyterians and Episcopalians turn in their graves and what would have horrified the weirdest decadent at the beginning of the century—homosexuality—is not censured and those who openly admit their homosexuality or lesbianism are admitted into the clergy.

Thus, 1972 saw the first homosexual pastor ordained in the United Church of Christ *(Time,* June 7, 1976, p. 51), and in 1975 the Unitarian Universalist Association spoke out in favor of "equal rights for homosexuals" *(The Washington Post,* June 27, 1975, p. D-15). A lesbian in the Episcopalian Church was made deaconess *(Time,* Jan. 24, 1977, p. 54), later a presbyter, and in 1977 that Church officially rejected a resolution on the inadmissibility of homosexuals into the clergy *(The Washington Post,* July 1, 1977, p. C-9). In the same year, the Southern Presbyterians voted down a resolution censuring homosexuality *(The Washington Post,* June 24, 1977, p. B-18). In 1978, following opposition from the laity, the United Presbyterians did not adopt a resolution proposed by a commission of theologians on the admission of homosexuals into the clergy *(The Washington Post,* March 17, 1978,

p. A-37). The important fact here is that the resolution itself was proposed by theologians. Finally, in 1979, the American Friends Service Committee (a joint Quaker organization) decreed that it would actively seek the services of members of the discriminated minorities, blacks, women and homosexuals *(Christian Century,* May 17, 1979, p. 528).

We do not know of any Church decrees liberalizing the attitude to drugs. However, "mystic experiences" with LSD are not forbidden in the churches and as far as marihuana is concerned, the pillar of situation ethics, Joseph F. Fletcher, said what ne had to say: "The morality of pot depends on circumstances. Social drinking is not immoral, social smoking is not immoral, social pot is not immoral—unless they are used to excess" *(Time,* Aug. 16, 1968, p. 43).

It would be very easy to brand all this as encouraging amorality and a permissive society. However, this would scarcely be true. On the contrary, it is not the slackening but the strengthening of responsibility which is proclaimed and is axiomatically transferred to man himself, to his intuition. Neither is it an attempt to replace Christianity by a principally new morality, just as the "death of God" which Altizer and others sadly and anxiously proclaimed, is not that "death of God" which Nietzsche spoke of with such triumph, immediately inventing his own myths. It is, however, consistent abolition of all clear, precise and absolute norms and behavioral guidelines. An "orgy of open-mindedness", as one witty pastor called it, is the case *(Time,* Jan. 17, 1964, p. 42).

Naturally, all of this has little in common with the American bourgeois system of values, indeed, with any system of values, if we understand by this relatively strict and clearcut evaluations.

Religion itself, by the logic of its internal development, destroys the system of values which resulted from it and which are founded on it. Let us now take a look at the processes developing parallel to these ideological processes at the level of mass consciousness.

5. Changes in Mass Consciousness

U.S. society has representatives of the most widely varying levels of the secularization of consciousness, corresponding to nearly every stage of religious development mankind has gone through. Santeria, introduced by black Cuban immigrants, is a modification of the ancient heathen

politheistic system. The fantastic world of sects, with their glossolalia, miraculous recoveries, etc., is by no means the beginnings of American history, not the Puritan colonies, but rather the first century A.D., the epoch of early Christianity being repeated in a grotesque and weird form against a background of skyscrapers. Billy Graham is the 19th and early 20th century. Since the main factor in the secularization of the consciousness is the growth of knowledge, the spread of different types of religious consciousness throughout society, from the least educated strata, isolated from contemporary cultural life, to the most educated, repeats, with certain modifications, the process of secularization in time.

However, at the moment we are not interested in what happens to culturally isolated groups representing an archaic form of consciousness; not in how contemporary cultural life breaks their consciousness, or, on the contrary, how they create the mechanisms of self-isolation.

We are interested in the changes which take place in the consciousness of members of the so-called middle stratum, the bourgeois and the intellectuals. The class composition of this stratum is heterogeneous and is constantly changing: the percentage of intellectuals in it keeps on rising, while the percentage of the independent bourgeois keeps on falling. But in cultural terms, this stratum is sufficiently homogeneous and possesses a great cultural continuity and tradition. These are college or university graduates, the main bearers of U.S. culture. It is the stratum which has the most secularized consciousness, within which the above described ideological processes take place, a stratum of people who read the works of modern theologians, historians and sociologists or who have at least heard of them. The worker and the poor farmer might not even suspect that "God is dead". In this stratum, "the death of God" serves as a source of both serious talks and reflection, of idle chatter, of vaunting one's own knowledge, of jokes. The number and percentage of those in intellectual professions who have higher education is ever on the increase; and although their social status and their culture change, it is, nevertheless, the one and the same culture, the same cultural stream; the American poor and, in many ways, even the American worker are outside this stream. What takes place in this stratum?

David Riesman, the creator of one of the most significant pictures of the transformation of the social psychology of the middle-class American, talking of the psychological

type prevalent approximately up to the 1950s, uses the term "inner-directed" person. This is the one who completely assimilated the American system of values in childhood, and it has become subconscious with him, no longer discussed or pondered over. He is a conscientious worker, strives to put by some money and climb up the social ladder, seeing this as the meaning of life and his duty. He has precise and rigid moral principles, he knows for sure what is good and what is bad. Depravity, laziness, excessive drinking, telling lies are bad. A strong family, sobriety, honesty, hard work are good. He values order both in his private life, at work, in social life and in organizations. He is a patriot and respects the laws. He believes that life will gradually get better and better as the result of the persistent efforts of people like him who are pursuing their own private aims. He believes in God, although attaches little significance to theological subtleties and to belief in various myths contained in the Bible. The most important things for him in religion are religious feeling and morality. He, naturally, does not always follow the principles which he assimilated in childhood. He may lose his self-control, may sin, not withstand the constant pressure on him and may take "the path to vice". However, despite all this, his principles remain as rigid as they were. He may perish and consider himself finished but this does not mean that he has betrayed the system of values. It simply means that man cannot live in accordance with this system. However, often after he has gone off the rails, there is a return, a revival—the person controls himself and returns to his normal self.

In the 1950s, phenomena were discovered in the consciousness of the masses by D. Riesman and W. Whyte, which look like a revolution in the sphere of social psychology. What do these changes consist in?

D. Riesman says that the 1950s saw the appearance of a new type of individual—an "other-directed" person. He astutely describes almost imperceptible changes in peoples' psychology with amazing keenness of observation, their friendships, loves and amusement. In Riesman's opinion, the main thing is the change in the method, in the mechanism of achieving conformity. The conformity of the behavior of inner-directed people was brought about by the same system of values which was assimilated in childhood. It is because of this that such people can be very non-conformist with respect to their immediate surroundings. By using very imprecise terminology (the subject

is such that it is very difficult to use precise terminology) we can conditionally say that an inner-directed person is an individualist, but an individualist devoted to a great collective-—the American bourgeois society. On the contrary, an other-directed person has less stable links with this huge collective. However, he is rather a collectivist in the simple, everyday meaning of the word. He draws his idea of good and bad rather from his immediate surroundings, from American intellectuals who are his equals and from the media which are commercial and, therefore, attuned to consumer sentiments and tastes. Hence the considerable role played by fashion, not only in clothes and the consumer items, but also in art, literature and science. People, as it were, seek a pointer in others: what is good at the given moment, what is wise, what is refined.

Therefore, such a person, although he strives to keep up with the fashion, with the times and often holds those who are behind the times in contempt and ostracizes them, is, at the same time, very tolerant in those matters which earlier looked to be of prime importance, determining the social image of the individual. Ignorance of some fashionable book or other is more severely treated in such circles than, for instance, being unfaithful to one's wife and divorce, and vulgarity, than switching over from Christianity to Buddhism.

This greater emphasis on the immediate surroundings is connected with the considerably lesser emphasis placed on social success by this kind of person. Careerism and the pursuit of money are no longer regarded that important. There is a sharp drop in the prestige of the businessman.

What does this mean? What led to these changes? Does this mean that there is a new system of values? When they first appeared, the books of Whyte and Riesman were a great source of polemics. A number of researchers headed by S. Lipset and T. Parsons refuted the reality of the subject of Riesman's book. First of all, they gave various examples to back up their claims, Tocqueville and other travellers of the 19th century, to the effect that all that to some extent had already existed in the past. The American had always conformed to his immediate surroundings, had always amazed the foreigner by his tolerance in religious matters. Secondly, they pointed out that all this could be taken not as the rejection of the old values, but as their developme'nt. Say, earlier, success crudely and dogmatically meant money and one's job; it was now a subtler and broader concept—the recognition of the well-developed, original individual, etc.

In our opinion, there may be no contradiction between these different points of view, if one admits that the same thing happens with the values in this sphere as happened to religion, to the myth of "God". God is not denied, no one triumphantly shouts that there is no God. God "dies". And, likewise, certain values "die", becoming less clear, less precise, more vague.

Therefore, the psychology of an other-directed person should obviously not be perceived as the psychology of a person with a changing system of values (for instance, collectivism instead of individualism), with changed guidelines in life. It should be understood as the psychology of a person whose system of values has been eroded, whose guidelines in life are less precise, less clear. Hence the fact that he is an other-directed person.

It is possible that the role of conformity with one's immediate surroundings has always been great in the U.S.A. In any case, it was noted by Tocqueville and it is probably natural, given the amorphousness of the American bourgeois ideological system and the slackness of external ideological discipline. However, the role of this conformism has evidently grown in connection with the erosion of the system of values, with the destruction of the "superego" and as an attempt to compensate for it.

This is not confirmation of the value of the collective. Only a new ideology could do this, but there is no such ideology. There is, rather, pseudo-collectivism, an attempt to take refuge in the collective from ideological and moral vagueness. Recourse to religion is another type of attempt to find a way out.

Very strange things, meanwhile, happen with religion. Sociological surveys taken in the 1950s established that the structure of religious consciousness had been substantially destroyed. We have no data available from surveys taken in previous periods, but there is no doubt that there was nothing like this in the last century, or early this century in the U.S.A. In answer to the point-blank question: "Do you believe in God?", 98 per cent of those asked said "yes". However, if the question was put somewhat differently, more mildly, a different result was obtained. Thus, 22 per cent of Unitarians, 63 per cent of Congregationalists, 67 per cent of Presbyterians, 72 per cent of Episcopalians, 79 per cent of Protestants as a whole and 85 per cent of Catholics agreed with the following statement: "I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it" (76; 128). (We can see that the most respectable denominations whose evolution we tried to trace above, gave the least percentage). In 1961, 74 per cent believed in life after

death *(76;* 127), while only 5 per cent feared hell (707; 86). This is not a clearly assimilated belief, but some kin kinds of scraps of Christian mythology. The picture is, generally, completely natural and not surprising. It is something else which is surprising. The strong erosion of religious dogma and myths occurring in the consciousness of the masses was not accompanied by a sharp drop in church attendance. Quite the contrary, institutionalized religion among the new middle strata of society sharply increased. Curves of religious statistics rose, reaching a record level in the history of the U.S.A. The research carried out by Leib shows that in the 1920s and 1930s atheism was quite widespread among the intelligentsia. There was no mention of atheists in the 1950s; the town with the greatest number of churches (in proportion per head of population) in the U.S.A. was Oak Ridge, a township of physicists, in the state of Tennessee *(107;* 75). William Whyte in describing the life of the intellectual suburb of Park Forest, shows how enthusiastically interdenominational churches were set up in this suburb, built by the future parishioners themselves. At the same time, to the question of what affected their choice of congregation, the following answers were given in order of importance: the pastor, the quality of Sunday school, location of the church, the denomination, the quality of the music (*212;* 408). Whyte particularly emphasizes the link between this church enthusiasm and pseudo-collectivism *(212;* 419).

It can be maintained, as Lipset did, that this was not a new phenomenon—there always have been ebbs and flows of interest in religion. It can also be added that the process of the erosion of myths and dogma has always been underway. However, development, evidently, continues until quantitative changes grow into qualitative ones.

One gets the impression that it was the destruction of religious consciousness and the disintegration of the system of values that led to the intensification of institutionalized religiousness in the 1950s. People tried to grasp hold of religion as something lasting, eternal. The unanimous, universal religious conversion was, as it were, called upon to silence all doubt. By attending church a man strives to forget, along with all the others, that it is no longer clear to him if he believes or not, and if he does, what that belief is.

While the 1950s were the period when the system of values was being eroded under the surface of social life, within the family, within the circle of friends and neighbors in

the intellectual suburbs, in the 1960s and early 1970s society was shaken by these processes coming to light in the form of the political, cultural and religious movement of young intelligentsia. For the first time in U.S. history students, who in the U.S.A. had usually been apolitical and interested above all in sport, and generally young people from good families revolted. Moreover, they did not revolt within the framework of adult organizations, but set themselves up against the world of their elders, and revolted for many different reasons all at once—from the war in Vietnam and the system obtaining in universities, to the ecological disaster, and in various forms—from setting up barricades to streaking. What happened, what were the reasons for this total revolt?

There can be no doubt that financial reasons and reasons of social status linked with the formerly elite, intellectual professions taking on a mass character, as shown in the works of M. I. Novinskaya *(39;* ch. I, II), did play a certain role in this. However, as M. I. Novinskaya convincingly shows this is an insufficient explanation, for the students who led the revolt were from elite families and studied at the most elite universities least of all concerned with financial problems and problems of status. Moreover, the movements' slogans least of all emphasized improved social and financial status.

Therefore, the youth movement of the 1960s should, obviously, be considered as the transformation and destruction of the system of values, the further disintegration of American bourgeois ideology and the direct continuation of the processes established by Riesman and Whyte in the 1950s. The rioters and hippies of the 1960s were the children of the other-directed people of the 1950s, bringing the thoughts of their fathers to a logical conclusion and proclaiming them in public with all the emotion and idealism of youth.

A direct link between the revolts of the 1960s and the privatism of the 1950s can be seen in educational system typical of the 1950s. The man of the 1950s was very much a pedocentrist, as Riesman noted and as can be seen from the works of Dr Benjamin Spock. Children were very much loved. Little was demanded of children, they were rarely punished, principles and knowledge were not thrust upon them. Emphasis was laid on the self-discovery of the child's personality. The child was loved not as one who could continue trie job, not as a future citizen, even less as a future soldier—he was loved simply as a child.

The pedocentrism of the 1950s was, obviously, linked in two ways with the destruction of the superego. First of all,

this emphasis on children, the family, personal life, was possibly the same as religion—the attempt to acquire psychological stability in the eternal, the lasting—love for children. People turned to children for help, as a means of restoring their psychological stability. Secondly, they did not punish them, tolerated their misdemeanors because they themselves did not have a very clear idea of what was right and what was wrong. A Puritan could spank a naughty or lazy child without suffering from any pangs of conscience, for he could answer the question "Why is it wrong to be lazy?" theoretically by saying: "In the beginning, God created Heaven and Earth". The other-directed person who lived according to principles close to situation ethics (regardless of whether he has heard of this or not), a person who knew that if God existed, He was "the depth of all things", and who was afraid the child would suffer from an Oedipus complex, was incapable of answering a child with such confidence, or of giving him a spanking with a clear conscience.

In the question of pedocentrism, as in other questions, Lipset rejects the novelty of Riesman's explanation and refers to Tocqueville who said that Americans brought children up very leniently. However, children's education was perhaps that aspect in the psychology of the 1950s, in which the quantitative changes becoming qualitative ones was most clearly manifested.

The point is that while the American always dealt with children more tolerantly, more leniently than, say, the German, the specific features of the child's upbringing had never led to the consequences which manifested themselves in the 1960s.

In the great deal of literature devoted to the 1960s, much attention is given to the theme of "new values", of "a new culture", "a new consciousness", allegedly elaborated by the youth of this period. This is most graphically described by Charles Reich, speaking of three types of consciousness which followed one another in the U.S.A.: the first type of consciousness—the inner-directed person, the second type of consciousness—the other-directed person, the third type—the consciousness of the youth *(172)*. There is a great deal that is vague and unclear in this, for such terms as "values", "culture", "consciousness", etc., are very indefinite. The majority of all statements on the youth of the 1960s are so phrased that agreement or disagreement with them completely depends on how one understands these vague terms. However, we want to emphasize that if precise principles of behavior which arise from a world outlook are understood by the word "values", there

can be no talk, in our opinion, of the new "values" of youth in the 1960s. The 1960s brought no new world outlook to contend with American bourgeois ideology. What are then the ideological and psychological components which make up those phenomena which are conditionally called "the consciousness of the youth of the 1960s"?

In our opinion, two major components can be seen here.

1. The extremely broad conception of the old values and the rejection of old norms and restrictions, which are interpreted as dogmatic narrow-mindedness, indecision and hypocrisy in realizing these values. Thus, the struggle for the rights of the blacks, for university reform, for sexual freedom and a thousand other freedoms can be understood as the struggle to abolish various restrictions on the value of freedom. Even anti-mercantilism can be understood as the struggle against restrictions on the value of success—the success of the thinker is now more broadly understood, including happiness, the quality of life, etc. All of this is development no less than negation. It can be understood as the same allegiance to the spirit of Americanism, as that of Protestant theologian, faithful to the spirit of Protestantism, who attacks the vestiges of dogma. And there is a great deal of idealism in all of this. It is not only to be found in such obviously idealistic aspects as the struggle for the rights of the blacks or for peace in Vietnam by white students who were not faced with army service. It is also to be found in the demonstrative violations of the accepted moral standards. And this is a direct continuation of the tolerance of the 1950s. It was only the idealism of youth that turned tolerance into demands for freedom.

2. Everything that can be understood as attempts to compensate for anxiety, loneliness, spiritual void which arise when the level of secularization is high and moral standards are much eroded. One and the same effect, one and the same phenomenon can evidently be seen in both these aspects—both in the aspect of the erosion of the old values and in that of compensating for the resulting fear and feeling of spiritual void. Thus, both aspects are to be found in the use of drugs: both the complete erosion of the old values and the attempt to fill the resulting void. We can see the utmost development of the value of freedom, the removal of all restrictions on freedom and the attempt to overcome loneliness, to replace ideological certainty and unity with physical intimacy, in the great role of sex, in the growth of the communes with free love (at present, there are 1,000 rural and 2,000 urban communes of this type) *(174;* 288). The growing role of physical

intimacy and specific collectivism is particularly clearly seen in such an element of the "sub-culture of youth" as dances and music with its hypnotic rhythms and contacts rapidly made not on an intellectual and emotion level, but on an emotional and physiological level. And while the first aspect of the youth movement of the 1960s was the continuation and development of the tolerance of the 1950s, this second aspect was the continuation of the pseudo-collectivism of the 1950s.

The 1960s saw the rise of a number of phenomena in religious consciousness, which have preserved their significance and even grown in importance over the past decade.

As we have already said, there was a kind of explosion of liberal reformism in the main Churches in the 1960s. It was a period which, among other things, declared the theology of the "death of God".

The process of the disintegration of dogma in the consciousness of believers, naturally, continued and the gulf between official Church doctrine and the real content of consciousness was sometimes colossal. Thus, while in the 1950s, according to the data of surveys cited above, 22 per cent of the members of the very "educated" Church of the Unitarian Universalists (84 per cent of its believers are college graduates) believed in God without reservations, in 1966 the figure was a mere 3 per cent (!!) and 90 per cent did not believe in life after death *(Time,* Apr. 14, 1967, pp. 69-74). Similar research carried out among members of the United Church of Christ showed that only 41 per cent of them believed unconditionally in God, 1 per cent did not believe at all, a mere 40 per cent believed that Jesus Christ was God the Father and God the Son, while 1 per cent believed that he had not existed at all, a mere 13 per cent believed in the Second Coming of Christ, while 25 per cent firmly believed that there would be no such Coming *(169,* 208-11).

Thus, the process continued. At that stage, however, it began to lead to other consequences. While in the 1950s, the destruction of religious dogma did not lead to people leaving the liberal Churches but rather, to the contrary, to the growth in the number of their members, the 1960s saw the beginning of a decline in their membership which is still continuing to this day. Who leaves these Churches? A considerable number of those who left these Churches were, undoubtedly, conservatives, who joined parallel Churches of the same religious tradition, but more conservative. Those years saw a rapid growth in the number

of such churches. People left the liberal Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) for the conservative Churches of Christ and the "Christian Churches and the Churches of Christ", the liberal Lutheran Church in America for the conservative Lutheran Churches of the. Missouri Synod and Wisconsin Synod, the liberal north American Baptist Churches for the conservative Southern Baptist Convention now spreading throughout the U.S.A.

However, it was not only the conservative elements which left these Churches. The most liberal elements, with the most eroded system of religious dogma, also left them. The data on this is rather indirect but, in our opinion, convincing enough. While in the 1950s, Whyte described how the U.S. intelligentsia, people whose religious consciousness was very much eroded, flooded into church, in 1968, Quinley established that the most orthodox believers stopped attending church and came to the conclusion that "ethicalism has not provided a theological substitute for those laymen who no longer accept the orthodoxies or traditional protestantism" *(169;* 201) (ethicalism is the name he gives to the moralistic social position of the Church). Robert Wuthnow came to a similar conclusion *(217;* 131-34).

Evidently, at a certain level of the destruction of religious consciousness, the traditional American attitude to religion, which allows Americans to continue to support the church for a long time and to attend church on a regular basis without fully adopting Church dogma, yet believing that the Church is important, necessary, brings people "high moral ideals", embodies the conscience of the nation, etc.,—this attitude becomes impossible. Where did people with the most wrecked system of Christian religious notions go when leaving the Church?

A great many of them remained within the framework of religion. As Alan Watts, a mystic and worshipper of LSD, put it in a perfectly American way, "The standard brands have not been delivering the goods" *(Time,* June 17, 1966, pp. 46-47).

Almost all the new religious phenomena in a society which follows an evolutionary development, as the U.S.A., are very deeply rooted. Some of their germs may be traced back almost to the 18th century. The Transcendentalists were already interested in eastern religions, spiritualism was very widespread among the U.S. intelligentsia in the post-Civil War period, Christian Science was also a trend which was widespread among the middle class. Here, however, as everywhere else, quantitative changes become

qualitative. American Protestantism and standard American religion in general have never come up against such potent and diverse challenges in the consciousness of the U.S. middle class.

Numerous and various weird and exotic religious phenomena began to manifest themselves in circles of young intellectuals, which, on the face of it, did not correspond to the high level of the secularization of their consciousness.

1. The rapid spread of astrology (1,200 out of the 1,750 U.S. newspapers now print horoscopes and there are more than 30 special astrological journals) *(174;* 289). In 1976, 32 million Americans believed in astrology (in the early 1970s—16 million); 10,000 people earned their living entirely from astrology and 175,000 combined this occupation with others (data from *U.S. News and World Report,* May 14, 1976, p. 74). Research carried out by R. Wuthnow in San Francisco showed that about 97 per cent of those asked, aged between 16 and 40, knew the sign of the zodiac they were born under (the figure for elderly people was somewhat lower) *(217;* 47), and, moreover, 48 per cent of college graduates and 41 per cent of post-graduate students believed in horoscopes to one extent or another *(217;* 48).

A similar phenomenon was the popularity of I Zin, the ancient Chinese book of fortune-telling, 51,000 copies of which were published in an expensive edition and sold out in 1969, and a further 50,000 paper-back copies were also sold. A segment of people has appeared who first consult I Zin before beginning any important undertaking.

2. The growing belief in witchcraft and Satan. This manifests itself in a number of forms. First of all, in the growth of orthodox witchcraft and sorcery which have traditionally passed on their secret knowledge and rites since the Middle Ages and antiquity. The growth figures for this are very inaccurate. According to some data, the number of traditional Sabbaths increased from 280 in the late 1960s to 400 in the mid-1970s (there ought to be 6 witches and 6 sorcerers in every Sabbath). However, there were up to a total of 8,000 sorcerers and sorceresses, (orthodox and non-orthodox, self-styled and those who have made sorcery their profession, and dilettantes) *(Newsweek,* Aug. 16, 1971, p. 34). The most important thing, however, is not the numerical growth, but fact that these phenomena come to the surface. Whereas earlier no one suspected that sorcery existed in some god-forsaken spot (even in the Middle Ages sorcery was regarded as the figment of the imagination of superstitious believers not as a real, underground system of superstitions), in the summer of 1970 a witches' meeting

was held in Central Park, New York, demanding freedom of cult.

A phenomenon close to the growth of traditional sorcery is satanism. The Church of Satan (about 10,000 members), founded by A. Sh. La Vay in San Francisco in 1966 is a relatively intellectualized form of satanism. There is also a little-known Process Church of the Last Judgement, founded in the late 1960s by R. De Grimson *(219;* 137), where both Christ and Satan are worshipped at the same time. The most sinister version of satanism was the terrible Mason Family (see *Time,* June 19, 1972, pp. 45-47).

Belief in sorcery and Satan is manifested in both positive and negative forms. Exorcism—the driving out of evil spirits—has now become very popular, and, moreover, in respectable Protestant denominations.

Finally, alongside the nucleus of true believers (in a positive or negative sense) you will always find an amorphous mass of semi-believers. The fact that films such as "Exorcist", "Omen" and "Rosemary's Baby" have become box-office hits shows this to be so.

3. The extremely rapid growth of mystic eastern trends includes:

a) Hinduist yoga popular in the form of applied yoga and in the form of the doctrine of yoga. According to the data of a nation-wide survey taken in 1976, 3 per cent of Americans were keen on yoga, including 5 per cent of college graduates and 6 per cent of those aged 18-24 *(173;* 52).

b) Transcendental Meditation, a doctrine and mystic practice introduced into the U.S.A. by the Indian Guru Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. 4 per cent of Americans practice this, including 7 per cent of college graduates and 7 per cent of those aged between 18-24 *(173;* 52).

c) Zen Buddhism which was popular as far back as the 1950s among the beatniks. There is a Zen Buddhist monastery in California and about 10 centers *(Time,* Apr. 9, 1973, p. 53).

In the U.S.A., these three eastern religions are particularly widespread among young intellectuals. According to a survey carried out by Wuthnow in San Francisco, about 5 per cent of its citizens practice transcendental meditation, 8 per cent are members of yoga circles, 3 per cent practice Zen Buddhism *(217;* 16-17). Out of these 81 per cent, 77 per cent and 84 per cent respectively are college graduates or went to college, while only 59 per cent of the population as a whole came into this category, and the fathers of 33 per cent, 38 per cent and 45 per cent respectively of those who practiced had some form of higher education (this figure is 27 per cent of the population

as a whole) *(217;* 21). Thus, educated young people from good families follow these eastern mystic trends.

These trends are distinguished by their very poorly developed dogma, their tolerance, the absence of any idea of historical development and the emphasis on mystic experiences when a person "switches himself off" from the world around him and experiences an "other-worldly" feeling of union with a Divine Being.

The general taste for "mystic experience", earlier foreign to American culture, is now very widespread. Thus, the mystic trends mentioned above are just one and the most obvious and clearest manifestation of this considerably broader tendency.

Other manifestations of this may be found in a number of eastern religious trends which combine contemplative mysticism with other features—Tibetan Buddhism spread by the lamas who fled from Tibet, the Buddhism of the Japanese sect of Nichiren Shoshu, with 50,000 to 200,000 followers in the U.S.A. *(Time,* Apr. 9, 1973, p. 53), the sect of Meher Baba, the Indonesian Subud sect, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the teachings of Gurdjieff, the Divine Light Mission of Maharaja Ji, who arrived in the United States in 1972. To this should be added mystic experiences with LSD, about which *Time* wrote: "LSD so far is strictly a middle class phenomenon" (June 17, 1966, p. 46), and the spread of glossolalia, typical of the Pentecostal sects, in respectable middle class Churches.

4. The spread of various types of coarsely mythological sectarian ideologies where the leader is fervently worshipped, the end of the world awaited, etc., generally typical of poor, uneducated people and the young intelligentsia, whose consciousness, theoretically, should long have outgrown such ideologies.

A number of the above-mentioned eastern and satanic sects may be added to this, as well as the sect of the Moonists, which spread from Korea (officially called the Holy Ghost Association for Unification of World Christianity) and has up to 30,000 members, the sect of the Children of God, headed by David Berg and the growth of ultra-fundamentalist variants of Protestantism in this sphere.

5. The spread of pseudo-science-fiction occultism, linked with flying saucers, people from outer space, telepathy, telekinesis and spiritualism. The most vivid embodiment of this is Church of Scientology founded by the former science fiction writer Ron L. Habbard, with between 100,000 and 600,000 members and the association for Research and Enlightenment, founded by the successors of the medium

Edgar Cayce.

Wuthnow's research shows that belief in extrasensory perception is very widespread. About 90 per cent of young people and 87 per cent of the older generation believe that these phenomena "probably" exist, while 39 per cent and 36 per cent of them, respectively, are sure that they do exist. 54 per cent of young people and 47 per cent of the older generation have experienced these perceptions themselves (44 per cent of them—telepathy, 42 per cent—premonitions, 2 per cent—clairvoyance, 1 per cent—telekinesis, 3 per cent—messages from the other world) ***(217;*** 63-65). The vast majority of these experiences are, to say the least, doubtful. However, these data speak of the widespread sentiment, peoples' tendency to interpret various facts and sensations in the appropriate spirit.

As we have seen, these are very diverse phenomena. Everything is widespread at once—glossolalia, witches' sabbaths, Zen Buddhism and fundamentalism. However, they all have something in common. All of this is not standard American Protestantism. All of these movements, to one degree or another and in one form or another, contradict the American bourgeois system of values. This is most clearly seen in eastern mysticism which rejects all the basic values on which U.S. bourgeois society is founded. The most striking, although not the most profound form of this is satanism.

All of these phenomena are directed towards empirical, visible proofs of the presence of forces from the other world.

They are all very vivid, mythological and would not seem to correspond to the level of the secularization of consciousness which has been reached, for it is that social stratum which has read of the theologians of the death of God which has given rise to groups awaiting and striving for the "descent of the Holy Spirit", glossolalia.

The only explanation of this is, evidently, the search for a new ideology which gives people a clear direction in life, for consciousness is not capable of coping with ever more pronounced ideological and ethical vagueness, a search being carried out in the most different, but mostly archaic and eccentric directions. It is the same attempt to return to something ancient, eternal, simple as was the religious boom of the 1950s. However, in the 1950s, this was the return to the normal Protestant denominations, while in the 1960s, it turned out that the main Protestant denominations could not be a religious fulcrum, because in them God "had died". Thus, this support is sought elsewhere, in something which is more

ancient and more distant than American Protestantism.

The archaic character of these new religious ideologies is in fact pseudo-archaic. It should not be taken literally or seriously and can only be regarded as a symptom of the illness. It is somewhat similar to that phenomenon whereby a person faced with a difficult situation for which he must bear the responsibility, begins to act like a child, trying, as it were, to return to a situation where he was protected and where adults took all the decisions for him.

The 1970s were marked by a relative calm and general conservative reaction. The period of criticism, revolt, the search for the new was followed by a period of yearning for traditional values which were to be affirmed once more. Students became more involved in their studies and less in demonstrations. The liberal and left-wing radically inclined intelligentsia quietened down. However, the so-called "silent majority", which had earlier watched on passively, now tried to become actively involved in issues and to place legal obstacles in the way of the evolution of morality and consciousness.

This can be explained by external reasons—the end of the war in Vietnam, the worsening economic situation, etc. It also had internal causes—the fact that the profound content of the evolution of the consciousness in the 1960s was outstripped by external manifestations, the unevenness of this process in various groups of the population, and, evidently, by the very logic of the intellectual evolution, when periods of clear and active rejection should be followed by quiet periods, periods of slow covert work. However, the process of the destruction of the system of values continues relentlessly.

Thus, while in 1954 only 37 per cent of those asked agreed that atheist should have freedom of speech and 33 per cent believed that supporters of nationalization should have this freedom, in 1977 the corresponding figures were 67 per cent and 57 per cent; in 1958, 48 per cent of those asked would have voted for a worthy black Presidential candidate, whereas the figure for 1978 was 84 per cent; in 1963, 72 per cent of those asked would have condemned mixed marriage, while the figure for 1978 was 54 per cent; in 1937, less than one-third of the population was prepared to see a woman President, while the 1978 figure was 81 per cent *(America,* July 1980, pp. 4-5). These, of course, are positive phenomena. But the essence of these phenomena is not one world outlook taking the place of another, not replacing one system of values with its

interdictions by another system with some alternative interdictions, but rather the lifting of restrictions as such.

Thus, in 1975, 21 per cent of Americans were in favor of complete freedom of abortion, in 1980—25 per cent; in 1975, 22 per cent were completely opposed to abortion, while in 1980—18 per cent. Moreover, 35 per cent and 9 per cent of college graduates were, correspondingly, unconditionally for and unconditionally against the legalization of abortion. *(Gallup Opinion Index,* June 1980, No. 178). In 1978, less than half of those with higher education censured unfaithfulness in married life (but 81 per cent with high school and elementary education) *(America,* July 1980, p. 5).

It can be noted that, generally, the percentage of those who agree with a statement affirming any values (except those of freedom) falls, while the percentage of those agreeing with demands for any kind of freedom rises. Thus, in 1969, at the height of anti-governmental speeches, 35 per cent of students admitted to the "high value of patriotism", while in 1973, despite the fact that such speeches were no longer being delivered, a mere 19 per cent; in 1969, 23 per cent recognized the value of money, while in 1973—20 per cent. In 1969, 43 per cent of students supported more sexual freedom (the height of counterculture), while in 1973—67 per cent. In 1969, 60 per cent of young people, not students, recognized the value of patriotism, while in 1973—only 40 per cent, of money—96 per cent and 26 per cent, respectively. 22 per cent and 47 per cent supported demands for more sexual freedom *(46;* 188). According to data of another survey, 60 per cent of students supported "civil rights for homosexuals" *(The Washington Post,* Dec. 15, 1978, p. E-14).

This is the picture which results from surveys taken among different groups. Thus, in 1963, 45 per cent of Catholics supported the use of contraceptives, which was forbidden by the Church, while in 1975—83 per cent. In 1963, 12 per cent were in favor of sex before marriage, while in 1975—43 per cent; in 1963, 52 per cent were in favor of divorce ana remarriage, while in 1975—73 per cent *(Newsweek,* Jan. 13, 1975, p. 44).

The processes of secularization and the collapse of the system of values, are, in our opinion, irreversible processes. The present successes of the Protestant right can not turn these processes back. Even supposing it managed to have a series of legislative measures adopted, aimed at restricting the current processes (the introduction of some forms of religious instruction, censorship, legislation in the sphere of family relations, etc.), the

process of disintegration would not come to a standstill, for it will always find a way.

If we try to extrapolate the existing tendencies of U.S. cultural life we get a grotesque, even monstrous picture. Ecumenism goes so far that everything merges with everything, and, at the same time, there are a great many weird and exotic faiths. Satan worshippers sit on ecumenical commissions alongside Buddhists and Christians. There is "the death of God" and mass Hinduism. Means of achieving mystic ecstasy can be bought for a small sum, and all sexual taboos disappear. All these are absurd and grotesque pictures, but it is easy to show that it is precisely these pictures which result if the existing tendencies are extrapolated.

Moreover, it can be shown that all of these tendencies result from the internal logic of the evolution of American religion (we have tried to do this in our book). But are these tendencies realized?

In our opinion, no. In the first place, U.S. society cannot exist if these tendencies go too far. Like any system, the American bourgeois ideological system has limits of elasticity. It may incorporate a great many various elements. However, it cannot incorporate all of them. Just as God "dies", just as the values expire and die away, so does the American bourgeois system, society "dies away". This process cannot be halted, for the process of secularization is at its basis and this process can be halted only by halting science and stopping the growth of knowledge. Secondly, all the fits of hysteria, all the pseudo-archaic religiousness contain elements of search for the new, for new forms and new means of integrating the individual and society. This ought to be something principally new, which corresponds to a very high level of secularization of the consciousness and differs from U.S. bourgeois ideology, not as ideologies which correspond to the same level of secularization differ from one another, as for instance, Christianity differs from Islam, but, say, as American bourgeois ideology differs from the Catholicism of the Middle Ages or as the Catholicism of the Middle Ages differs from the religious beliefs of the Teutonic barbarians. These searches should, ultimately, lead to the struggle to build a new society, which will no longer be a capitalist society.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

We raised a very wide range of complex issues in our work. This was only inevitable, for the more deeply we became involved in our work, the clearer became the connections between phenomena chronologically far apart, on the one hand, and, on the other, phenomena which, although coincided chronologically, seemed, on the face of it, to have no logical connection. On the one hand, it became clear to us that the specific features of Puritan ideology, of the ideology of the Reformation, the ideologies of Luther and Calvin, had to be taken into consideration if we were to understand contemporary U.S. religion. This forced us to examine these chronologically far off ideologies and periods (and having analyzed the ideologies, to point out the specific features of early Christian ideology, linking not only the 20th century with the 16th century, but also, to a certain extent, the 16th century with the 1st century). On the other hand, it became clear to us that such heterogeneous phenomena as the specific features of American religion and the specific features of the American labor movement were, in fact, functionally interrelated. This forced us to touch upon a considerable complex of phenomena, whose connection with the specific features of religion are not visible to the untrained eye.

It seems to us that this attempt to connect phenomena which, on the face of it, are very far apart is long overdue. Nevertheless, we can clearly see the inevitable shortcomings connected with this. Detail was sometimes sacrificed to our desire to comprehensively cover our theme. We did not have sufficient knowledge of some spheres, while in others we had to generalize and simplify some phenomena since an analysis of all their details and fine points would have taken up too much space and time.

Therefore, our conclusions contain a great deal that is hypothetical. We consider this work to be not so much

the end result of research, as the beginning of new research. In our opinion, however, further work on the issues examined here should be carried out along the same lines. Further research, in our opinion, should bring to light problems of the connection between religion and aspects of social life, which we did not deal with here (for instance, the specific features of religion in the U.S.A. and the specific features of art and literature, the specific features of religion and those of the family, etc.). They should reveal those relationships, of which we spoke only cursorily, more clearly and distinctly. They should precisely outline the role of the major religious events of the last century, the consequences of which have permeated the entire life of the United States, those alternative situations, the outcome of which are permanent factors influencing American life. The influence of Puritanism, the influence of the religious situation of the American revolution—all of this demands long and deep consideration in separate research, not a cursory glance. Finally, in our opinion, a consistent comparison, from our point of view, of complex issues affecting the U.S.A. and other countries would be very fruitful.

All this, however, is a matter for the future.

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